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Abstract
Contemporary warfare poses significant and progressively difficult challenges for military
planners. In this context, the increasing prevalence of conflicts classified as Hybrid Wars
greatly contributes to the general growth of such complexities. This work will attempt to
address Hybrid Warfare and the complexities it poses through first examining the most
relevant Western and non-Western theoretical literature on the subject, based on which it
will  proceed  to  analyze  two  Hybrid  Wars  through  a  historical  sociological  paradigm
offered by the theoretical framework of Siniša Malešević. This work will thus examine the
sociological peculiarities that Hybrid Warfare encompassed in the Second Lebanon War
and  Russian  incursions  in  Ukraine,  in  terms  of  two  evolving  historical  processes  of
cumulative bureaucratization of coercion and centrifugal ideologization, as introduced by
Malešević.  Drawing  on  this  analysis,  this  work  will  be  able  to  observe  significant
differences between the two Hybrid Wars, and will argue that these are largely caused by
the  differences in the societal construction and the ideological  landscapes prevalent in
relevant  conflict  zones.  In  a  further  effort  to  analyze  the  reasons  for  the  differences
between these two Hybrid Wars, this work will argue for the need to increasingly refine
the theory of Hybrid Warfare. It will present Hybrid Warfare as a historical continuation
of  warfare  and  will  attempt  to  diversify  the  theory  by  proposing  two new analytical
categories of Hybrid Warfare: General Hybrid Warfare and Specific Hybrid Warfare.
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Warfare has perplexed the minds of scholars since the inception of recorded history. The
impact war has had on humanity can not be underestimated. After all, if one looks into
the recorded history of the ancient world up until the last centuries then violence and
conflict are the central theme and have to a large degree shaped and modeled  the current
world we live in.
In this context, how are we to understand the socio-historical changes in warfare?
U.S. Lieutenant Colonel James Harp argues that although the historical nature of war is
violence, the character and characteristics of war inevitably change over time. He believes
that  the  future  wars  will  include  both change and continuity  from the  past  and will
inevitably reshape the character of war over time.1 He further notes that this adaptive
process has produced a trend in warfare where non-state actors have engaged in a type of
warfare consistently limited in scale and in which asymmetric modes of war are employed
against  larger  state  actors.  In  the  context  of  the  contemporary  world  this  is  clearly
illustrated by Lebanon Wars  and Hezbollah,  as  well  as  the recent  rise  of  the terrorist
organization referred to as Daesh. 
The increasing importance of non-state entities and the prevalence of asymmetric
warfare  is  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  since  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the
conventional military strength of the United States is so great that it renders a traditional
model of warfare or force attrition an undesired form of war for its potential adversaries.
The weakness of the traditional modes of warfare is further exemplified by the debacles of
Afghanistan and Iraq, where a tactical victory was achieved in the face of a victory on the
battlefield, but as the U.S. Colonel John McCuen notes, the lack of understanding about
how to fight against an enemy who seeks to protract the war by conducting it within the
population while simultaneously attempting to erode confidence at home and abroad,
ultimately resulted in a strategic failure.2 Subsequently, alternative modes of warfare are
sought abroad. Evidence of the changing mode of conduct of contemporary warfare is not
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hard  to  come by.  Relatively  recently  warfare  entered  the  new  digital  realm  and  as  a
consequence spawned the theory of cyber warfare. But how are we to make sense of such
changes? While there is a general consensus that the institution of warfare is experiencing
significant changes, the causes and implications of these developments are not self-evident.
A renowned sociologist Siniša Malešević suggests that since our relationship with
war is determined by our social character, one has to understand the social in order to
understand war itself.3 With the rapid development of technologies, and societal change,
warfare has now entered new realms and has extended its reach into our common lives.
The social actors of the medieval times were nearly never engaged or in contact with the
political decisions leading to the waging of war, whereas today's common people have
become actively involved in the political decisions which lead up to armed conflict, insofar
as they remain politically active. War has started to involve the common people more than
ever before and our contact with it has been radically enhanced through the consumption
of mass media which covers and to a large degree shapes our perception of the conflicts
around  the  globe,  as  it  has  become  our  main  source  of  information.  The  recent
developments have given birth to various theories of warfare, but one of the latest trends is
the  concept  of  Hybrid  Warfare.  The  New  Wars  paradigm  has  already  been  an
interdisciplinary subject of study, but Hybrid War has posed problems for scholars and
especially military planners, and even the stances toward whether it is a separate mode of
conflict or not, vary. 
Hybrid Warfare
The conflict which rooted from the aftermath of the political unrest in Ukraine
and the geopolitical uncertainty caused by her possible alignment with the West escalated
with the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and peaked with the ongoing
War in Donbass. Along with the global uncertainty this conflict has inflicted, it has also
provided  ground  for  debate  for  the  advocates  of  the  theory  of  Hybrid  Warfare.  The
discussion on the topic has reemerged into meaningful scholarly debate for the first time
since  the  aftermath  of  the  Second  Lebanon  War  in  2006,  which  had  evoked  Frank
Hoffman  to  adopt  an  analytical  approach  and  properly  define  the  qualities  and
phenomena of Hybrid Warfare and hybrid adversaries. Various analysts have subsequently
adopted Hoffman's concept of Hybrid Warfare when examining the events that unfolded
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in Lebanon in 2006.4 5 6 Its advocates define it as an area where conventional and irregular
warfare  converge  into  a  new form of  warfare.  In  such a  conflict  the  participants  use
different techniques both from the field of irregular and regular warfare, and blend them
into something novel.7 The importance of  understanding this,  a  rather  novel  term, is
crucial in making sense of the conflicts which have unfolded in the recent decade. To a
degree,  the  current  debate  also  concerns  the  novelty  of  the  term.  While  parts  of  the
techniques Hybrid Warfare covers are by definition not novel, the term itself has emerged
relatively recently. And the success granted to those employing Hybrid Warfare proves the
necessity to continue the study of warfare in its new emerging forms, as states have to
adopt new strategies and methods to counter it. 
The term Hybrid Warfare as such was proposed in the start of this century, but has
developed in different directions  due to the vagueness it initially encompassed and the
changing environment we live in. It is clear that the interpretation often employed under
which it is simply the fusion of conventional and irregular forces and activities, is too
superficial  and as  pointed  out  by  Mansoor  and Murray is  applicable  for  most  of  the
conflicts over recorded human history.8 In fact such a definition is more descriptive of
Compound Warfare, as defined by Thomas Huber.9 In addition, it is often unrecognized
as a distinct form of warfare, but rather a type of warfare which is hybrid in nature, i.e it is
not a form of war in itself, but simply the denoting term used to describe a conflict in
which  different  modes  of  warfare  are  used,  whether  in  unified  direction or  not.  The
implication of such an understanding is that there are already sufficient modes of warfare
that cover the areas that Hybrid Warfare seeks to cover and therefore the term is deemed
redundant. However, I believe that while such a perception is applicable for Compound
Warfare, it is not the case with Hybrid Warfare. I would thus argue that the recent rapid
developments in technologies  intertwined with social change from the introduction of
mass communications in the latter part of the 20th century to today's info-technological
evolution, and the  Internetization10 of our lives represent changes in the construction of
our  societies  which  have  given  birth  to  new  areas  of  contestation  in  war,  ultimately
legitimizing the usage of the term Hybrid Warfare as a contemporary category of war.
I will examine the development of such changes by examining conflicts which can
be defined as Hybrid Wars. By doing so, I hope to establish the social, ideological and
technological changes that will be the underlying components for my own interpretation
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of contemporary Hybrid Warfare. This thesis will therefore seek to tackle the vagueness of
the term and attempt to distinctly set it apart as a separate form of contemporary warfare. 
Methodology
I will attempt to do so, first by providing a comparative analysis of two chosen
conflicts that exhibit phenomena associated with the concept of Hybrid Warfare, to see its
development  in  the  context  of  Malešević-defined  historical  sociological  framework  of
cumulative bureaucratization of coercion and centrifugal ideologization. 
Thus,  firstly  an operational definition of  Hybrid Warfare  is  established for  the
purposes  of  the  thesis.  Such  a  definition  is  proposed  after  examining  the  theoretical
literature relevant to the subject in Chapter Two. Secondly to gain an understanding of
the term and its development, a mere militaristic observation of the conflicts falling under
the definition of Hybrid Warfare is insufficient. It is thus necessary to examine the social
and technological context of the time in question. To see such a context, an examination
of the conflicts that exhibit the phenomena associated with Hybrid Warfare is conducted
in such a way as to unveil  the causal relationship between the changes in society and
technology,  and Hybrid Warfare.  For  this  Malešević's  work in „Sociology of  War and
Violence“ serves as a theoretical base.  According to him, two historical processes have
contributed to the developments in warfare: cumulative bureaucratization of coercion and
centrifugal  ideologization.  The  former  stands  for  the  historically  ever-increasing
bureaucratic nature of our societies, their increasing coercive nature and the increasing
bureaucratization  of  killing,  while  the  latter  stands  for  the  increasing  importance  of
ideologies  emphasized  and facilitated  by particular  social  organizations  or  institutions.
Both  of  these  processes  help  facilitate  and  justify  ever  greater  violence.  The  hybrid
conflicts will be analyzed as to unveil these processes at work. This is necessary for the
latter  part  of  the  thesis  where  aspects  arising  from  this  analysis  are  assessed  and  an
elaborated  account  of  Hybrid  Warfare  is  presented  by  presenting  two  new  analytical
categories of Hybrid Warfare. 
Authors such as Mansoor and Murray have pointed out that Hybrid Warfare in its
traditional form is rather the norm than the exception of human history. Therefore the
selection of conflicts to analyze is critical. Due to the nature and the scope of this thesis,
the  amount  of  conflicts  chosen  for  analysis  is  limited.  To  see  if  there  has  been  any
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development  of  the  concept  of  Hybrid  Warfare,  the  conflicts  chosen  are   from
contemporary history. Drawing from this analysis, I will then continue by presenting my
perception of contemporary Hybrid Warfare and establish how it differs from the more
traditional  account  and other  types  of  warfare.  I  will  argue,  following the  insights  of
Russian theorists such as Gareev, Gerasimov, Checkinov and Bogdanov, that the societal
and  technological  changes  have  led  to  a  type  of  warfare  where  information  and
psychological  war  become  central  to  the  theory.  As  a  result  I  will  propose  two  new
analytical categories of Hybrid Warfare. In addition, I will argue that due to its modern
components, Hybrid Warfare is an evolutionary continuation of warfare, representing and
reflecting  the  complicated  societal,  technological  and  ideological  changes  of  the
contemporary world. 
Selection of sources and literature
There have been numerous authors and writers on the subject of Hybrid Warfare.
Therefore a selection has to be made for the purposes of this thesis. Such a selection was
carried out on the basis of the theoretical relevance to the subject. A number of authors
are used to determine the definition of Hybrid Warfare and these authors are chosen for
their theoretical contributions for the development of the concept of Hybrid Warfare and
presented in a chronological fashion in chapter two of the thesis. Such a definition will
thenceforth be referred to as operational Hybrid Warfare and will be coined solely for the
purposes of this thesis and its application for the comparative analysis.
The theoretical  base  for  the  examination is  the  framework  proposed by  Siniša
Malešević, as his theory provides a sociological examination of the historical development
of warfare. A deeper insight into his theoretical framework is established in chapter two of
the thesis. 
Limitations and delimitations
During the course of my work I encountered four limitations to my research. I
have specified these limitations in the following paragraphs and explained what actions I
have taken to minimize the effect of these limitations. Firstly it became clear during my
research that Hybrid Warfare is not a universally defined form of warfare. Some would
even  argue  that  the  term  is  redundant,  as  the  existing  terminology  is  sufficient  in
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providing explanations to the recent developments and conflicts. However, the purpose of
this  thesis  is  not  to  engage  in  a  debate  of  whether  Hybrid  Warfare  exists  or  not.
Concurrently to avoid being engaged in such a debate, I adopted two basic assumptions:
(1)  There  exists  a  phenomenon  that  fits  the  description  of  Hybrid  Warfare;  (2)
Phenomena  referred  to  as  Hybrid  Warfare  has  evolved  due  to  the  societal  and
technological developments. Neither of these assumptions will be questioned throughout
the course of this thesis.
The second limitation I encountered during conducting my research was linguistic
in nature. Namely, it manifested itself in my incomplete Russian language proficiency.
While conducting my research I examined literature published by Russian authors in the
Russian language and due to my limited language proficiency I  often had to rely  on
translations of Russian publications. The translations had to be precise, as the military
terms need utmost clarity when used,  and subtle differences in translation of  military
terms can occur due to translators who are not from a military background. However, this
issue was not severe. In case several translations of the material did not already exist, or if I
was unable to properly understand the literature due my incomplete Russian language
proficiency, I was able to clarify such uncertainties with my Russian-speaking colleagues.
Thus I managed to read various translations of the same texts to minimize the effect of
any potential misunderstandings. 
The third limitation I encountered concerned the military terms used in Russian
literature. Namely they often have disparate meanings than their western counterparts.
The meaning of the terms such as information warfare differ in the Russian and Western –
particularly the US – literature. However, many of such differences are often subtle and
occasionally insignificant, such as 'motorized' as opposed to western's 'mechanized'. To
overcome the possibility of such misconceptions, I adopted concrete definitions for such
terms  which I have specified and concretely defined in Chapter Three.  
Lastly, the fourth limitation is related to the the relatively contemporary nature of
my research subjects, particularly those relating to the conflict in Ukraine. Namely, this
limitation manifested itself in the limited amount of credible military and other sources
when it comes to discussing the conflicts I analyzed, particularly the more recent War in
Ukraine. The contemporary nature of the conflicts I researched provided that they were
often clouded by military secrecy and thus I was often forced to rely on open, and more
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often than not journalistic sources. Both of the conflicts I analyzed evidently proved that
the Hybrid War phenomena exhibits the necessity to control the spread of information for
operational and strategic success. Thus it was often extremely complicated to get standard
quotations and documentary evidence directly from army sources. It is likely that they will
become available after sufficient time has passed, together with more witness narratives of
participants,  but  in  the  current  situation  they  were  not  available.  However  the
developments of the events I examined fully confirmed the quotes that I had obtained
from using open journalistic sources.  Additionally, due to the nature of such sources, I
made every effort to avoid accepting any interpretations present in such sources and used
them as thematic orientation points, merely to point out that some actors were somehow
engaging  in  some sort  of  activity,  the  nature  of  which  can naturally  demand further
examination. The debate over several aspects relevant to the phenomena of Hybrid War
thereby often occur on the pages of respected media outlets and journals, such as the
Armed  Forces  Journal,  the  Military  Review  and  Military  Thought,  and  I  have  thus
attempted to adopt to this accordingly by relying on such reports in attempting to make
sense of the military and non-military activities pertaining to the phenomena associated




In  the  current  chapter,  I  will  first  examine  the  literature  which  will  be  used  as  the
theoretical basis for the comparative analysis. For this, I will be providing an insight into
Siniša  Malešević's  Sociology  of  War  and  Violence where  he  coins  the  two  terms  most
relevant  for  the  analysis:  cumulative  bureaucratization  of  coercion  and  centrifugal
ideologization.  Secondly  I  will  examine the most  relevant  literature and focus  on the
authors who have engaged in the discussion concerning Hybrid Warfare. The goal of this
chapter is hence twofold. Firstly to create a theoretical base for the comparative analysis
and secondly to provide an insight into the academic discussion over the term Hybrid
Warfare and to create a solid theoretical ground for the definition later used for examining
the subjects of the comparative analysis.
Malešević, Sociology of War and Violence
Malešević is first and foremost concerned with the sociological examination of violence
and war and therefore argues that since much of our relationship with violence and war is
determined by our social character, then it is essential for us to understand the social as a
precondition for understanding war and violence and the encompassed changes.11 Using
his historical sociological theory allows this thesis to avoid falling into the trap of technical
determinism, typical for many authors writing on the subject. He asserts that the reason
why violence and war is so fascinating for us is because it is not common to our daily lives.
In  fact  humans  are  proven  to  be  bad  at  prolonged  violence.12 This  is  an  especially
profound realization in the face of the passing of the most violent and bloody century of
recorded human history. He notes that modernity has created an ontological dissonance
when it comes to war and violence. The modern ideas rooted in Enlightenment have more
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than ever before nominally valued human life, yet modernity has also been the time of the
bloodiest  conflicts  and seen  technological  advancements  such  as  the  invention of  the
electric chair, concentration camps, gas chambers and nuclear bombs, all perfecting the
systematic slaughter of human life. As he puts it: „There is an inherent discrepancy between
a  normative  universe  that  cherishes  human  life  and  scorns  war  and  violence  while
simultaneously practicing killing at an exceptional and unprecedented rate.“13
In seeking a reason why this situation has come about he looks into the changes in
society and argues  that  this  ontological  dissonance is  rooted in the complex interplay
between the increasing social organization of violence and the proliferation of modern
secular  ideologies. These are the two vital components which have to be in action in order
for  us  to  be  in  a  position  to  conduct  effective  prolonged  violence.  He  terms  them
cumulative bureaucratization of coercion and centrifugal ideologization
Cumulative bureaucratization of coercion
First  and  foremost  it  is  a  historical  process,  as  it  increases  over  time.  More
specifically, it refers to the bureaucratic nature of society which has an essential role in
supplementing and increasing coercion. Malešević argues that the bureaucratic nature of
the  society  originates  from the  military  sphere  as  it  rests  on  discipline  and  demands
obedience. And since there is no effective use or threat to use violence without developed
social organization, he asserts, with a reference to Weber, that since the central component
of bureaucratic rationality is discipline, and since the military gave birth to discipline, it is
the original source of such vast coercive bureaucratic social organizations. In a sense, he
argues that the character of the laws and the organizational principles that govern our lives
are coercive in nature. In explaining this, he compares a factory worker or a nurse with the
soldiers and the police and finds that in a general sense they are both governed by the
same principles of bureaucratic organization: all of the organizational demands are based
on legal codes that impose penalties or punishment for the refusal to adhere. This proves
the coercive nature of the social organizations and he further argues that this is still an
evolving  historical  process  with  the  ever  growing  organizational  capability  for
destruction.14 He then continues to examine the evolution of the bureaucratization of
coercion.
According to Malešević, the increasingly bureaucratic nature of the military sphere
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owes a great deal to the ideas of Enlightenment. He notes that the revolutionary ideas of
liberty,  equality,  fraternity  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness  –  in  short  the  ideas  of
Enlightenment – were adopted less due to their ethical or logical appeal, but more owing
to the violence conducted by the armies of the French and the Americans to install them.
Hence, these ideas were adopted through violent uprisings and on a more broad scale
through the use of violence. This not only rendered them immediately contradictory but
also led to an even more brutal aftermath, as the revolutionaries took it to their own hands
to spread these ideas worldwide through the use of warfare.15 The resistance to the armies
attempting to impose such ideas – like the many despots of Europe opposing the idea of
individual freedom and equality at the time – led the revolutionaries to believe that would
the  revolution  fail  to  continue,  it  would  wither  and  die  out  altogether.  Thus  the
immediate support from the population was necessary not only in accepting these ideas,
but also as a source of potential soldiers fighting for them. Malešević argues that in this
context the right to bear arms became interpreted as a right of a free citizen, ultimately
encouraging the formation of a citizen army supporting the cause.
The  French  revolutionary  ideas  drew  on  their  ideological  mass  appeal  and
ultimately led to the establishment of a massive army, based on a principle that has now
largely become common: deeming all suitable males fit for the service of the state. The
levée en masse decree of 1793 meant that the French built an army of nearly a million
men.16 Armies  such as  this  were  larger  than ever  before and demanded an increasing
amount of co-ordination and control. The French achieved this by adopting a meritocratic
hierarchical  structure  for  the  army  in  combination  with  a  potent  social  organization
created  by  the  state.17 Following  this,  a  model  of  a  combination  between  centralized
supreme  command  and  adaptable  decentralized  regiment  structure  has  become
commonplace.
Another example of where bureaucratization of coercion was cumulative was the
state  of  Prussia.  Their  remarkable  ability  to  mobilize  a  very  high  number  of  soldiers
despite being a small state relied firmly on their organizational might. Compulsory short-
term military service was installed already in 1814 and by 1866 every citizen was liable for
service of three years, followed by four years in reserve and five years in the Landeswehr.18
Prussian war-like nature is perhaps best illustrated by the way they embraced technological
advancements such as the proliferation of railways.  Namely, the railways network they
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created  was  built  around  existing  and  potential  front  lines  in  anticipation  of  future
conflicts. The Prussian military was also characterized by strict discipline and a precisely
defined  hierarchy.  The  Prussian  model  of  short-term  well  trained  conscript  armies,
supported by reservists and governed by an expert general staff soon became the norm for
all continental militaries.19
An additional aspect worthy of mentioning is the rapidly growing role of the state.
The  state  became  principally  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  armies.  Everything
including arming, training, feeding, clothing, supplying and housing the troops quickly
became under the responsibility of the state.  This necessitated the expansion of the state
administration as the increase in the size of the army and its upkeep demanded increased
funds  and  the  need  for  more  extensive  fiscal  systems  which  could  enforce  efficient
taxation. Malešević is of the opinion that the modern bureaucratic nation-state emerged
to a degree as a result of the costly and intensive war-making processes. In explaining this,
he relies on Weber who observed that the administrative power of the modern nation-state
originated  from the  rationalization and bureaucratization of  the military  sphere.  Such
disciplinary ethics of the military ended up as a rationalization giving birth to a new social
order.20
The  disciplinary  ethos  caused  numerous  changes  in  the  military  sphere.  The
demand for anonymity for uniformed soldiers distanced from the civilians meant that
extravagant  and  ritualistic  features  of  warfare  such  as  personal  displays  of  bravery  or
heroism, individual warrior ethos and battles fought in duels became things of the past.
They were replaced by the anonymous bureaucratic nature of killing where quality was
surpassed by quantity, a world where the machine gun broke down the traditional military
codes of fairness, empathy for fellow soldiers and stripped heroism on the battlefield from
its traditional significance.21 For Malešević, the machine gun is a perfect metaphor for the
bureaucratization  of  coercion  in  the  modern  age:  A  mass  produced,  highly  efficient
industrial weapon which reaps alienation together with dehumanization via emphasizing
quantity over quality, sowing mass slaughter in the process. 
The cumulative bureaucratization of  coercion is  then a historical  process  partly
responsible for the ontological dissonance that modernity encompasses for Malešević. The
strict hierarchical bureaucratic systems adopted in the military sphere together with their
incorporation  in  the  modern  nation-states  and the  technological  innovations  have  all
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facilitated recent centuries of modernity as the bloodiest time ever recorded in the history
of  warfare.  However,  cumulative  bureaucratization  of  coercion  is  not  the  only  factor
Malešević  sees  responsible  for  the  ontological  dissonance.  It  represents  only  the
institutional  bureaucratization  of  coercion,  but  a  separate  inquiry  is  required  for  the
subjective perceptions, ideas, values and practices in the context of war and violence, 22 for
social organization alone would not be able to succeed without a just purpose. This is why
he  introduces  another  term  of  centrifugal  ideologization,  interconnected  with  the
bureaucratic social order.
Centrifugal ideologization
Before proceeding to explain this term, ideology has to be defined first. For this,
Malešević  lies  on  Michael  Freeden's  perception  according  to  which  social  facts  and
political events require interpretation, as they are not unambiguous.23 Ideology is then the
perceived  network  into  which  events  and  social  facts  are  contextualized  into.  In
Malešević's words, it is a „complex social process through which actors articulate their actions
and beliefs.“24 He believes that centrifugal ideologization is a mass phenomenon spreading
via social organizations or movements to gradually encompass an increasingly numerous
population.25 It  is  also  necessary  to  understand  the  process  of  the  ideologization  of
violence, as the act of killing another human being is in great contradiction with most of
the  social  orders  and  therefore  requires  believable  mechanisms  of  justification.  As
Malešević puts it:  „To reconcile the modern view that all human beings are of equal moral
worth, and that human life is precious, with the everyday practice of mass extermination, a
person has to deny humanity to his or her enemy.“ 26
The changes Enlightenment ideas of equality and liberty created were immense,
especially with regard to justifying violence and warfare. In earlier history, warfare was
mostly conducted in the context of a hierarchical structure of the society where peasants
considered themselves a lower species than the nobility or the town-folk, and where a
special warrior/soldier class was present in this structure. Correspondingly, most of the
earlier wars were fought between warrior nobles with certain ritualistic routines facilitating
mutual respect, and more often than not it was not an affair of a peasant.  All of this
changed with the introduction of the notion of equality and the establishment of mass
conscription based armies.   Malešević argues that the nominal equality created by the
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ideas of Enlightenment prove to be disadvantageous on modern battlefields. Modernity
demands very elaborate explanations as to justify violence, unlike the ancient era where
mythology and religion were used as proto-ideologies of justification.27 In the modern era,
for mass killings to take place at all, it is necessary to overcome the values which cherish
and value human life. 
Malešević  sees  the  modern  justification  of  violence  in  secular  and  secularizing
ideologies. For him, the age of ideology was truly born once the urban poor started to
perceive themselves as of equal moral worth to their superiors (bishops, aristocrats and the
bourgeoisie). Enlightenment's central goal was the establishment of a better, more just and
more rational  society.  Any opposition to this  quickly became interpreted as irrational,
consciously unjust and in the end, evil. Since there could be no compromise with evil, it
had  to  be  crushed.  Thus,  the  revolutionaries  were  often  inspired  by  the  belief  of  a
universal singular truth which once found, would provide a way to achieve happiness for
all. This can clearly be observed in the post-revolutionary France, where the belief that one
was fighting for the survival of the just, rational and a morally superior state against the
forces of evil triggered numerous people to take up arms. Malešević notes the importance
of ideology here, as the revolutionary soldiers were singing political anthems glorifying the
revolution,  wore explicitly  republican uniforms,  chanted anti-royalist  rallying calls  and
hyped their revolutionary leaders.28 The state also recognized the importance of ideology
and distributed literature which endorsed the most radical political views among soldiers.
The  War  Ministry  even  went  as  far  as  to  buy  as  much  as  1,800,000  copies  of  the
newspapers of Marat and Hebert to educate the troops in this respect.29
With further developments in science and political and social theory, the second
half of 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century saw an increased impact of
ideology on warfare.  This combined with the growing popularity of Social Darwinism
provided a much needed fertilizer for the ground on which mutually exclusive ideologies
developed.  It also fueled colonialism and influenced first  the perception and then the
treatment of the indigenous populations, always perceived through the prism of Social
Darwinism. This ultimately culminated in the German massacre of Hereros and Namaqua
in 1904-07 which qualified as the first ideologically driven genocide of the modern era.30
In analyzing the First World War, Malešević notes that the changes it brought with
itself were numerous and extensive. It was the first total war insofar as it forced entire
13
societies to work for the war effort. While there is no common ultimate purpose in times
of peace due to the fact that social agents and individuals pursue their own goals, it is
wartime that unites them under a common purpose: to contribute to the war effort. In
times of war, contributing to the war effort shortly becomes the central goal for the whole
society,  and  its  members  individual  wills  are  rendered  minuscule  if  not  non-existent
altogether. The First World War saw the rise of depicting the adversaries via increasingly
negative stereotypes facilitated by the means of propaganda. The most common of such
First  World  War  images  were  the  British  and  French presenting  Germans  as  ruthless
militant  savages  who  were  keen  to  destroy  civilizational  advancements.  This  was
contrasted  with  the  German  images  of  the  barbaric  Slavs,  the  frivolous  French  and
materialistic  Brits.31 All  of  them were  incorporated  into  the  driving  ideologies  under
which the Germans for instance were fighting for their unique culture.   According to
Malešević, the war intensified both centrifugal ideologization and nationalism, the latter
of which was now becoming the dominant discursive framework for the majority of the
population.32 The First World War ended inconclusively, created more problems than it
solved and ultimately resulted in another total war.
The Second World War was perhaps the most prominent example of the battle
between  uncompromising  ideologically  constructed  societies  and  ultimately  between
ideologies  themselves.  National  socialism  in  combination  with  fascism  and  scientific
racism was to see off liberal polyarchy and state socialism. The Second World War took
the totality of the war to a whole new level. Whole cities were bombed down as it became
increasingly clear that there was no significant distinction made between the combatants
and the civil population, as all that seemed to matter was that the ones getting bombed
were on the enemy side. But the Second World War will forever remain in the history
books not only for its unprecedented lives lost on the battlefields, but for the ideologically
motivated  and  bureaucratically  engineered  and  executed  Shoah.  What  made  the
Holocaust  stand  out  was  the  ideological  and  organizational  modernity  used  for  its
execution. The ideological aspect was that of a Reich based on an ethnically, physically
and sexually pure society while the execution of the Shoah was simultaneously based on
aspects  of  modern  social  organization  -  advanced  division  of  labour,  hierarchical
delegation of tasks and instrumental rationality. One can consider the Holocaust a clear
manifestation of bureaucratization of coercion and centrifugal ideologization, insofar as it
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came about due to ideological reasons and was efficient due to its bureaucratic hierarchical
nature where the social actor's individual responsibility was diffused by the hierarchical
bureaucratic structure, assigning responsibility for the individual's action to the Nazi party
where the order ultimately came from.
In times  of  war  it  is  an ideological  necessity  to portray  not  only the potential
victims of such atrocities but also the enemy in general, as monsters and animals who have
no regard for human moral principles and whose actions prove their intrinsic inhumanity.
This acutely stands out in Second World War propaganda campaigns. Malešević notes
that the Germans had to depict Jews both as subhuman and super-human for this:
„To make a small, politically insignificant and largely invisible segment of German society look
dangerous, threatening and highly discernible it was essential to conceptualize Jews both as
animals  (parasites,  vermin,  etc.)  and  as  exceptionally  skillful  plotters  who  were  able  to
mastermind the takeover of the entire world (Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy). The fact that most
Jews were so assimilated and integrated in the German society was taken as a further proof of
their (superhuman and subhuman) devious, canny and un-human nature.“33
Likewise,  the  image  the  Americans  held  about  the  Japanese  was  similarly  sub-
human. The Japanese were perceived as vicious apes. For the Americans, Germans were
still perceived as humans, while the Japanese were cruel animals, „like the beasts you never
see  until  they  are  dead.”34 The  image  of  their  sub-human  character  is  perhaps  best
characterized by the fact that their bones and skulls were often sent home as souvenirs by
the Americans in the early stages of their involvement.  The treatment of the Japanese
corpses as if they would be animals became so blatant that already as early as 1942, the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet gave out an order which stated: „No part of the
enemy's  body  may  be  used  as  a  souvenir.  Unit  Commanders  will  take  stern  disciplinary
action...“35 Similar views were in fact prevalent in most of the camps, but while many of
them might have led to smaller scale war crimes and mistreatment of the POWs, none of
these ideologically motivated propagandist views led to a systematic genocide similar to
the Holocaust. 
For Malešević, the clear legacy of the two world wars was a further increase in the
organizational and ideological powers of the modern state.36 He notes that when it comes
to successful mass murder, the modern nation-state has no historical equivalent, and the
vast  killing fields of  modern battlefields,  the efficiency of  mass extermination through
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genocidal policies and the unprecedented killing ratios of warfare in the last century all
prove this.
Hybrid Warfare in theory
The following sub-chapter deals with the influential Western authors who have engaged in
the discussion of Hybrid Warfare. I will seek to establish each of the following author's
theoretical  understanding   of  the  concept  of  Hybrid  Warfare  with  the  intention  of
providing an applicable definition to be used later on for the purposes of this thesis. A
similar overview is then presented of the Russian authors theorizing on the subject of
New-Generation Warfare, which is to a degree interchangeable with the western notion of
Hybrid Warfare and offers a crucial insight into components that might be lacking from
the western concept. 
Western discourse
The term emerged in Western military literature in the context  of  “New wars”
theories.  However, the peculiarity of Hybrid Warfare in Western literature is  that it  is
more often than not presented in opposition to the Western militaries and societies. As
such,  the  examination  of  Hybrid  Warfare  often  occurs  outside  of  the  context  of  the
Western civilization. That is to say, the examination is such as to render the West hesitant
in employing Hybrid Warfare by their military planners. Ergo the United States Army
command does not recognize Hybrid Warfare as a distinct form of warfare at all. Rather,
the paradigm is presented through defining a hybrid threat as the diverse and dynamic
combination of regular forces, irregular forces,  criminal elements,  or a combination of
these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually beneficial effects.37 While the
U.S.  Military  tends  to  speak  about  the  topic  in  terms  of  a  hybrid  threat,  academic
literature speaks of Hybrid Warfare. What follows now is a brief overview of the Western
academic literature on the subject.
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Nemeth
William  J.  Nemeth's  Master's  thesis,  published  in  2002,  represents  the  first
scholarly study of the subject. In his thesis „Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid
Warfare“ he first looks into the development of a „hybrid society“ as the base for the
conduct of Hybrid Warfare. Nemeth's hybrid society is called such as it has elements of
both  modern society  and  pre-state society.  He argues  that  the  military  structures  and
strategies employed are effectively a reflection of the construction and peculiarities of the
society under the framework of which the military operates. Therefore a profound insight
into  the  society  itself  is  necessary  to  understand  the  military,  its  peculiarities  and  its
operations. In his thesis, he provides an insight into what he understands as pre-state and
modern societies and then proceeds to analyze the War in Chechnya, which he considers
an example of Hybrid Warfare, conducted by a hybrid society. He defined hybrid societies
as  those  operating  within  a  gray  zone  between  modern  and  pre-state  societies  while
additionally  employing  modern  bureaucratic  systems  in  structuring  themselves.38 In
addition, when observed through the perceptive of Western values, hybrid societies may
appear unjust and anarchic, as „war and a high level of inter-personal violence are accepted as
normal in most hybrid societies.”39  The peculiarities of such a society thus transfer to the
military sphere which reflects the prevalent societal norms. 
Nemeth supposes that the strengths of the hybrid forces do not match with the
conceptions  of  Western  military  strength,  as  the  components  which constitute  hybrid
strengths are: (1) ideas; (2) Individuals, the charismatic leader; (3) The fact that society
and military can absorb tremendous punishment;  (4)  Strong belief  in their  cause;  (5)
Decentralized tactics.40 As a result he argues on the basis of the case of Chechnya that their
ability to employ both conventional methods and quickly transition to the use of guerrilla
tactics relied on the societal and cultural layout of Chechnya. Their deep knowledge of
adversary's weaknesses helped their case even further, although the tactics the Chechens
employed often walked on a thin line between guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Nemeth's
Hybrid Warfare then, is essentially a form of contemporary guerrilla warfare – asymmetric
in nature – which has become more effective than pre-state warfare because it employs
both modern technology and effective methods of mobilization. 
Nemeth also predicted that Hybrid Warfare is increasingly likely to become the
dominant form of warfare faced by the West, a prediction made just a year before the start
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of the Iraqi war. He also notes that the Western conceptions which expect hybrid societies
to eventually accept the prevailing Western norms will  provoke further  asymmetry,  as
hybrid norms are not rooted in modern society, but in pre-state era.41 He also notes that
hybrid states are better in using technology in ways that greatly enhance their operational
effectiveness,  as  they  allow  advances  to  drive  new  organizations  and  operational
techniques,  as  opposed  to  the  modern  forces,  which  employ  technology  in  a  more
evolutionary  fashion,  attempting  to  achieve  greater  efficiency,  better  command  and
control, and more detailed planning.42
Nemeth's perception of Hybrid Warfare, where it  is  a result of the societal and
cultural construction of the society employing it, is of relevance to the current thesis not
only by being the first scholarly study of Hybrid Warfare, but including a sociological
element in his theory, extending it beyond the military sphere as opposed to most of the
theories of Hybrid Warfare I've encountered while researching the subject.
Huber
Thomas Huber is important in respect to the theories from which Hybrid Warfare
ultimately grew out. Huber was the first to coin the term Compound warfare. For Huber,
Compound Warfare is  created by the simultaneous use of regular or main forces,  and
irregular,  or  guerrilla  forces.43 In  essence,  it  is  then  simply  a  simultaneous  use  of
conventional  and  unconventional  forces.  Huber’s  edited  central  book  on  the  topic
„Compound Warfare: That fatal knot.“ published in 2002, examines military history to
find instances where the blending of regular and irregular tactics  was used to gain an
advantage over the opponent. The most prominent conflicts he deems fit to make a case
for Compound Warfare are, among others – the American Revolution and Napoleon’s
Spanish War. 
Compound warfare occurs when a stronger force has occupied most or all of the
weaker counterpart's territories who then resorts to a combination of forces: regular and
irregular. This creates a dilemma for the stronger force, as a difficult issue is now posed:
not only does the stronger force now have to deal with the regular forces, but the sparsely
dispersed irregular threat looms all over a large territory and creates complications that can
become decisive.44  The choice whether to fight the insurgency or the main force becomes
critical.  And although Huber's definition of Compound Warfare involves coordination
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between the regular and irregular forces, he remains vague about the level of coordination
as the historical examples he uses to support his case include conflicts with various degrees
of  coordination  –   from  little  coordination  to  command  authority.  In  addition,  the
definition  of  Compound  Warfare  differs  from  that  of  Hybrid  Warfare,  as  the  latter
involves elements of criminality and terrorism in addition to the fusion of conventional
and unconventional forces. As such, Compound Warfare can be viewed as the precursor of
Hybrid Warfare. 
Hoffman
Frank G. Hoffman is a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the U.S. Marine Corps
Reserve  and currently  serves  at  the  National  Defense  University  as  a  Senior  Research
Fellow with the Institute for National Strategic Studies. He has also become one of the
main advocates of Hybrid Warfare and his work on the subject represents a landmark in
the study of the topic. His work has become a typical reference point for authors writing
about the subject post-2006. Prior to his works the term was referred to simply as the
fusion of different modes of war and did not stand for a distinct mode of war,  often
interchangeable with Huber's Compound Warfare.  
Hoffman's theoretical perception of Hybrid Warfare is perhaps best established in
his renowned paper „Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars“, published in
2007. In it, he first highlights the importance of understanding Hybrid Warfare, as he
believes this is what future conflict will most likely look like.  He builds his concept on
the  theory  of  Huber's  Compound  Warfare.  In  this  sense,  Hybrid  Warfare  is  an
evolutionary continuation of Compound Warfare, insofar as it involves similar elements,
yet  has  become  more  sophisticated  due  to  the  addition  of  new  elements.  While
Compound Warfare was a construct designed  to highlight the potency and strength of
unconventional forces and to demonstrate that the combination of regular and irregular
forces  shows  the  capacity  for  potentially  productive  and effective  interdependence,  in
several aspects it stands in contrast with Hoffman's Hybrid Warfare.
The essence of Hoffman's Hybrid Warfare is „the blurring of modes of war, the
blurring  of  who fights,  and what  technologies  are  brought  to  bear“45 and he  sets  his
concept apart  from other similar  „New Wars“ concepts  by noting that  while  in most
conflicts the irregular and regular components occurred in separate theaters of war, or in
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distinctly different formations, in Hybrid Wars these forces become blurred into the same
force in the same battle space. Unlike in Compound Wars, where the irregular forces and
tactics  are  used  as  a  supplement  for  the  regular  force,  in  Hybrid  Wars  they  are
operationally  integrated  and tactically  fused  so  that  the  irregular  component  of  force
actually seeks to become operationally decisive, rather than simply protract the conflict or
be a nuisance inflicting heavy defensive costs or seeking to provoke overreactions.46 In
addition,  Hoffman's  concept  of  Hybrid  Warfare  stands  apart  from  the  concept  of
Compound Warfare  through the  inclusion of  criminal  activity  and terrorism.  On the
operational, tactical and strategic level, this type of warfare can be conducted either by a
state or by a non-state. This leads to several complications. 
Firstly it represents the loss of the state's monopoly of violence, as non-state entities
become  prominent  actors  in  Hybrid  Wars.  Secondly,  a  substantial  problem  and
simultaneously an advantage for the employers of hybrid tactics is that such entities do
not  fall  under  the  conventional  rules  of  war  regulated  by  international  rules  and
regulations as defined by a number of conventions, such as Law of Land Warfare, Geneva
Convention, and Rules of Engagement. As Hoffman notes, the likeliest opponents of the
future will accept no rules and will seek to wreak havoc not only on the battlefields but
also through seeking their own degree of „crude and awe“ with barbaric actions as opposed
to precision weaponry,  all  of  which is  amplified by modern communications,  such as
video.47 
His definition of Hybrid Warfare is then a synergistic fusion of conventional and
irregular forces in combination with criminal behavior and terrorism.  He believes that
despite  the  fact  that  Hybrid  Wars  are  on  the  rise,  it  does  not  represent  the  end  of
conventional warfare, but rather presents a complicating factor for defense planning in the
21st century.48
McCuen
John McCuen, a retired US Colonel and a counterinsurgency expert published a
noteworthy article in the Military Review in 2008 in which he examined the concept of
Hybrid Warfare through a different theoretical perspective than Hoffman had done. Being
a counterinsurgency expert, he believes that the most decisive battles will not be fought on
the fronts, but rather on asymmetric battlefields within the „population battlegrounds“ of
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the  conflict  zone,  and  the  home  and  international  populations.49  His  perception  of
modern warfare  in general  emphasizes  that  military  victory  alone is  not  sufficient for
overall political victory and the west has for too long neglected this, exemplified by the
characteristic failures in face of protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
He first defines Hybrid Wars as a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war
in which the intervening forces  conduct traditional  military  operations  against  enemy
military forces, while simultaneously attempting to achieve control over the indigenous
population of the conflict zone via stability operations to secure and stabilize the area.50 
His conception of  Hybrid War therefore centralizes  the importance of what he
terms population battlegrounds. He classifies three such battlegrounds: the combat zone's
indigenous population, home domestic population, and the international population and
notes that the possibility of achieving the strategic objectives depends on our ability to
succeed in all of these three battlegrounds.51 Without success in all of these battlegrounds,
he considers the possibility of ultimate victory dubious, as the adversaries seek to protract
the war by conducting it within the population while simultaneously attempting to erode
confidence at home and abroad as a precursor to military victory.52  One of the most
important operational and strategic problems Hybrid War poses, is how to prevent the
enemy from filling up the governmental vacuum left behind after the advancement and
success of the military.53 
McCuen's approach and definition of Hybrid Warfare places little importance on
the aspect of non-state entities participating in it. Rather the theory is presented through a
traditional state-vs-state paradigm. However, his account of Hybrid Warfare is essential in
understanding that it is not classified as such not only by how a conflict is fought, but also
where  it  is  fought.  The  introduction  of  population  battlegrounds  also  permits  a
sociological perspective in understanding the relevant populations and therefore reaching a
more conceptualized understanding of these battlegrounds as the core elements of Hybrid
Warfare. The importance of population battlegrounds as essential dimensions of Hybrid
Warfare  is  further  exemplified  and developed by the  latter  part  of  this  thesis  when a
contemporary definition is developed.
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Murray and Mansoor
In „Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the
Present“ published in 2012, the editors attempt to present a historical context for the
concept of Hybrid Warfare. This is done in an attempt to neglect the notion that Hybrid
Warfare is a novel concept. Murray claims that we are too often prone to marching into
the future thinking that everything we encounter is new and „thus fill body bags with dead
soldiers rather than reaching back into the past for the lessons others have learned at such great
cost.“54  The book provides analysis of nine conflicts from particular ages of human history
to illustrate the main argument,  which neglects  the novelty of  the concept of Hybrid
Warfare.  As there is no universally accepted definition of Hybrid Warfare, the authors
took the liberty of establishing their own framework. They defined Hybrid Warfare as a
conflict  in  which  both  conventional  and  irregular  forces  (guerrillas,  insurgents  and
terrorists) are used by either states or non-states to achieve a common political purpose.
In essence, Hybrid Warfare is given a rather broad definition of being a combination of
regular  and  irregular  forces,  employed  to  negate  the  advantage  of  the  opponent's
potentially  superior  conventional  strength.  This  definition  does  not  entail  that  both
irregular and regular forces need be present at the same time and place, nor does it make
mention of  central  direction,  criminal  activity or  terrorism proposed to be central  by
Hoffman. Rather, what is examined in the cases presented by authors other than Murray
and Mansoor is characteristics corresponding to the concept of Compound Warfare. It is
the  very  broad  definition  incorporated  by  the  editors  which  allows  them  to  present
different conflicts over a historic narrative of nearly 2000 years, as conforming to their
framework of Hybrid Warfare.  As a result, the concept is presented as rather unuseful and
allows Murray to conclude that  „the historical record suggests that Hybrid Warfare in one
form or another may well be the norm for human conflict rather than the exception.“55
Non-Western discourse
While  the  Western  literature  speaks  of  Hybrid  Warfare,  the  literature  I  am about  to
present in the following chapters conforms to the Western notion, however differs to a
degree from it. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the military superiority of the US over
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the rest of the world became an undebated reality. With such a recognition alternative
means of conducting warfare became desirable for its potential adversaries, as opposing
the  superior  conventional  force  of  the  US with  a  similar  conventional  force  was  not
deemed  cost-effective.  As  a  result,  the  account  of  the  phenomena  pertaining  to  the
Western concept Hybrid Warfare in literature such as the Russian literature,  presented
below, approaches the concept from a completely different perspective than the West. It is
recognized as a viable option for a state to conduct, and in the case of Russia, is often
explained as a defensive measure. The main difference then is the employer of this type of
warfare.  While  in  the  western  literature,  it  is  given  major  significance  through  its
employment by a non-state, in Russian literature it is the state.  
New-Generation Warfare of Russia
Alongside the Western thinkers and theorists, the Russians have not sat idly by and have
studied the nature of the changes in modern warfare and the new emerging forms of
combat. The general consensus is that the Russian view of modern warfare is dominated
by information and psychological warfare, where the war is won not on the field, but in
the minds of the people. In the following section, a very broad overview is presented with
regard  to  the  theories  of  New-Generation  Warfare  of  Russia  which  are  theoretically
relevant  insofar  as  there  is  a  degree  of  interchangeability  with  the  Western  notion of
Hybrid Warfare. Such an overview is established by examining three theoretically relevant
authors who have engaged in the debate in Russia during the last decades. 
Gareev
While not proposing a general framework of “New Wars” or Hybrid Warfare, in
his book If War Comes Tomorrow, published in 1995, a Russian General Makhmut Gareev
argued for the changing nature of warfare, caused by the technological progress spawning
not only an increased destructive effect of conventional weapons, but also completely new
types of weaponry. Gareev explicitly pointed out the proliferation and sophistication of
the  means  of  information  warfare.  He  argued  that  the  „systematic  broadcasting  of
psychologically  and ideologically  biased materials  of  a  provocative  nature,  mixing partially
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truthful  and false  items of information … can all  result  in a mass  psychosis,  despair  and
feelings of doom and undermine trust in the government and armed forces; and, in general,
lead  to  the  destabilization  of  the  situation  in  those  countries,  which  become  objects  of
information warfare, creating a fruitful soil for actions of the enemy.”56 
Gareev,  while  predicting  the  increasing  importance  of  information  warfare  in
future conflict also noted that correctly foreseeing the nature of future armed conflict in
its entirety has never been fully achieved.57 However, as early as in 1995, information
warfare  was  already  considered  a  crucial  element  of  future  wars.  In  addition,  Gareev
suggested that  such information warfare methods can transform warfare from a direct
armed attack into a hidden, latent and undeclared war. Gareev's more recent publications
have endorsed the view generally held by the rest of the military theorists of Russia: that
the distinction between war and peace itself is blurring and even the conduct of military
operations does not always signify the beginning of a war.58 59 Additionally he believes that
cyber  warfare  poses  significant  difficulties  in  determining  where  such  covert  cyber
operations and attacks originate from, thus making it unclear against whom a war should
be declared.
Gareev thus calls for the science and defense industry not to work only on the
newest means of armed warfare, but also concentrate their efforts on the application of
developing modern technologies for waging successful information, cyber, psychological
and other non-military kinds of warfare.60 
Gerasimov
Valery Gerasimov is a recently appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Russian
Federation who in 2013 published a noteworthy article with regard to warfare in the 21 st
century. Gerasimov spoke of a new generation of warfare. In his article, titled „The Value
of Science in Prediction“61 62 Gerasimov started by noting that the way in which warfare is
conducted is changing, and that  „a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and
even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign
intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war.“63 This
claim was made in the context of the Arab Spring revolutions and Gerasimov went a step
further by noting that the rules of war themselves have changed. He continues the line of
thought emphasized by Gareev, that the role of non-military means of achieving political
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and strategic goals has increased and in many cases already exceeded the power of force of
weapons  in  effectiveness.  Purely  from  a  military  perspective,  he  notes  that  „frontal
engagements of large forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing
of the past. Long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means
of achieving combat and operational  goals.“ In addition, he believes that  the differences
between offensive and defensive operations are being erased64. 
Gerasimov also places great emphasis on the utility of asymmetrical actions such as
„the use of special operations forces and internal opposition to create a permanently operating
front  through  the  entire  territory  of  the  enemy  state,  as  well  as  informational  actions.“65
Subsequently  he  suggests  meaningful  ways  in  which  to  employ  this  knowledge.  He
proposes  that  these  non-military  means  have  to  be  applied  in  coordination  with  the
protest potential of the target population and then supplemented by military means of a
concealed character. This means that the open use of military forces – either in disguise of
peacekeeping or crisis regulation – is resorted to primarily only to achieve final success in
the conflict.66 Of particular interest is the amount of attention paid on the informational
aspect.  For  Gerasimov,  the  informational  paradigm of  war  opens  up  a  wide  array  of
possibilities  to  reduce  the  fighting  potential  of  the  enemy.  In  noting  the  changing
character of war, he quotes a former Soviet military theoretician Georgii Isserson, who
predicted that „war in general is not declared. ... mobilization and concentration is not part
of the period after the onset of the state of war as was the case in 1914 but rather, unnoticed,
proceeds long before that.“67
Gerasimov's account of New Wars is a rather short affair, yet highly influential not
only in understanding the conflict which unfolded in Ukraine a year after his article was
published, but also in developing the Russian understanding of the fusion of phenomena
which in the West has increasingly been known and referred to as Hybrid Warfare. His
theory of New Wars has become further elaborated since then.
Chekinov and Bogdanov
In an article „The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War“68 published in
the  Military Thought in 2013, the authors Reserve Colonel Sergei Chekinov and retired
General-Lieutenant  Sergei  Bogdanov  develop  Gerasimov's  thoughts  further.  They  put
their  main  emphasis  on  asymmetric  methods  aimed  at  nullifying  the  adversary's
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conventional  superiority through the use of  non-military  means that  include political,
economic, technological, ecological and information campaigns. 
They predict that New-Generation Wars will be dominated by psychological and
information warfare, aimed at breaking the will of the enemy population and troops.69 As
a result,  they place a particularly strong emphasis  on the need to achieve information
superiority  over  the  target  country.  This  is  to  be  achieved  through  comprehensive
propaganda and electronic warfare.70  
They also propose a very specific way in which a New-Generation War is to be
conducted. It consists of the opening and the closing phase, where the opening phase
describes the use of non-military means and the closing phase is a military invasion. They
provide a detailed account of the former,  but a rather simplified version of the latter,
further  facilitating  the  understanding  that  the  New-Generation  Warfare  is  first  and
foremost  a  non-military  affair.  The  opening  stage  sees  an  exhaustive  campaign  that
includes  diplomatic,  ideological,  psychological,  economic  and  information  measures
coupled with an intensive propaganda campaign with the aim to weaken the opposing
government's authority, depress the enemy population and attempt to weaken the morale
of its armed forces.71 A network of agents has to be established in the target state which
during the campaign would conduct terrorism, provocations and attempt to create general
instability. The agents would also conduct espionage to uncover the locations of enemy
military  units  and  key  infrastructure.  Bogdanov  and  Chekinov  believe  that  after  the
successful application of the opening phase, the enemy should be rendered ungovernable
due to the heavily damaged infrastructure and the destruction of the military and political
centers, and the military invasion – the closing phase – would only start following an
extensive  electronic  warfare  campaign  aimed  to  achieve  that  end:  incapacitating  the
enemy's military and government. 
Their  concept puts informational  superiority and anticipatory operations at the
core of the concept and its successful application. However they do not believe that the
conventional  armed forces  will  become less  relevant,  but  that  they will  be applied in
coordination with the non-military means of attack and will be deployed based on the
success of such means. 
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Reflection on literature
The Russian concept of New-Generation Warfare is to a degree interchangeable with the
Western concept of Hybrid Warfare. However while in the West the irregular and non-
military means are considered supplementary to the conventional force and basic military
success, the concept proposed by the Russians uses the conventional force as a supplement
for the irregular forces and non-military actions: the conventional military comes into
play only in the final stages of the conflict, based on the success of the non-military means
employed. Furthermore, the New-Generation Warfare concept does not entail centrality
of non-state actors, as Hybrid Warfare does in the West. In the Russian New-Generation
warfare the state retains its central role. I believe that this difference is largely caused by
the general stance taken toward the concept: the West presents it in opposition to western
militaries,  often  outside  the  context  of  contemporary  Western  civilization  while  the
Russian counterpart does not. 
In  addition,  it  seemed  to  me  that  the  concept  is  often  used  as  ground  for
speculation  about  the  robotic  and  often  times  what  appears   rather  fictional  or
hypothetical, yet terrifying nature of future conflict. Both Gerasimov and Chekinov and
Bogdanov engage in speculation about the currently developing robotic aspect of future
conflict. Gerasimov speaks of „battlefields [...] filled with walking, crawling, jumping, and
flying  robots.  In  future  it  is  possible  a  fully  robotized  unit  will  be  created,  capable  of
independently  conducting  military  operations.“72 Chekinov  and  Bogdanov  add  that
„untraditional forms of armed struggle will be used to cause earthquakes, typhoons, and heavy
rainfall  lasting  for  a  time  long  enough  to  damage  the  economy  and  aggrevate  the
sociopsychological climate in the warring countries.“73
However,  when  comparing  Hybrid  Warfare  and  New-Generation  Warfare  of
Russia, Jānis Bērziņš believes that it would be a conceptual mistake to try and fit Russian
New-Generation Warfare on Western concepts, such as Hybrid Warfare. He argues that
Hybrid Warfare,  as  defined by Hoffman,  presupposes  the application of  kinetic  force,
while the Russian New-Generation Warfare does not.74 However, as both types of warfare
refer to a fusion of conventional, irregular and non-military means to achieve strategic
goals – while they might not be synonymous – there is a great degree of interchangeability
between the concepts  of  Hybrid Warfare and the Russian New-Generation Warfare.  I
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believe that they are related concepts, as they both describe the conditions and conduct of
war in similar contemporary environment, and the differences between the concepts are
largely caused by an attempt to approach the same complicated nature of contemporary
warfare by applying different modes of thought. As Bērziņš noted, the Russian concept
reflects  „another  cultures  way  of  thinking,  and  strategic  understanding  about  the  way  to
conduct  warfare.“75 In  similar  vain,  the  Western  understanding  of  Hybrid  Warfare  is
presented from a different  perspective  than that  of  Russia.  The Western authors  have
increasingly distanced themselves from potentially employing the concept in the sense that
they  consider  it  an  inherently  defensive  mode  of  war,  employed  by  a  conventionally
inferior force, as an alternative to conventional war. However, where the discussion with
regard to Hybrid Warfare  has been relatively  quiet  is  its  application by a strong state
power, opening up a wide array of possibilities and extending the defensive concept to
inherit an offensive value.
Lastly, I would like to point out the Aesopian notion of defense employed in the
Russian literature on the subject.76 While the articles like those written by Chekinov and
Bodganov  mainly  suggest  Russia  to  implement  the  proposed  strategies  for  defensive
purposes, these strategies are offensive in nature and the authors make no real attempt to
propose measures that are defensive against them. On the contrary, Gerasimov suggested
that  the  distinction  between  offensive  and  defensive  actions  is  becoming  increasingly
meaningless. As such, it appears that defense is perceived through the lens of offense. The
Aesopian nature of such publications is further facilitated by our knowledge of the events





The current chapter will serve two purposes: to clarify the definitions of terms used within
this  thesis,  including  Hybrid  Warfare,  and discuss  the methodology employed for the
comparative analysis. Firstly I will provide concrete definitions for the terms that might
otherwise be understood in various ways depending on the context in which they are used.
Such definitions are necessary since the nature of the phenomena these definitions refer to
are not not of immutable substance, but have developed over the course of history and are
thus not unequivocally understood in different cultures. In addition such definitions are
offered to avoid any possible misunderstandings caused by the geopolitical location of the
reader, as these terms can have multiple meanings depending on such a position.  Since
the thesis is concerned with the contemporary state of affairs, the definitions introduced
here are also of contemporary nature. 
Firstly definitions of several military terms that are used throughout this thesis are
established  and  secondly  an  operational  definition  is  provided  for  the  term  Hybrid
Warfare for the purposes of the comparative study undergone in the next chapter of the
thesis. This chapter will conclude with the overview of the methodology of the thesis and
explain as to how the comparative analysis was conducted.
Definitions
Conventional forces - Synonymous with regular armed forces. As defined by
the  International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross,  they  must  satisfy  four  conditions  as
described by the Hague Conventions: (1) being commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates to a party of conflict; (2) having a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable
at a distance; (3) carrying arms openly; (4) conducting operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
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Irregular forces  - Defined by exclusion, they encompass combat forces
distinct from the regular army.  Combat forces that do not satisfy the four criteria as
described by the Hague Conventions are defined as irregular forces. 
Irregular tactics - Tactics  commonly  employed  by  irregular  military
forces in which they avoid large-scale combat and instead place emphasis on numerous
crafty small scale hit-and-run engagements. 
Information warfare - The definition used in this thesis is a non-western one
where it  is  defined as  a struggle between two or more (non-)states in the information
space with the goal to damage information systems, processes or resources, critical or other
infrastructure, to undermine political, economic and social systems, to destabilize a society
and  a  state  by  massive  psychological  influence  on  the  population,  and  also  putting
pressure on a state to make decisions that are in the interest of the opponent. Such a
definition is proposed by the Russian Ministry of Defense.77
Internetization - The meaning used here is  based on the term which
was  coined  recently  by  Constantine  Passaris,  a  professor  at  the  University  of  New
Bruinswick, which describes the ubiquitous influence of the internet and the world wide
web on all aspects of human endeavor.78 Information technology and the Internet have
had a direct impact on state bureaucracies, whereas public services are made digital by
default. As a result, our lives, and more importantly the states themselves have a growing
digital  presence.  In this  context,  countries  such as  Estonia  where  many basic  services
offered  by  the  state  have  seen  the  traditional  bureaucratic  administrative  machine
increasingly replaced with services based on the internet – such as e-government (voting in
the elections, tax filing, applying for health insurance, etc), e-business (electronic residence
permits), e-school, etc – such systems become part of the state's digital infrastructure. A
state  where  bureaucratic  institutions  are  increasingly  replaced  by  digital  infrastructure
based on the internet would in this context be described as an Internetized state. 
Cyber  warfare - Cyber  warfare  is  a  broad concept,  hence a  narrower
definition is adopted for this thesis. In the context of Hybrid Warfare, cyber warfare is
considered a means of information warfare. It describes cyber operations taken by a state
or  a  non-state  to  penetrate  the  opponent's  computers  or  computer  networks  for  the
purposes  of  damage  or  disruption.79 Since  many  systems  that  private  citizens  and
governments  rely  upon could successfully  be  targeted  and quickly  destroyed or  made
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inoperable,  such  operations  have  the  potential  for  causing  societal  and  economic
disruption without inflicting direct physical damage.
Defining Hybrid Warfare
For the conduct of the comparative analysis, an operational definition of Hybrid
Warfare is necessary. As examined in the previous chapter of the thesis, Hybrid Warfare is
a  term adopted  relatively  recently.  While  the  type  of  conflict  it  refers  to  –  whether
historical or contemporary – differs per author, what all authors generally agree upon is
that the contemporary world has posed conditions in which such warfare is  becoming
increasingly prevalent and complex. Since I believe that Hoffman's contributions to the
theoretical debate and the analytical value of his writings are the highest, I will adhere to
his conception of Hybrid Warfare when providing the operational definition. His work
was a landmark in the study of the topic as it set Hybrid Warfare out as a distinct type of
war.  The operational definition used for the purposes of this thesis to determine Hybrid
Wars  is  then  as  follows:  Hybrid  War  is  an  asymmetric  conflict  in  which  one  of  the
adversaries uses a fusion of conventional and irregular forces and tactics in coordination
with terrorism and/or acts of criminality. 
Additionally,  in the context  of a Hybrid War, the hybrid adversary attempts to
diminish  the  advantage  of  a  conventional  and  technologically  advanced  opponent  by
fighting  not  based  on  one's  strengths  but  on  the  opponent's  weaknesses,  while
simultaneously attempting to blur the distinction of who fights. However, a conflict does
not qualify as a Hybrid War if it is a mere mix of conventional and irregular forces and
tactics, since this is more evocative of compound warfare.80 As such, these forces have to
be present in the same theater of war and either terrorism or criminality have to be present
in addition to the fusion of conventional and irregular forces and tactics to make a case for
a Hybrid War. In essence this type of warfare seeks to blur together regular and irregular
forms of warfare and thus often entails a distinct information warfare campaign. Such a
definition  will  be  used  to  locate  particular  Hybrid  Wars  from recent  history  for  the
purposes of the comparative analysis.
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Methodology
Relating to the first goal of the thesis which is to understand the development of Hybrid
Warfare over time, a comparative approach is adopted, encompassing two conflicts. These
conflicts  are  the  Second Lebanon War and the Russian incursions  into Ukraine.  The
reason  for  choosing  the  Second  Lebanon  War  is  due  to  it  being  perhaps  the  most
prominent  example  of  Hybrid  Warfare  among  scholars  studying  the  subject.  The
successful  approaches  adopted by  Hezbollah  in  this  conflict  acutely  demonstrated  the
challenges „hybrid warriors“ pose to their adversaries. In addition, this conflict represents
the point of rapid growth of scholarly interest in the subject of Hybrid Warfare.81 82 83 84
And lastly, the Russian interventions on the Ukrainian crisis and the subsequent War in
Donbass are used as examples of what Hybrid Warfare has become in its most recent
form. The conflict in Ukraine is also another landmark in the study of Hybrid Warfare, as
it has reinvigorated the debate on the subject.85 86 87 88
The theoretical base for the analysis is the framework proposed by Malešević. He
argued that there have been two historical processes at work to influence the changes in
warfare:  cumulative  bureaucratization  of  coercion  and  centrifugal  ideologization  The
analysis of the conflicts will be conducted in such a way as to see how the Malešević-
defined coercion and ideologization were achieved in the context of Hybrid Warfare. This
is done in order to unveil whether and to what a degree have these two historical processes
influenced Hybrid Warfare and whether such developments have to be incorporated into
the understanding of contemporary Hybrid Warfare. To briefly  summarize: cumulative
bureaucratization of coercion describes the increasing capabilities of modern states – or
non-statues for this matter – and their increasing efficiency in enforcing coercion of those
sub-ordinated  by  a  bureaucratic  structure,  and centrifugal  ideologization  refers  to  the
increasing importance of elaborate ideologies in both being able to facilitate and to justify
coercion and violence. Malešević believes that the ideologization is centrifugal since it is
radiated  by  a  particular  social  institution  or  a  social  organization.  The  relevance  of
Malešević and his two concepts is crucial for my understanding of changes in warfare. For
the comparative analysis, I created a structural construct based on Malešević's theoretical
framework which will serve as the main framework through which both of the conflicts
will be analyzed. In such a construct, there are four aspects examined in each conflict. 
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Firstly, I will establish what makes the chosen conflict or war a Hybrid War. For
this  I will  refer  back to the  operational definition proposed in the earlier  part of this
chapter and examine whether the aspects of the conflict correspond to the aspects of the
definition. That is, whether it was an asymmetric conflict in which one of the adversaries
used a mix of conventional and irregular forces and tactics in coordination with terrorism
and acts of criminality, etc.
Secondly  I  will  examine  the  technological  context  of  the  conflict.  The  main
technological advancements relevant to the organization of society and the military sphere
are  introduced and their  impact  considered.  This  is  done in order  to  set  a  particular
technological  context  that  (1)  sets  its  limits  to  the  means  with  which  to  impose
Maleševićian cumulative bureaucratization of coercion and centrifugal ideologization; (2)
explains  the  military  capabilities  of  both  sides  with  regard  to  their  technological
modernity.
Thirdly, I will examine the social organization of the hybrid adversary. This is done
in an attempt to see  how the Maleševićian bureaucratic  coercion was achieved in the
context  of  the  conflict.  For  this  I  will  examine  which  relevant  social  and  military
institutions were in place during the conflict and will attempt to see if there was an impact
– and if yes then to what a degree – of societal and cultural norms and conditions on the
military  operations  and  the  social  coercion  of  the  military  forces.  Additionally  I  will
attempt to define particular peculiarities pertaining to a specific conflict and examine the
context in which they came about.
Lastly, I will analyze the conflict in terms of Maleševićian centrifugal ideologization
to  see  whether  there  were  any particular  social  organizations  in  place  that  dealt  with
imposing and/or propagating an ideology relevant in and/or for the conflict. For this end I
will examine which were the ideologies relevant for the conflict; what was their appeal on
the relevant populations; and what was done to enforce such an ideology. Additionally I
will examine what effect did information warfare have both on centrifugal ideologization
of the adversaries as well as its general implications on the course of the conflict.
The comparative approach is taken to facilitate my first argument, that based on
the two Maleševićian historical concepts of cumulative bureaucratization of coercion and
centrifugal ideologization, Hybrid Warfare is an evolving form of war and the changes in
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it  are  brought  about  to  a  large  degree  by  these  two  processes  which  have  in  the
contemporary world given birth to various state and non-state social institutions directly
involved in perpetuating information and psychological warfare. 
My account of contemporary Hybrid Warfare will then be a historical continuation
of the concept and I will propose to establish two new analytical categories of Hybrid
Warfare: General and Specific. The General Hybrid Warfare will be a concept where the
importance of irregular forces and tactics is centralized to the successful application of this
type of war and the Specific Hybrid Warfare will be a concept where non-military means
will be centralized for its successful application. General Hybrid Warfare is ultimately a
defensive concept and can be employed mainly by non-state entities,  such as  terrorist
groups like Hezbollah, while the Specific Hybrid Warfare is offensive and directly linked
with statehood, or generally with the powers traditionally associated with the state. Both
concepts will more or less be based on the traditional understanding of Hybrid Warfare, as
introduced earlier.  Where  they  differ  however,  is  their  strategic  goals  and hence  their
conduct. I will argue that the difference in conduct is based on the societal, technological




In this chapter, I will be providing a comparative analysis of the Second Lebanon War in
2006 and the Russian incursions into Ukraine starting from 2014. I will examine these
conflicts  based on the criteria set in the previous chapter.  The chapter starts with the
analysis of the Second Lebanon War, followed up with Russian incursions into Ukraine
and  concludes  with  the  examination  of  the  implications  these  conflicts  have  had  on
Hybrid Warfare and study where they differed and where they coincided. The purpose of
this chapter is not to provide a historic overview of the conflicts as a chronologic string of
military battles and engagements, nor to provide a comprehensive overview of the general
course of the conflicts discussed – the reader is thus to a large degree expected to possess
such an overview beforehand.
Second Lebanon War
The  Second  Lebanon  War  represents,  now,  a  classic  case  of  Hybrid  Warfare  for  the
Western military theorists engaging in the debate and has become the defining conflict for
the term. Hoffman's theory of Hybrid Warfare uses this conflict as a prototype, and as
such is largely the basis of his theory.89 In addition, this war attracted major military-
scholarly interest, and represents the start of for the growing interest to the theories of
Hybrid Warfare.90 91 92 93
The Lebanese region in question had seen many armed confrontations in the past
decades  preceding  the  Second  Lebanon  War  in  2006.  Increased  tensions  are  a
commonplace  even  during  times  of  peace.  In  2006,  it  first  seemed  like  another
provocation, when after several attempts to kidnap fighters of the Israeli Defense Force
(henceforth referred to as the IDF), a Hezbollah team crossed the border to Israel on July
12th, 2006, and finally succeeded in kidnapping two soldiers, killing three and wounding
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two additional soldiers in the process.94 95 The original plan was most probably to use the
two  captured  IDF soldiers  as  hostages  or  exchange  them for  Hezbollah  fighters  held
captive in Israel and considered terrorists by the Israeli military. However, the reaction of
Israel was imminent. Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert declared that the abduction had
been interpreted as a declaration of war and the battles commenced soon after. It was not
just the start, but also the result of the following conflict that raised eyebrows all around
the world, especially in the military sphere. Thirty four days is all it took for Hezbollah
fighters to withstand the attacks of the most modern conventional army in the region
before an internationally mediated ceasefire came into effect. 
Hybridity of the conflict
Being  the  most  prominent  case  study  of  Hybrid  Warfare,  the  Second  Lebanon  War
exhibits  various phenomena associated with the concept.  Firstly,  it  was an asymmetric
conflict insofar as the conventional IDF faced an adversary who was highly trained and
skilled  in  using  irregular  tactics  and  engaged  in  small-scale  hit-and-run  engagements
inflicting heavy damage on the modern IDF and they were ready to pay a high cost of
lives for inflicting such a damage.  The amount of Hezbollah fighters actively operating
during the war is estimated to have hovered between a thousand96 to three thousand97
while the IDF reportedly deployed tens of thousands of soldiers throughout the conflict98.
Secondly,  the  fighters  of  Hezbollah  were  in  possession  of  modern  military
equipment  and  employed  it  in  unexpected  ways.  Decentralized  tactics  and  usage  of
antitank guided missiles against Israeli armor and defensive positions were a surprise for
the IDF. The uniqueness of the way in which Hezbollah fought was that they were the
first resistance movement in possession of strategic weapons coupled with traditional army
capabilities in combination with the use of guerrilla tactics in the framework of a guerrilla
type war99.
Thirdly, Hezbollah fighters were hard to spot due to the fact that many of them
did not wear military uniforms100 and are therefore considered irregular forces. The IDF
soldiers called them „maddeningly elusive“101, as they had deliberately blended into the
civilian population and infrastructure. This was especially troublesome for the IDF as the
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operations were conducted in an urban environment, in close proximity to civilians. The
Israelis  were  forced  to  admit  that  the  forces  they  faced  in  that  34-day  period  were
tenacious and skilled102. US Lieutenant Colonel Michael Snyder believes that even if a kill-
or-capture operation was able to eliminate a military target, but in the process alienated
the surrounding civilian population (or otherwise undermined political legitimacy) then
the military operation, however technically successful, must be judged an overall failure.103
This resonates the importance of maintaining support on the McCuen-defined population
battlegrounds, as crucial for overall political victory. Civilian casualties in Lebanon caused
by the Israeli  attacks  were a  constant  feature  in the  media  and severely  undercut  the
legitimacy  of  Israel's  attacks104 105 106 despite  the  fact  that  Hezbollah kept  on hurling
thousands of missiles to civilian targets in Israel also causing civilian damage.107
The bottom line remained that the most modern conventional army of the region
could  not  break  Hezbollah's  carefully  coordinated  irregular  forces  and  stop  their
numerous Katyusha rockets from hitting Israeli civilian targets. It has been estimated that
3970-4228 Hezbollah rockets were fired at Israeli civilian targets during the war.108 95%
of these rockets were Katyusha artillery rockets with an estimated range of 30km. It was
further estimated that about 23% of these rockets hit urban areas, while the rest ended up
at  open  areas.109 The  conflict  acutely  demonstrated  the  deficiencies  of  modern
conventional  armies  when  facing  a  hybrid  adversary  in  a  complex  operational
environment. 
It is known that the asymmetric nature of the conflict made the outcome of the
war all the more impressive. Hezbollah's roughly a thousand active fighters were able to
repel tens of thousands of IDF soldiers. In this context, Hezbollah's combatants impressed
both the Israeli and the American analysts, especially in terms of their level of training and
combat skills necessary to fight an opponent like the IDF. The forces IDF encountered in
Southern Lebanon used both insurgent-like skills and more conventional operational and
tactical  skills.110 Their  preparedness  indicated  a  degree  and  type  of  training  not
traditionally associated with guerrilla forces, but rather that of a conventional force. In
addition,  they  had  access  to  newer  weapons  technologies  and  were  very  effective  in
covering, concealing and preparing its fighting positions, and its coordination with direct
fire  support.111 Confrontations  with  the  IDF  were  fought  in  small  disperse  units
employing „hit-and-run“ tactics with the aim to deny easy targets for the Israeli Air Force
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and undermine Israeli surveillance and reconnaissance. In every factor of fighting, their
strategy reflected the central notion of Hezbollah's ideology: resistance.  Hezbollah had
calculated that inflicting heavy losses on the IDF would be crucial, as they believed IDF's
unwillingness to absorb incessant losses to be their strategic weakness.112 Thus, Hezbollah
had prepared a clear strategy for the war which was simple: keep hurling rockets into Israel
and survive by defending the well-prepared positions in southern Lebanon. Both of these
objectives were fulfilled, as no IDF effort was able to stop rockets from being fired into
Israel, and the result of the war was ultimately inconclusive. 
While both sides declared they had won, it has to be noted that in a Hybrid War,
the victory of  the hybrid adversary  is  often simply its  survival  and protraction of  the
conflict, rather than military victory in battle. In explaining this, Michael Snyder resides
to the David versus Goliath narrative, where Goliath – the conventionally superior force –
is expected to win outright in any circumstance, and any deviation from this is perceived
as a victory of David. As such, Hybrid Wars in the Western conception are often simply
protractions  of  conflict  rather  than  a  succession  of  offensives  conducted  against  the
enemy; and in such a context Hezbollah emerged as a clear victor. 
While the IDF did not suffer a military defeat per se, Hezbollah celebrated the
indecisive result of the war as a „Divine Victory“ and IDF was forced back to the drawing
board in order to devise strategies that could ultimately lead to victory in the subsequent
wars. 
Technological context
The importance of the evolution of modern mass communications and the international
media is a key element describing the era of this war. A counterinsurgency expert David
Kilcullen  has  noted  that  "If  bin  Laden  didn't  have  access  to  global  media,  satellite
communications, and the Internet, he'd just be a cranky guy in a cave"113 The global media
has given grounds for contestation for the population battlegrounds as defined by McCuen
earlier. Coupled with the Internet, global media has had a profound effect on the ability to
influence people within these battlegrounds. The new technologies available to report on
war became relevant for the militaries as well:  as weapons of war. The journalists who
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during the Second Lebanon War in doing their job reported from rooftops of buildings or
hilltops in an attempt to cover troop movements, often unveiled sensitive information to
the  enemy  with  regard  to  troop  placement  and  movement.  Thus,  not  only  did  the
journalists covering the war transform the gruesome images of the realities of warfare into
influence on the public opinion and official diplomacy, they also became reconnaissance
assets for both IDF and Hezbollah. The latter took full advantage of this. As a result,
control over the media has become extremely relevant in contemporary wars. 
In terms of military capabilities, there was a substantial division between the pre-
war opinions held of Hezbollah's capabilities and the reality that presented itself during
the war. It was not only that Hezbollah was resilient and willing to suffer casualties in
order to protract the war and erode confidence and legitimacy of the IDF attacks, but also
that they possessed a mixture of modern weapons necessary to execute their tactics for this
end. Between 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah had formed several rocket artillery units which
would control  a  vast  arsenal  of  122-mm Katyusha  rockets  and in order  to  avoid any
preemptive  airstrikes  undermining  this  capacity,  the  missile  launchers  were  located  in
hilltop civilian villages and towns of southern Lebanon.114 The supplies for forming such
units had came from Syria and Iran and by 2006 an estimated 12 000 – 13 000 short-,
medium-,  and  long-range  ground-to-ground  missiles  had  come  under  Hezbollah's
possession.115 In addition to the supplies, the training necessary to operate these systems
was carried out by the Iranians.116 Furthermore, the irregular units formed were armed
with  numerous  sophisticated  weaponry.  Operationally,  Hezbollah's  main  actions  were
taken against the highly mechanized IDF's tanks and armored vehicles, and the irregular
units had a plentiful supply of not only anti-tank missiles but also mortars which were
integrated  into  their  defensive  strategy  whereby  they  pre-sighted  certain  avenues  of
suspected Israeli approach, spotted by forward observers who would then engage the tanks
by indirect fire, with Hezbollah veteran fighters assigned for anti-tank ambushes. 
By the summer of 2006, Hezbollah's war apparatus at the Israel's northern border
had become a  well-oiled  machine  highly  motivated  for  battle.  It  consisted  of  a  light
infantry  brigade,  which  was  backed  by  a  militia  with  strong  veteran  elements.  The
infantry brigade was a more or less conventional force of 3000 men trained by Iran, while
the militia numbers were far greater, and about twice the size of the infantry brigade.117 
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Cumulative bureaucratization of coercion
„Hezbollah has a set of persuasive tools—ranging from the mobilization of ethnic solidarity, to
lying, to paying for support, to outright thuggish intimidation. These allow it to impose on
Lebanese society a level of discipline that has no counterpart in a liberal and democratic society
such as Israel.“ 118 –  U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Snyder
Hezbollah has been classified as a Foreign Terrorist Group by the United States, a non-
state entity for the purposes of this thesis. Established in 1982, it is a Shia Islamic militant
political  organization  based  in  Lebanon.  It  has  political  representation  in  Lebanon,
currently occupying 12 out of 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament. But it can not be
understood as a mere political party with a jihadist military wing. Since its formation, it
has grown into an organization with a radio station, a satellite TV station, large scale
military  formations  within  and  outside  of  Lebanon,  and  it  enjoys  the  capacity  of
providing a wide range of social services for the Shia population in Lebanon. As a result of
possessing an institutional framework traditionally associated with state power, Hezbollah
has often been described as a state within a state.
The perception of Hezbollah in the west has often been shadowed by its militant
jihadist  wing  and  its  prevalent  classification  as  a  terrorist  group.  As  a  result  of  this,
understanding of its social appeal is mainly presented through the prism of its ideological
appeal  both  on  Shia  Muslims  and  those  opposing  Israel.  Its  capabilities  traditionally
associated with state power,  such as the social service system are overshadowed by the
systematic  notion  of  "terror".  However,  I  would  argue  that  Hezbollah's  model  for
providing social services deserves particular attention, as it provides Hezbollah with a clear
source of legitimacy and popular support in Lebanon and further facilitates Hezbollah's
military  organization.  Without  the  Social  Service  Section,  Hezbollah  would  lack
substantial political and social support from within Lebanon, and its military wing would
become undermined in the long term. Hence it is essential to analyze its social structure,
and the organizational model in order to understand the underlying social appeal of this
organization  
The peculiarity of Hezbollah is that it is not a mere political party or a terrorist
group. It cannot be explained as a mere political party, as while it does operate within the
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democratic political system of Lebanon, takes part of democratic elections and so forth, it
does so mainly in order to exploit the system for its own benefit and is able to operate not
only within the political system of Lebanon but also outside of it  – its organizational
structure overreaches that of a mere political party. The military wing of the organization
provides it with strength to intimidate other political forces in Lebanon and the elections
provide  that  they  have  become  politically  engaged  with  the  power  structures  of  the
Lebanese  state.  As  Penny  Mellies  puts  it:  “Over  the  decades,  Hezbollah  has  not  only
professionalized its military capabilities but joined Lebanon’s political process and enmeshed
itself into the fabric of Lebanese society.119 […] Like Hamas, it has muscled itself in key posts
across Lebanese society.” 120
In a similar vain it can not be considered a mere terrorist organization, as it works
not only on the military and political scene, but also on the social scene of Lebanon. As
such, it should first and foremost be considered a Jihadi movement engaging in politics,
whereas terror is simply an extension of its external ideological policy. In the following
section, I will attempt to break down its structure in order to understand to what a degree
is the institutional and social layout of the organization providing Hezbollah grounds to
achieve cumulative bureaucratization of coercion and how is it able to not only remain an
operational  militarily  force,  but  also  a  politically  and  a  socially  appealing  force  in
Lebanon.  For  this  end I  will  first  provide  an overview of  its  social  structure  and the
peculiarities  it  embodies,  followed  by  analyzing  how and  to  what  a  degree  does  this
structure translate into bureaucratic coerciveness.
Social Structure
Hezbollah is governed by a sophisticated organizational and leadership structure.
To  break  it  down,  there  are  a  number  of  Councils  that  govern  the  organization  of
Hezbollah. First and most important is the Shura Council, which wields all the decision
making powers and directs a number of subordinate councils, each with their own area of
responsibility. The Shura Council is the main executive institution, which since 1992 has
been led by its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. The Shura Council oversees all the
political  activity,  the Jihad activity  and the cultural  and social  activities.  According to
Hezbollah's Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem:
„If the military wing were separated from the political wing, this would have repercussions,
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and it would reflect on the political scene. But Hezbollah has one single leadership, and its
name  is  the  Decision-Making  Shura  Council.  It  manages  the  political  activity,  the  Jihad
activity, the cultural and social activities [...] Hezbollah's Secretary General is the head of the
Shura Council and also the head of the Jihad Council,  and this.  means that we have one
leadership, with one administration.“121  
The Shura Council is governed by nine members, seven of which are Lebanese and
two are Iranian representing Iran's interests within the organization. Iranian influence and
finances  are  an integral  part  of  Hezbollah as  it  depends  to  a  large  degree  on Iranian
funds.122 The subordinate councils of the Shura Council are responsible for governing the
underlying military, political and social aspects of Hezbollah's activities. These councils are
the Executive Council,  the Political Council,  the Parliamentary Council  and the Jihad
Council.  What  follows is  a  general  overview of  how the  social,  political  and military
structures are managed within this framework which is done in order to determine their
influence on social coercion pertaining to the Second Lebanon War of 2006.
Social Service Sector
When examining the structure of Hezbollah, it is evident that the Social Service
Sector is one of the most important factions, as proven by its funding, as 2007 saw an
estimated  half  of  the  Hezbollah  budget  allocated  to  the  Social  Service  Sector.123 The
original goal of the Social Service Section was to provide all necessary social services for
the oppressed population. However it also functions as an ideologically defensive measure
in explaining the necessity for Hezbollah. This is why, while it can be argued that a well
defined social system is a requirement of Islam itself, the leaders of Hezbollah refer to it as
„party duty“. 
The Social Service Section also serves to increase Hezbollah's political influence
over other competing Shia organizations in the region – such as Amal – or the Lebanese
government itself. The effectiveness of this sector is best explained by its comprehensive
bureaucratic structure. It consists of six subgroups, each of which has its own set of tasks
and an area of responsibility:  The Jihad al-Binaa Development Group,  Islamic Health
Organization,  the Martyrs  Foundation,  the Women’s  Association,  the Imam al-Mahdi
Scouts, and the education division.124 
The  Jihad  al-Binaa  Development  group  is  responsible  for  repairing  buildings
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damaged by war in Shia areas and exclusively employs Shias  as the workforce.  In the
aftermath of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Hezbollah took advantage of the slow
reaction time of the Lebanese government and provided immediate help in the face of
repairing  the  infrastructural  damage  caused  by  the  war  for  the  whole  population  –
regardless of their political or religious affiliations.  
The Islamic Health Organization is responsible for providing medical services and
immediate  help  in the face of  evacuation of  the wounded,  running clinics,  providing
medication and distributing food.125 With the cost  of  health care  in mind,  this  is  an
especially expensive operation and demands foreign financial support, which is achieved
with funding from Iran and Syria. 
The  Martyr  Foundation  and  the  Women's  Association  have  a  shared  primary
function of treating the wounded, killed or martyred people fighting Israel. 
The Imam Al-Mahdi Scouts is  a youth movement aimed at  indoctrinating the
younger  generations  in  terms  of  radical  Shiite  Islam as  interpreted  by  Hezbollah,  to
increase Hezbollah's future support base. 
And lastly, the educational branch serves to undermine the Lebanese Department
of Education, and provides that Hezbollah-developed curriculum is implemented right
from kindergarten up to collage level, with the aim to indoctrinate the population for
popular  support.  Furthermore,  the  educational  branch  is  responsible  for  staffing  the
schools, constructing of schools and covering the costs related to the publishing costs of
the materials necessary under the Hezbollah dictated curriculum.126 For a more detailed
account of all the branches of Social Services Sector refer to James Love's account.127
The discussed social  structure is  essential  not  only  for religious-ideological  and
social reasons, but also crucial in maintaining the military side of the organization, as it
not only provides the whole organization and thus the military wing of it with legitimacy
within the Lebanese Shia population, but also directly indoctrinates future fighters and
provides them with  social security in return for their loyalty to Hezbollah. Due to this
social structure, Hezbollah is able to recruit and train fighters for the conflict against Israel
with relative ease, as the social structures in place enforce such coercion very effectively.
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Military sector
The  military  sector  of  Hezbollah  is  first  and  foremost  governed  by  the  Jihad
Council,  under  the executive supervision of  the Shura Council.  Jihad Council's  main
responsibility is  the coordination of  „resistance activity“ and therefore all  military and
security operations conducted by Hezbollah within and outside of Lebanon fall under the
responsibility of the Jihad Council and as a result Hezbollah's militia, terrorist wing, and
security  organ  all  report  to  the  Jihad  Council.128 However,  apart  from  its  vague
organizational structure, there is little known of Hezbollah's military wing, as the majority
of party's elected parliamentary members are left unaware of Hezbollah's covert military
and terrorist activities.  According to the US government, these are exclusively decided
upon by the senior leadership of the party and overseen by Secretary-General Nasrallah,
and carried out by the leadership of the Islamic Resistance movement and the Islamic
Jihad Organization Neither of these is an independent organization, but both merged into
Hezbollah and have become part of the organizational structure under the command of
the  Jihad Council  and conduct  operations  within  the  framework  of  the  military  and
terrorism sub-branch of the Jihad Council. The Islamic Resistance movement conducts its
operations  on  the  Lebanese  domestic  scene,  while  the  Islamic  Jihad  Organization  is
responsible  for Hezbollah's  global  military  reach.  The second sub-branch of  the Jihad
Council is the security branch, which essentially deals with party security and external
security in the form of counterintelligence and the responsibility to prevent threats of
external  penetration  of  the  organization.  Hezbollah's  military  wing  is  therefore  run
through a sophisticated bureaucratic system under which the ultimate decision-making
power lies on the Secretary-General Nasrallah, but the execution of the decisions is carried
out through the organizational mechanisms discussed here.
Politcal sector
The political sector of Hezbollah is connected to the executive sector and consists
of the Political Council – also known as the Politburo – and the Information Council –
also referred to as the Informational unit. The Political Council essentially deals with the
everyday political campaign, political strategy and advises the Shura Council  on issues
related to this. However in terms of this thesis, the Information Council demands further
examination. This council controls Hezbollah's media outlets and is the sole information
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provider with regards to the images Hezbollah perpetrates through these media channels.
It  operates  the  Hezbollah  owned  television  station,  four  radio  stations  and  five
newspapers.  Despite  the fact  that  some of  theses  outlets  have not  received an official
license from the Lebanese government, they have become well established. The television
channel Al-Manar (The Lighthouse, in translation) is a satellite television channel which
offers traditional programming, yet dances in the rhythm of the necessary rhetorical and
ideological  lines  of  Hezbollah.  Despite  being  operated  by  the  Information  unit  of
Hezbollah, it  has an audience far wider than that of Lebanon and reaches millions of
people internationally. As a result, it became integral to the information warfare campaign
during the 2006 war.  During the earlier conflicts,  it  broadcasted messages in Hebrew,
claiming that Israeli advances will trigger Katyusha rockets being launched into Israel. Al-
Manar  also  became known for  its  famous „Who's  Next?“  campaign screened both in
Hebrew and Arabic during the Israeli occupation, aimed at demoralizing the soldiers of
the IDF – it featured a constantly updated photo gallery of the latest Israeli casualties with
the subsequent question mark emerging on the screen and rhetorically asking which Israeli
soldier will be next.129 
During the 2006 conflict, Al-Manar remained integral to the information warfare
campaign as it broadcasted messages and images from the war to demoralize the Israeli
home population and undermine the legitimacy of the Israeli attack in the eyes of the
international community. The main emphasis was put on broadcasting images showing
damaged Israeli vehicles, and civilian buildings wrecked by the Israeli air raids. In terms of
information  warfare,  the  Information  Council  is  therefore  essential  in  imposing
Hezbollah's  narrative  and ideology on the population  vis-à-vis the effectiveness  of  the
media  it  cultivates.  The aspect  of  information warfare  will  be further  discussed when
analyzing the centrifugal ideologization during the conflict. 
Structural implications
The discussed social structure of Hezbollah can be viewed as a clear manifestation
of  cumulative  bureaucratization  of  coercion.  Such  a  structure  is  aimed  at  facilitating
conflict with Israel and its layout is directly responsible for facilitating military struggle
through coercing  those  falling  under  this  structure.  While  the  justification  of  such  a
structure lies in the ideological views Hezbollah perpetrates – which is further discussed in
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the  next  section  –  the  structural  layout  of  Hezbollah  is  a  clear  manifestation  of
institutionalized violence as  the  bureaucratic  structures  in  place are  involved with the
facilitation of violence. Ultimate decision-making happens in a centralized manner:  all
under the supervision and direction of the Shura council.  Thus the military wing of the
organization is responsible for perpetrating violence directly through a strongly centralized
hierarchical command structure where even the political sector is often times left unaware
of  the  detailed  account  of  the  military  operations  Hezbollah  aims  to  conduct.
Furthermore,  the  political  sector  is  used to facilitate  information warfare  through the
Informational unit and has thus became central to the informational campaigns aimed
against  the Israelis,  also  present  during the Second Lebanon War.  The comprehensive
structure of the social service sector provides the whole organization an ideological appeal
through the conduct of social services, primarily aimed at Lebanon's Shia population and
its sub-branches which are directly involved in institutionally indoctrinating their pupils
via youth and general education. 
Hezbollah's institutional layout thus contributes greatly to its ability to conduct effective
warfare,  especially  Hybrid  Warfare,  as  witnessed  in  2006.  However,  the  institutional
bureaucratization of coercion was not the only factor at work in providing Hezbollah its
hybrid  might  in  2006.  A separate  view is  necessary  for  the  process  intertwined  with
cumulative bureaucratization of coercion: centrifugal ideologization.
Centrifugal ideologization
While Malešević believes that most of modern conflict and its unmatched death tolls are a
consequence  of  justifications  facilitated  by  secular  ideologies,  this  does  not  seem  to
conform to  the  countries  in  the  Middle  East,  particularly  Islamic  Arab  countries  in
general. In such regions the dominant ideologies are almost exclusively of religious nature,
especially in the case of Hezbollah. As such, the justification of warfare does not lie in
complex  secular  ideologies  and  there  is  a  lessened  need  to  enforce  violence  through
denying humanity to the adversary, as the ideological justification is achieved through the
framework of religion and a particular extremist interpretation of Islam. 
The cause of this can be that the Arab Islamic cultures in the region have not gone
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through  the  European  type  “Enlightenment”  movement,  and  as  such,  the  ideas
Enlightenment  cherishes  have  not  become  dominant  in  the  region.  Some  scholars
specializing in Islamic studies such as Murad Wilfried Hofmann argue that Islam should
not be asking Muslims to repeat the mistakes of the Enlightenment and thereby subscribe
to  “an already outdated modernism”,130 but rather it should ask the West to consider the
results of its scientific revolutions and see its failures.131 The understanding that Islam is
yet to go through an intellectual movement similar to the Enlightenment movement was
also resonated by Muqtedar Khan who argued for an Islamic notion of Enlightenment
and its possible future application.132 Thus it is reasonable to argue that the ideologies of
organizations such as Hezbollah have to be understood in the religious context of Islam
rather than Enlightenment provided secular ideologies as Malešević had suggested.
Ideology of Hezbollah
Categorized as radical Shiite Islamism, the agenda of Hezbollah was set in stone by
the 1985 manifesto called „The Hezbollah Program“.  Their ideology operates on the
notion of „resistance“, and „defensive jihad“, particularly against Israel and the United
States. Due to this central rationale, confrontation or conflict with these adversaries is to a
degree a desired status quo, as it is through conflict that Hezbollah is able to maintain
external legitimacy and a wide base of support. This base support is additionally facilitated
by the bureaucratic social system as discussed earlier.
The central  ideological  objectives  of  Hezbollah are  then the establishment of  a
Shiite theocracy in Lebanon, elimination of western influence in the Middle East and
annihilation of Israel. In this context, any reconciliation with the state of Israel is a lost
cause and not considered possible, and the only solution to the conflict is the destruction
of  Israel.  This  struggle  against  Israel  is  the  central  ideological  reason  for  Hezbollah's
existence  and under  its  ideology,  violence  conducted against  Israel  is  justified  on two
grounds:  Israel  is  an  illegitimate  state;  Israel  is  occupying  the  territories  of  Lebanon.
Futhermore,  Israel  is  seen  as  the  personification  of  state  terrorism  and  Western
imperialism and the very creation of Israel is considered an act of terrorism.133 In addition,
the  actions  against  Israel  are  enforced  by  Hezbollah's  religious  ideology,  whereby  it
employs the term „defensive jihad“. In order to understand this, one has to understand the
interpretation of jihad within Hezbollah's ideology. 
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According  to  Hezbollah's  Deputy  Secretary-General  Naim  Qassem,  Hezbollah
identifies two types of jihad: the „greater jihad“ and the „lesser jihad“. „Greater jihad“ is
the daily spiritual struggle within one's soul to resist and overcome vices and temptations
of human life in order to achieve divine knowledge, love and spiritual harmony, while the
„lesser  jihad“  -  also  known as  the  „military  jihad“  -  is  the  material  struggle,  and for
Hezbollah, falls into two categories: „offensive jihad“ and „defensive jihad“. The „offensive
jihad“ allows Muslims to invade or wage war against other countries and societies on the
basis that Islam is the one true religion, however, Hezbollah considers „offensive jihad“
inapplicable  until  the  return  of  the  „awaited  imam“  -  a  true  Caliph,  or  the  rightful
successor of Muhammad. Hezbollah's central actions against Israel are however explained
in the context of a „defensive jihad“ which stipulates not only the right but an obligation
to  defend  Muslim  lands  and  communities  from  aggression  and  occupation.134 As
Hezbollah considers Israel an occupant of the territories of Lebanon, „defensive jihad“
becomes an obligation for each of its Muslim members. Such an obligation reflects the
coercive nature of its  religious ideology, as true believers  can not easily avoid such an
obligation.
As such, Hezbollah commends that all acts of resistance against the Jewish state are
legitimate already on the ideological level and considering it terrorism is nonsensical. In
such a context, it bares no relevance whatsoever whether these acts are directed against
civilians  or  soldiers  –  under  the  rationale  that  they  are  „occupiers“,  everything  is
considered lawful.  While some of  Hezbollah's officials have claimed that  they are not
against Jews or Judaism per se, actions speak louder than words and such words have little
credibility  in  the  wake  of  blatant  Holocaust  denial  and  spreading  of  anti-Semitic
conspiracy theories.135 In addition, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah has stated that „If
we searched the entire world for a person more cowardly, despicable, weak and feeble in psyche,
mind, ideology and religion, we would not find anyone like the Jew. Notice I do not say the
Israeli.“136 
Religious ideology is thus the main framework facilitating battles against Israel.
Such an ideology is indoctrinated through social institutions and education provided to
children from a young age. Under the institutional framework of the Social Service Sector,
the educational branch and the  Imam Al-Mahdi Scouts youth movement both  enforce
this.  In  the  educational  sphere,  it  is  achieved  by  imposition of  Hezbollah'  developed
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curriculum which is effectively able to indoctrinate children into men who are willing to
fight the „defensive jihad“. The curriculum comes into effect already in kindergarten and
persists to collage and vocational levels.  Hezbollah's ideological program therefore fully
supports  armed struggle  against  Israel,  starts  indoctrinating people  from a young age,
strives  on  the  notion  of  „resistance“  and  is  realized  through  extensive  bureaucratic
machinery maintained by the organization. 
Hezbollah is thus in a very strong position to enforce centrifugal ideologization
The whole organizational structure of Hezbollah is built to control the central ideological
narratives  –  based  on  their  interpretation  of  the  Qur'an  –  through  the  media,  and
education that is based on a specialized curriculum. In addition, the social services provide
them  with  a  large  base  of  legitimacy  within  the  Shia  population.  The  centrifugal
ideologization  achieved  through  the  indoctrination  of  its  pupils  is  aimed  at  the
ideologization of  violence against  the Israelis  and the  Americans.  In comparison with
Ukraine, Hezbollah is in a much better situation with regard to centrifugal ideologization,
as the basis of the social actors who fight for Hezbollah is ideologically homogeneous, as
opposed  to  corresponding   heterogeneous  ideological  landscape  of  Ukraine.  Such  a
position  granted  Hezbollah  an  ideal  environment  for  conducting  information  warfare
against Israel during the Second Lebanon War. 
Hezbollah's information warfare
„When they attack Humvees, they're not doing that to reduce the number of Humvees. 
They're doing it because they want spectacular media footage of a burning Humvee“137 
– counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen
Hezbollah,  along  with  al-Queda  and  Hamas  have  all  highly  sophisticated
propaganda  organizations  and  media  channels  and  systems  that  support  them.  As
discussed earlier, Hezbollah operates television stations, broadcasting a variety of shows,
including  children  programs,  and  reaches  audiences  beyond  the  territory  under  its
political  control.  These  are  perfect  tools  to  enforce  particular  narratives  upon  its
consumers in the context of information warfare. 
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One of the main shortcomings of the Israelis in the Second Lebanon War was the
lack of effective strategies to counter Hezbollah's information warfare. In addition, the
Israelis  believed  in  the  existence  of  a  negative  bias  in  the  Western  media.  A  hybrid
belligerent often fights based on the opponent's weaknesses rather than its own strengths,
and in the case of Hezbollah and Israel, this is exactly what happened in the context of
information warfare. What follows now is first an analysis of what constituted the Israeli
weakness, followed by the examination of informational strategies employed by Hezbollah
which proved effective and prevalent in the context of the Second Lebanon War. 
International media and the IDF
The  Israeli  weakness  lies  in  its  communication  with  the  media.  This  has
handicapped the IDF in terms of how the international media covers conflicts in this
region.  International  coverage  is  to  a  large  degree  crucial  for  how these  conflicts  are
perceived outside the region, and have the potential to shift not only international public
opinion, but also diplomacy  of its allies. There are several problematic menaces in the
Western media that have caused a certain deadlock, and as a result Israel argues that the
coverage appears biased against Israel and more often than not neutral toward Hezbollah,
as  witnessed  during  the  Second  Lebanon  War.  While  this  is  a  direct  result  of  the
information  strategies  employed  by  Hezbollah,  these  strategies  are   simply  taking  an
advantage of problems the roots of which run elsewhere. 
Prior to his resignation, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair,
identified problematic ways in which the contemporary media has changed for the worse.
He claimed that (1) there is  a blurring of lines between opinion and news, as factual
reporting is routinely packed with political commentary; (2) commentary always receives
more  space  than  actual  news;  (3)  more  attention  is  devoted  to  stories  producing  an
immediate emotional response, rather than to those providing deep insight, and as such,
scandal and controversy will always be preferred to a story intended to inform and engage
the public's intellect; (4) the stories are always presented as black and white, whereas the
life's gray is almost entirely lost.138 Such international media coverage is thus inclined to
chew up controversial  stories and spit  them out in the form of black-and-white easily
understood  narratives.  This  is  especially  relevant  for  the  political-military  sphere,  as
reporting from the battlefields often entails images of civilian suffering and death which
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can severely undermine public legitimacy of military campaigns. The IDF was unable to
adequetely adjust to this, and the relationship between the international media and the
IDF has seen the Israeli counterpart argue for the existence of a negative bias, especially in
European  media coverage of the conflicts they engage in. 
Snyder identified three instances which have enforced such a belief,139 which I will
briefly examine in the following paragraphs. First was the coverage of the alleged massacre
during the battle of Jenin in 2002 in the context of the Second Intifada. The UN reported
that 52 Palestinians, half of whom might have been civilians and 23 IDF soldiers had died
in the conflict.140 While the near equality of fighter casualties indicated a house-to-house
urban warfare type of conflict, where the Israelis refrained from using indiscriminate air
attacks,  the  European  press  had  previously  reported  about  alleged  massacres  of  the
Palestinians141 and  claimed  that  whole  families  had  been  crushed  by  the  rubble  of
buildings  hit  by  airstrikes.142 In  particular,  The Times  (of  London)  went  as  far  as  to
compare  these  attacks  to  the  wars  in  Bosnia,  Chechnya  and  Kosovo,  where  the  the
indiscriminate killing left  many thousands  dead.143 Such disproportionate comparisons
only aggravated the Israeli perceived bias. 
Additional  anti-Israeli  propaganda  is  fabricated  through  stories  of  individual
civilian suffering and death, such as the second instance Snyder identified: the case of
Muhammad al-Durrah, a child who allegedly died in Gaza through Israeli fire on 30 th
September 2000. The images of suffering children are especially effective in spreading and
attracting attention of the international media. The death of this child was used as an
iconic  figure in the Arab world,  symbolizing the brutality  of  Israel.  However Richard
Landes has argued that the video footage captured by a French journalist showing the last
moments of this child is a hoax.144 He went on to coin the term “Pallywood” referring to
staged  productions  of  Palestinian  civil  casualties  with  the  intent  of  being  filmed  and
ending up in international press.145 A French web site owner Philipe Karsenty was sued by
the French 2 television station for accusing them of using the images capturing the alleged
scenes of al-Durrah's death filmed by their cameraman for propaganda purposes.146 While
he was initially  found guilty,  he appealed and an appeal  court  found him not guilty,
indeed affirming that the video was not genuine and that the bullets had likely come from
Palestinian positions.147 While the Israeli spokespersons initially admitted that the bullets
that killed al-Durrah came from Israeli positions148 – providing this propaganda its initial
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effect – following an investigation, the Israelis distanced themselves from the event and
affirmed that Israel was likely not responsible for his death.149
Third instance of this was the case of Huda Ghaliya, whose family was killed in an
explosion on one of the beaches at Gaza. She was filmed mourning over the body of his
father, images of which quickly became popular in the international media. Questions
were quickly raised about the source of the shell that had killed the family. Israelis were
again quick to admit guilt, but soon after the IDF investigation was carried out, it was
claimed that no Israeli shell fired that day could have caused the incident.150  Despite such
a claim, the Human Rights Watch – an independent NGO – contradicted these claims
and asserted that the Israeli investigation was biased and the Israelis were to blame.151 This
contradiction was largely prominent in the European media.152 
As a result of these prominent, and a number of other incidents, the Israelis are
prone to thinking that the European press and NGOs pursue a policy of opposition to
Israel. Whether this is true or not, it is clear that many NGOs often criticize the IDF and
cast doubt on its motives and as a result undermine the credibility of the IDF and its
investigations and statements.
Controlling the media: Hezbollah vs. Israel
An additional Israeli  weakness  and Hezbollah's strength can be observed in the
differences in their ability to exert control over the media. Maintenance of war activities
necessitates a certain degree of control over the media, as its depiction of the conflict has
the potential to influence public opinion in ways that are not desirable by the belligerents.
However, the organizational structures and political ideologies in action during the 2006
war  provided  that  the  media  access  differed  greatly  in  the  territories  under  either
Hezbollah's or Israeli control. This was partly due to the societal difference, as one is an
democratic  society  with freedom of  speech and press  respected,  while  the other  is  an
example of a closed society with firm ideological grip over its members maintained by the
power institutions. The difference in control is reflected in the access the journalists were
provided to the conflict zones under either of the belligerent's control. In their attempts to
control the media the belligerents  thus  differed greatly and I argue that this was due to
their societal construction. 
Societies cherishing liberal democracy, particularly ones making clear attempts to
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protect the freedom of speech and press, such as Israel, find it far more difficult to muzzle
the media than closed societies such as Hezbollah do. Hezbollah had a firm institutional
and  ideological  grip  over  their  media  due  to  the  very  fact  that  such  control  was
institutionalized  into  their  societal  construction.  The  closed  nature  of  such  a  society
provides  that  they  are  in  a  clearly  advantageous  position  in  comparison  to  liberal
democratic,  open  societies,  when  it  comes  to  conducting  effective  centrifugal
ideologization. The liberal democratic societies, keen on protecting the freedom of speech
and press, provide a ground for scattering ideological beliefs and thus sabotage universal
centralized narratives which the military ideally aims to achieve centrifugal ideologization.
The fact that journalists are to a large degree left to their own devices when providing an
interpretation  of  the  events  they  cover,  provides  an  easy  ground  for  hindering  the
effectiveness of centrifugal ideologization. A prime historic example of the vulnerability of
open societies to this phenomena was the Vietnamese War. It has prevalently been argued
that the relative freedom of US journalists to report on the Vietnamese War turned public
opinion  against  the  administration  and  while  the  Americans  were  coming  close  to
winning the war, they were still forced to retreat due to the the popular public pressure
and  anti-war  protests  at  home.  This  had  been  instigated  by  the  nearly  unrestricted
reporting from the battles and the fact that is was the first “Television War”153 bringing
images of the horrific realities of warfare into common American living rooms and thereby
provoking an anti-war popular response. This sobered up the military establishment and
was not to be repeated.154 It is for this very reason that the US has subsequently adopted a
common practice of censorship during the times of war, as not to hinder the conduct of
effective  centrifugal  ideologization  both  on  the  level  of  military  and  in  terms  of  the
domestic “population battleground”. Thus the keen maintenance of an “open character”
of Western-like societies during the times of war can potentially hinder their ability to
conduct effective centrifugal ideologization in comparison to societies of a closed nature,
such as Hezbollah, who are able to control their media and project an image of order and
discipline. 
What one could observe during the Second Lebanon War was that societies keen
on  protecting  the  freedom  of  speech  and  press,  such  as  Israel,  find  themselves  in  a
significant disadvantage in comparison to closed societies when it comes to imposing their
own narrative on the media and hence on their ability to conduct effective centrifugal
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ideologization. While closed societies such as Hezbollah are able to project an impression
of order and discipline, open societies such as Israel, project the opposite: rumors spread
rapidly,  leaders  feel  obliged  to  comment  and  issue  statements  without  complete
understanding  of  the  issues  on  which  they  comment,  and  the  strong  professional
competition drives journalists to publish and broadcast information which can prove to
have no substance.155 This was gravely reflected in the conflict of 2006, when Hezbollah
was able to project a distinctly clear narrative, while the Israeli response was relatively
chaotic. Thus often times open societies become the victim of their own openness, as their
inability  to  coordinate  their  media  and  society  adequately  with  the  war  effort  can
undermine  their  military  efficiency.  What  follows  is  an overview of  this  control  with
regard to both sides of the conflict. 
Hezbollah  was  able  to  exert  a  rigid  control  over  the  media  by  providing
information to the foreign and other media by providing “tours” through their regions.
Such tours were governed by a rigid set of rules and routes, prohibiting the journalists
from deviating from set paths, additionally prohibiting contact with the inhabitants of the
regions they went through. The regions in question were always exclusively those civilian
areas which had been heavily damaged by Israeli air raids. In addition, pictures were only
allowed to be taken of Hezbollah' approved cites and any violation of this was met with
confiscation of equipment.156 Despite these restrictions, journalists attempted to bypass
them by arriving at the scene and operating unofficially. They still  met restrictions, as
whenever they saw an opportunity to take footage of the guerrillas, they were warned not
to do so, or else they would „run into trouble when returning to Beirut“.  The result was
such, that the main imagery that surfaced in the western media was the devastation of the
civilian infrastructure of Southern Lebanon, with pictures of civilians trying to survive in
the war scenery. The rarest picture of them all was one depicting a Hezbollah guerrilla.
Interviews with Hezbollah officials or soldiers were thus practically non-existent on the
media scene. All of this served the information strategy of Hezbollah who only provided
limited access to the battlefield and encouraged the visiting journalists to use their own
television network – Al-Manar – as their source.
Despite the complaints from a large number of foreign journalists about the lack of
access on the Israeli side, the Israelis were not particularly successful in their control over
the media. The attempts at censorship were largely unsuccessful, as they were unable to
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stop the reporters from bypassing the restrictions and using modern technologies to cover
the conflict. In addition, they did not have a clear informational strategy when it came to
restricting access, as interviews were conducted with IDF soldiers baffled by Hezbollah's
resistance and with the Israeli officials alike. 
The result of these restrictions and methods employed by Hezbollah and Israel to
shape the international media coverage was the emergence of a distinct set of narratives
clearly beneficial for Hezbollah and its strategic informational objectives. What follows is a
brief examination of two basic strategies and their effect on the war. 
„Disproportionate“ attacks
Hezbollah had a clear informational strategy during the Second Lebanon War. The
campaign's first aim was to remove its fighters from the media scene. In doing so, they
prohibited  their  press  from publishing  photos  of  their  fighters  who  gave  little  or  no
interviews.  The  structural  discipline  to  avoid  images  or  reports  picturing  Hezbollah's
fighters from appearing was key to achieving this goal. Hezbollah as the main political
force at the region, was able to coerce the press to comply with these bans and as a result,
the Israeli air raids on civilian zones were the main imagery of the war that appeared in the
media. The goal of such coercion was to enforce a narrative in which the Israelis were
reacting disproportionately to Hezbollah's provocations. Snyder identified three ways in
which this strategy influenced the perception of the war: (1) It fostered the impression
that on one side,  stood a modern army and on the other only civilians;  (2) It subtly
undercut the Israel's claim that Hezbollah used civilians as human shields – if there are no
pictures of fighters then there can be no proof of fighters exploiting helpless civilians; (3)
It removed the Syrian and Iranian influence from the scene.157 
In  addition,  Marvin  Kalb  finds  it  beyond  doubt  that  the  theme  of
disproportionality was emphasized by the media everywhere starting from day one.158 It
was not only the disproportionality  of  the Israeli  attack that  was focused on,  but the
disproportionality surfaced in the depiction of casualties  as well.  Despite the fact  that
there were casualties on both sides – the flow of Katyusha rockets fired into Israel by
Hezbollah did not stop throughout the conflict – the media disproportionality reported
on the casualties on the Lebanese side.  This was to be expected from Arabic-language
newspapers, such as Asharq Al-Awsat who provided 24 headline photographs of the war:
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22  photographs  of  the  destruction  caused  by  Israel  in  Lebanon,  and  just  1  of  the
destruction caused by Hezbollah in Israel.159 
When it came to western media, such as the BBC, then while 38% of the stories
they ran pointed out Israel as the aggressor, Hezbollah was depicted as the aggressor only
in 4% of the stories.160 In addition, Kalb referred to the research of Media Tenor – a media
research organization in Germany – according to which both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya
favored the view that Israel was the “aggressor”, as 78% of the stories Al-Jazeera ran on the
war  referred  to  Israel  as  the  aggressor,  while  in  case  of  Al-Arabiya  the  corresponding
number was 94%.161 
This strategy was thus extremely successful. The main theme that emerged in Arab
and European reporting of the conflict was the repeated assertion that Israel responded
disproportionately to Hezbollah's initial provocation. This mounted pressure on the IDF,
as such reporting was the basis  of  the increasing diplomatic pressure from its  allies  –
particularly  from  the  United  States  –  calling  Israel  to  limit  or  to  halt  its  operation
altogether. This severely limited IDF's capabilities, as military success required intensifying
attacks, yet their intensity correlated with the mounting diplomatic pressure on Israel.  
Civilian-victim narrative
Wartime propaganda provided by Hezbollah was the constant use of the Civilian-
Victim narrative.  The central claim of this narrative is  "You (Israelis,  Americans or any
adversary)  are  killing  innocent  women  and  children  or  supporting  someone  who  is."162
According to Snyder this was the core of their information strategy. Such an approach
grants universal appeal, as people are naturally inclined to sympathize with the civilian
suffering caused by war. It is then especially paramount for terrorist groups like Hezbollah
to play on these universal sympathies, as their ideological appeal is largely limited to the
ranks of the already indoctrinated. 
The IDF had already prior  to the war been struggling with the civilian-victim
narrative. In all of the cases, their military operations would spark claims about civilian
suffering and casualties; the media and the internet will provide that these claims spread
globally;  third  parties  such  as  NGOs  will  validate  these  claims  and  as  a  result,  the
legitimacy  of  the  operation  becomes  severely  undermined  in  all  of  the  McCuen's
population battlegrounds. In addition, Hezbollah's Civilian-Victim narrative was enforced
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not only by the international media, but also by the NGOs in the region such as the
Human Rights Watch, who reported on "serious violations of international humanitarian
law"  in which they suggested that the IDF had purposefully targeted civilians with no
connection  to  military  activity,  while  simultaneously  admitting  that  Hezbollah  had
occasionally stored weapons in or near civilian homes.163
Concluding remarks
The Second Lebanon War acutely demonstrated the necessity for modern conventional
armies to adjust their approaches when facing a possible hybrid adversary. The Western
scholars have responded to this conflict by emphasizing and prioritizing the theories of
Hybrid Warfare in order to properly understand such conflicts. My argument with regard
to the war was that Hezbollah was able to achieve success largely due to their progress in
producing  effective  centrifugal  ideologization,  as  their  fighters  were  ideologically
homogeneous and highly motivated to fight and Hezbollah was thus ready to pay in heavy
casualties in order to inflict a continuous loss of life on the IDF. 
Secondly I argue that the organizational and institutional layout and structure of
Hezbollah  are  clear  manifestations  of  bureaucratization  of  coercion.  Their  structure
facilitates  institutionalized  violence,  and the  ideology  of  Hezbollah grants  it  a  greater
degree of coerciveness. The institutional layout where the Hezbollah-adopted curriculum
in schools and the maintenance of extensive youth organizations ease the process of future
coercion through indoctrination and facilitation of an anti-Israeli state of mind from a
very young age, ultimately coercing them to participate in the “defensive jihad” against the
state  of  Israel.  Thus  cumulative  bureaucratization  of  coercion  was  achieved  through
Hezbollah's complex organizational structure which was able to indoctrinate its fighters
from a  young  age,  provided  them with  social  security  in  turn  for  loyalty,  ultimately
securing that the military function effectively during times of war.'
Thirdly I argue that centrifugal ideologization was institutionalized into the very
structure  of  Hezbollah.  It's  ability  to  conduct  effective  centrifugal  ideologization
depended  on  the  social  institutions  established  within  the  institutional  framework  of
Hezbollah. Thus, I consider sub-divisions of the Social Service Sector, such as the Imam
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Al-Mahdi  Scouts  movement  and  the  educational  branch  along  with  the  Information
Council – a sub-division of the Political Council – clear institutional manifestations of
centrifugal ideologization. These institutions are explicitly responsible for radiating the
ideology of  Hezbollah and help indoctrinate  the populations  under  their  influence to
become fighters of the “lesser jihad”. Hezbollah would likely suffer significant difficulties
in  conducting  effective  centrifugal  ideologization  would  these  institutions  become
undermined or removed altogether.
Additionally, I argue that the military effectiveness of non-standard hybrid actors is
often a result of a closed societies' – or hybrid societies' as defined by Nemeth 164 – ability
to perform effective centrifugal ideologization. Closed societies are able to exert control
over the media – and thus the narratives featured in the media – far more effectively than
open societies who remain keen on protecting the freedom of speech and press. As a result
of this, open societies find it far more complex to impose centralized narratives which
could effectively enforce centrifugal ideologization than closed societies do. It thus follows
that closed societies, such as Hezbollah are in a clearly advantageous situation when it
comes to imposing narratives on the media necessary for achieving effective centrifugal
ideologization. Additionally, the open societies which will keenly attempt to protect the
freedom of speech and press provide an ideal ground for scattering ideological beliefs, and
its  belligerents  can take advantage of  this  by providing its  media  with narratives  that
undermine the conduct of effective centrifugal ideologization.  Following the debacle of
the  Vietnamese  War,  the  US  learned  it  the  hard  way,  and  it  became  common  that
reporters  and journalists  found themselves  restricted  and censored  when  covering  the
subsequent wars. The war efforts of liberal open societies, anxious to protect the freedom
of speech and press, thus often suffer from this very openness. This was clearly witnessed
also during the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict where Israeli military establishment not only
already perceived a negative bias in the international media, but failed to control their
media effectively and reassert the legitimacy of their campaign on the level of relevant
“population battlegrounds”.  The inability of the Israeli state to battle the narratives of
civilian victims and disproportionality illustrate this problem very well, and provided that
Hezbollah's information warfare proved a major success, as external diplomatic pressure
on Israel soon forced an internationally mediated ceasefire into effect.
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Russian incursions into Ukraine
The most recent conflict in question is the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Despite the fact
that the conflict is still unresolved, there has been invigorated debate and scholarly interest
on the subject, both from military and civilian institutions.165 166 167 168 The content of the
conflict  examined  in  the  following  sections  is  the  annexation  of  Crimea  and  the
subsequent Hybrid War waged in Eastern Ukraine, henceforth referred to as the War in
Donbass.  Since  the  Russian  intervention  in  Ukraine  was  preceded  by  an  exhaustive
information warfare campaign, I will assume that both the operations in Crimea and the
subsequent  involvement  in  Eastern  Ukraine  are  a  result  of  the  application  of  a
comprehensive strategy developed beforehand, and the operations conducted under the
framework of these strategies ought to be considered a single continuous conflict. This is a
logical  realization  in  the  context  of  Russian  military  theorists  and generals  who have
repeatedly stressed the importance of non-military means and the consequent formulation
that contemporary warfare blurs both the distinction between war and peace and who
actually fights. 169 170 171
Russian involvement in the battles  of Eastern Ukraine has to be understood in
terms of the political goals Kremlin aims to achieve with such an involvement. Since the
whole crisis was triggered by Ukraine's leadership warming up toward the EU and the
West, the obvious goal for Kremlin has been and is to avoid that. Ukraine is to a degree
considered a part of Russia, a close ally, or neutral at best. As Henry Kissinger puts it:
“To Russia, Ukraine can never be a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called
Kievan-Rus.  The  Russian religion  spread from there.  Ukraine  has  been part  of  Russia  for
centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. [...] Even such famed dissidents as
Aleksandr  Solzhenitsyn  and Joseph  Brodsky  insisted  that  Ukraine  was  an integral  part  of
Russian history and, indeed, of Russia.”172 
The standpoint of Russia on this matter is  complex and Andrew Wilson believes that
Russian leadership is psychologically unable to cope with the idea of an equal relationship
with Ukraine, as a separate sovereign entity.173 However, Ukraine becoming completely
foreign in the face of closer relations with the EU and NATO represents a red line for the
Kremlin and has proven that they will take actions would this state of affairs be shaken up.
Indeed, the leading Russian officials including president Vladimir Putin had repeatedly
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stressed the possible severe implications, would Ukraine's warming up toward the West
materialize into specific  contracts and actions.  In 2008, amidst  the speculations about
Georgia and Ukraine potentially joining NATO, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
stated that Moscow will do everything it can to prevent the two countries from becoming
NATO members.174 His statement was backed by the Russian Chief of Staff General Yuri
Baluyevsky who declared that steps taken aimed at ensuring its interests at the border “will
not only be military steps, but also steps of a different nature.”175 Splitting up Ukraine as a
consequence of  meddling with EU and NATO was  allegedly  mentioned by president
Putin already as early as in 2008.176 And the radical aftermath of Euromaidan acted as a
toreador for the bull that then ran for Crimea.
I believe that taking any action had to be preceded by a clear realization of the
strategic goals. While the West and Ukraine have spoken of a full occupation narrative,177
occupying the whole of Ukraine clearly was not a goal. Rather, a more realistic strategic
goal would be to keep Ukraine in its "sphere of influence": keep it a compliant buffer zone
between the West and Russia. However, complete secession of both Crimea and Eastern
Ukraine into the Russian Federation would not be able to fulfill this goal, as the Western
and Central part of current Ukraine would stay out of reach and would likely be pro-EU
and pro-NATO,  based  on  their  historical  affiliations  with  Europe,  manifested  by  the
Euromaidan  itself.  In  addition,  such  an  incorporation  would  demand  that  the  state-
building necessary for the normal functioning of post-war Eastern Ukraine fall under the
responsibility of Russia and its finances. In the face of the fact that Russia already invested
heavily in Crimea,178 a much larger region of Eastern Ukraine would demand far greater
financial support and covering these costs – which would now also include repairing large
war  damages  –  should  seem  largely  undesirable.  Therefore,  to  achieve  Ukrainian
compliance in terms of it being a buffer zone, Kremlin's main goal should in fact be to
maintain Ukrainian territorial  integrity,  and in this  sense the Oblasts  of Luhansk and
Donetsk would have to remain part of Ukraine, as a proposed federative counterweight to
Western  Ukrainian  affiliations.  In  this  context  it  is  clear  why  Putin  has  refused  to
incorporate Donetsk and Luhansk into the Russian Federation. 
Lastly, it is important to note here that while largely engineered by the Kremlin
and  its  involvement,  the  leaders  of  Donetsk  People's  Republic  and  Luhansk  People's
Republic (henceforth referred to as DPR and LPR respectively) have not always endorsed
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Kremlin's  goals.  This  is  clear from the statements of  both entities'  leaders  during the
signing of the first Minsk agreement in September 2014. Igor Plotnitsky – the head of
LPR – claimed that "sooner or later, we will become part of the Russian Federation"179 while
the  leader  of  DPR,  Alexander  Zakharchenko  considered  being  forced  to  sign  the
agreement an act of betrayal.180 Both of them had repeatedly asked Putin to incorporate
DPR and LPR into the Russian Federation.  
Hybridity of Crimea and Donbass
First aspect of what made this a Hybrid War was the irregular forces present throughout
the conflict. In Crimea, the little green men181 fit the definition of irregular military insofar
as they were unmarked and no recognizable emblems that would provide grounds for
identification as part of a particular organization of armed forces. Western media depicted
them as Russian,  based on analysis  of  their  weaponry and equipment,  while  the pro-
Russian  media  responded  by  presenting  them  –  based  on  Putin's  words  –  as  local
spontaneous  self-defense  units,  who  might  have  come  in  possession  of  their  Russian
uniforms  and  weaponry  from  shops.  These  forces  blockaded  crucial  Ukrainian
administrative  institutions,  such  as  the  parliament  in  Simferopol,  the  International
Airport of Simferopol and most of the military bases in Crimea. The irregular military
forces that presented themselves in Ukraine in late February of 2014 had an essential role
in orchestrating the swift and successful takeover of Ukrainian territory by the Russian
Federation. 
The lack of declaration of war by any side rendered the Ukrainian counterpart
stunned as they lacked any proper strategy to counter the "little green men". In reality it is
now known that  the little  green men were in fact  those Russian soldiers  stationed in
Crimean military bases operated by Russia aided by its special operations forces.182 183 But
the initial denial of their Russian origin and the maintenance of their irregular nature was
crucial in rendering the Ukrainian and international community helpless in countering
them. 
Similar  denial  has  been  present  throughout  the  War  in  Donbass,  where  the
Russians  are  backing  the  separatist  movements  in  Eastern  Ukraine  by  sending
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humanitarian  and  military  reinforcements  over  the  border.  The  latter  is  a  well
documented fact, however one that is continuously denied by the Russian officials and
their controlled media. United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
has repeatedly issued reports in which this is discussed. The leader of the self-proclaimed
Donetsk People's Republic Alexander Zakharchenko stated on 27th August of 2014, that
3000-4000 Russians were fighting alongside the armed groups, including both former and
serving  Russian  soldiers;  and  the  Ukrainian  forces  reported  being  bombarded  with
advanced weaponry.184 The monitoring mission claimed that  „an increasing number  of
foreign fighters  were  reported to  be participating  in  the  fighting,  including citizens  of  the
Russian Federation: „former servicemen“ or active duty personnel „on leave“.”185 In the latest
fully available report – during the writing of this thesis – of the United Nations regarding
the  period  from  16th February  to  15th May  of  2015,   it  was  noted  that  „reports  of
sophisticated  heavy  weaponry  and  fighters  being  supplied  from  the  Russian  Federation
persisted.“186 187 In addition, the reports indicate that various Ukrainian soldiers were kept
in captivity on the territory of the Russian Federation.188 However, the Russian officials
have denied any official intervention and president Putin has unequivocally claimed that
there are no Russian troops in Ukraine.189 In addition, Putin has claimed that the Russian
soldiers in eastern Ukraine were merely volunteers and could not be called mercenaries as
they were not paid.190 This conforms with the official narrative adopted by the Kremlin,
emphasizing that those Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine are volunteers or on official
vacations. This narrative was also partly supported by Zakharchenko who claimed through
Rossiya-24 that „a lot of soldiers come to us from Russia, soldiers who prefer to spend their
vacation not on seashores but in the same ranks with their brothers as they battle for freedom in
Donbass.“191
The denial of  any  official involvement is  firstly necessary for the success of the
operation, as was the case in the earlier Crimean part of the operation and secondly, this
rhetoric allows the Kremlin to shrug off any official or direct responsibility for the conflict
in Eastern Ukraine. As long as these forces remain unrecognized as officially in Russian
service, they ought to be considered irregular, and as such, the Ukrainians are facing both
separatist and irregular forces in their attempts to remain in control of their territory. The
irregular forces are the first aspect of what made both the Crimean crisis and the early
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stages  of  the  War  in  Donbass  a  Hybrid  War.  In  addition,  the  lack  of  international
recognition for DPR and LPR renders them non-state entities, a further aspect descriptive
of  western Hybrid Warfare.   With the initial  hybrid tactics  providing little  success  in
Donbass,  the  later  increased  Russian  involvement  added  an  increasingly  conventional
element to the conflict.
I would also argue that the self-proclaimed republics of Eastern Ukraine are to be
considered  to  a  degree  an  extension  of  Russian  foreign  politics,  insofar  as  they  were
proclaimed by Russians and remained loyal and largely dependent on Russia throughout
the conflict. This will be addressed in the following sections. In essence I will argue that
the War in Donbass saw Ukrainian government forces fighting a Hybrid War against two
pseudo-states – or non-states –  both backed by and largely dependent on the Kremlin.
However, making an effort to define the whole of War in Donbass by presenting it
merely  through  the  lens  of  Western  Hybrid  Warfare  can  prove  insufficient  for
understanding the subtleties of the crisis.  Instead one can observe that the conduct of
Russia during the crisis of Ukraine largely follows the path of New-Generation Warfare as
discussed by Chekinov and Bogdnanov.192 The opening phase Chekinov and Bogdanov
discussed was set in motion long prior to the actual military engagement. They spoke of
an exhaustive campaign including diplomatic, ideological, psychological, economic and
information measures coupled with an intensive propaganda campaign. In the aftermath
of the takeover of the interim government in Kyiv, one can clearly observe nearly all of
these measures taken by the Kremlin against Ukraine, particularly prior to the annexation
of Crimea.  Diplomatic  pressure was seen in renouncing the legitimacy of  the interim
government  and undermining  that  of  the current  government;  ideological  pressure in
constant enforcement  of  a narrative  in which the interim government was fascist  and
corrupt193; economic pressure by the sharp increase of gas prices offered to Ukraine and
the halting of a loan program; all of which was coupled with an exhaustive propaganda
campaign in terms of information war, discussed later on. The closing part saw military
action in the face of taking over key strategic facilities by the Russian military in Crimea
and its support for the insurgents and their self-proclaimed republics in Eastern Ukraine.
All of this will be further examined in the following sections.
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Technological context
There were several technological aspects  outside the military sphere worth noting that
pertain to the conflict.  In the whole of the Ukrainian crisis,  social media has been of
central importance. The rise of social media as a means employed for conducting mass
protests and uprisings was evident already from the Arab Spring revolutions. Social media
– as integral as it would seem to our lives currently – is an extremely recent phenomena,
and as such, was not present on a large social scale in 2006 during the Second Lebanon
War.  As its global reach grew, so did its potency as an informational weapon, and a mere
four years later it proved central for organizing civilian revolts and uprisings in the Arab
nations, as well as organizing Ukrainian Euromaidan protests in 2013-2014.  It is after all
an environment where individual opinions sprouted out in an appealing linguistic form
can  grow  into  influential  ideological  slogans  in  a  matter  of  hours,  as  any  appealing
message  can  spread  to  any  other  part  of  the  connected  world  within  milliseconds.
Euromaidan activists  used the social  media mainly  for mobilization,  and according to
Olga Onuch, it was the second most influential channel for providing information about
where and when to take part in Euromaidan protest events in Ukraine.194 She notes that
the social media was more important for early joiners of the protests – those who joined
between 21st and 29th November – while those who joined later – after 30th November –
were  slightly  more  likely  to  rely  on  mainstream  media  when  it  came  to  getting
information about where and when the protests take place.195 This suggests that social
media was crucial during the inception stage of the protests when the media coverage was
minimal, and people had to rely on social media for information about the protests. In
addition, she noted that while social media provides ground for „individual ownership over
the mobilization process“, it also limits activist's control and management of the protests.196
That is, despite the fact that it gives ordinary citizens a central role in the mobilization
process, it can allow radicals to take control, as witnessed during the Euromaidan protests
where it resulted in the 18-19 February massacre.197 
In  addition  the  conventional  and  internet  media  have  been  the  ground  for
information warfare conducted prior to the military involvement. Russian state media had
a strong ground in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, therefore it became a tool facilitating the
image of chaos and anarchy in Ukraine, manifested in the alleged threat to the Russian-
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speaking populations. 
In a military sense the armies fighting in Eastern Ukraine were far from being
considered modern at the start. The basis of Ukrainian Armed Forces (henceforth referred
to as UAF) military equipment was Soviet. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine
inherited  all  the  military  equipment  and  formations  stationed  in  their  territory.  This
inheritance was remarkable.  Ukraine came into possession of  the world's  fourth most
powerful  military,  only  behind  the  US,  China  and  Russia,  and  in  some  cases  their
weapons systems were even more advanced than that of Russia.198 But what was on paper
an extremely capable force was left without proper maintenance. The army was constantly
downsized and underfunded and as a result became largely outdated and physically not
ready for combat. By 2010, only 6000 ground troops were being maintained for constant
battle readiness.199 Same problems haunted the air and naval forces, the former of which
had only 31 fighters and 10 bombers and 8 ground-attack aircraft deemed operational
while the latter had only 4 ships combat ready.200 The problem with the ill-ready army
became clear  when Yanukovych attempted to deploy military  against  the Euromaidan
protests, but no other part than Immediate Reaction Force could be used. In addition,
some of  its  brigades  could not  be utilized,  as  they were sympathetic  with the protest
movement. In the end only about 500-600 paratroopers along with several tanks from
Zhytomyr were deployed along with 350 marines and the special units forces who were in
fact  naval  commandos,  combat  swimmers201 –  not  an  ideal  force  for  inland  special
operations. 
Along with the outmoded and ill for battle UAF, a large number of paramilitaries
have been formed to fight the insurgent groups in Eastern Ukraine. Among the most
prominent  are  the  Donbass,  Azov  and  Kharkiv  battalions,  now all  in  allegiance  with
separate  ministries  of  Ukraine  and  therefore  possessing  largely  the  same  type  of
equipment.
The  initial  basis  of  Luhansk  and  Donetsk  armies  was  similar.  The  military
equipment available to the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk was largely that of the
Ukrainian army and therefore the Ukrainian military was aware what kind and quantity of
equipment had been lost to the separatists after the takeover of Donetsk and Luhansk
territories. In addition, it was announced that a number of military and security personnel
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had joined the separatists  and about  15 000 policemen in the Donetsk  and Luhansk
regions  had  defected.  Furthermore,  the  separatists  received  military  equipment  from
Russia, such as the the weapons captured by Russians in Crimea. This has been proven by
various  authorities,  but  one  can  clearly  see  the  importance  of  this  equipment  and
manpower when looking into the course of the war itself. The separatists were haunted by
a lack of success in the early stages of the war in Donbass, as Ukrainian forces were able to
re-take territory and slowly but steadily advance. Following major setbacks, Igor Girkin,
the insurgent commander of DPR blamed the inexperience of his irregular troops and the
problems with mobilizing people to cover for the losses and called for immediate help
from the Russian Federation.202 By the 3rd of August, the UAF reported that nearly 3/4 of
the territory the insurgents had previously seized had been re-captured by the Ukrainian
forces.  With  both  the  cities  of  Donetsk  and  Luhansk  seeing  battles  inside  them,  the
situation became critical for the insurgents. As a result, the sending of military aid in the
form of a Russian incursion occurred.203 204 205 The aid of a more coherent conventional
force soon halted the advances of the Ukrainians and a counter-offensive was carried out
instead.  The Russian incursions  to  Ukraine and their  military and humanitarian help
provided to DPR and LPR appears to have had a severe effect on the outcome of the
battles, as the initial failures were replaced by an effective counter-offensive. On 15th of
August, DPR's leader Alexander Zakharchenko stated that the reinforcement that came
from Russia played a decisive role in organization of the counter-offensive.206 The military
equipment employed during the following part of the conflict was suddenly more modern
than that  of  Ukraine  and  saw the  separatists  use  modern Russian  tanks,  such  as  the
Russian T-72B3 which was the latest T-72 model in Russian service, introduced only in
2013 and is not known to have been exported.207 For a comprehensive overview of other
such arms  and munitions  employed  during  the  first  months  of  the  conflict,  refer  to
Ferguson and Jenzen-Jones report.208 The Kremlin however denounced its involvement
with claims that the Russian soldiers – such as the paratroopers spotted on 25th of August
20 km in Ukraine – had crossed the border  "by accident",209 or that the troops were in
Ukraine voluntarily.
Fighting two opponents aided by a superior force proved too much for the UAF
and  as  a  result  they  began  to  lose  territory.  The  “anti-terrorist”  campaign  quickly
transformed into a defensive operation. The counter-offensive was to a degree disrupted
66
by the agreement of the first Minsk ceasefire on the 5th of September, though fighting
continued, albeit on a smaller scale. 
Cumulative bureaucratization of coercion
The degree to which bureaucratization of  coercion is  achieved depends largely on the
structural  integrity  and  organizational  might  of  the  adversary.  In  order  to  properly
understand the military operations conducted by the self-proclaimed republics of Luhansk
and Donetsk and their initial failures it is thus paramount to examine the nature of the
institutions established, responsible for their military organization. Thus in the following
sections I will first examine the social structures of DPR and LPR in order to uncover any
peculiarities the social organization of the rebellious Eastern Ukraine embodied during the
initial stages of conflict. Secondly, I will follow up by analyzing the implications of these
structural peculiarities and seek to establish if there was an effect, and if yes then to what a
degree, on the conduct and results of the battles fought in Eastern Ukraine.
While much of Western emphasis has gone on the attempts to label DPR and LPR
as similar terrorist organizations, as claimed by Ukraine, I will attempt to go beyond such
labeling and examine the social structures responsible for the governing of the political
and military entities they encompass. There are striking differences between the emerged
entities and it is certainly worth examining these structural differences, as I argue that they
directly influenced the outcome of the battles conducted during the conflict. In addition,
the first months after their creation, both DPR's and LPR's respective militias operated in
separate  theaters  or  war,  both  controlling  their  own  regions  and  lacking  both  in
coordination  between  themselves  and  the  political  leadership  of  their  self-proclaimed
republics. I will examine the development of the structures of the respective entities in a
chronological  fashion  in  the  next  paragraphs  and  follow  up  with  analyzing  the
implications these structural peculiarities had in terms of cumulative bureaucratization of
coercion and whether or not the cumulative nature of bureaucratization indeed increased
the effectiveness of their forces.
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Donetsk and Donbass People's Militia
First to be formed was the Donbass People's Militia, which was originally involved
in capturing the government and strategic buildings in the Donetsk Oblast, led by Pavel
Gubarev, who after capturing a regional government building in Donetsk had declared
himself the People's Governor of the Donetsk region. However, following this declaration
he was arrested by the Secret Service of Ukraine (henceforth referred to as SBU) on 6 th of
March and faced charges of up to 10 years in prison.210 The organization of the rebels
became  more  coherent  as  Igor  Girkin  declared  the  creation  of  the  Donetsk  People's
Republic after militants under his control had seized the Regional Administration and the
City Hall of Donetsk.211  
Igor Girkin is a controversial figure. He does not originate from Donbass nor is he
Ukrainian. Girkin is an ethnic Russian born in Moscow who served as a colonel of the
Russian army, having served both in Bosnian and Chechen Wars, as well as taken part in
the orchestration of the takeover of Crimea.212 His role has been cited as proof of direct
Russian involvement in Eastern Ukraine and he was accused of being a Russian agent213
and he indeed later admitted to being a colonel of the FSB.214 After the declaration of the
republic, the occupation of local government buildings followed and on 12 th April a group
of militants led by Girkin seized strategic buildings in Slovyansk for the declared Donetsk
People's Republic. This group of militants became known as the Donbass People's Militia.
However,  since  the  original  leader  of  the  militia  had been  arrested  by  the  SBU,  the
militant structure was not coherent, with members of it identifying with different leaders,
depending on the region of the Oblast they fought in. While some claimed to be fighting
under the command of Girkin, others identified themselves under Gubarev's leadership.
Such  initial  organizational  confusion  was  common to  both  self-proclaimed  republics,
largely  due  to the  lack  of  coordination between the  political  and military  leadership.
Girkin remained in control of the rebel forces as the Defense Minister of DPR until 14 th
of  August  2014.  He  did  not  expect  that  Russia's  involvement  would  not  follow  the
scenario of Crimea and that both the DPR and LPR would to a large degree be left to
their own devices. He claimed that the separatist groups had not contemplated building
functional  states  and  instead  hoped  to  be  incorporated  into  Russia  and  when  the
realization that this will not occur hit them, they were shocked.215 
As one could observe, DPR's initial political arena was turbulent, with no clear
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authority emerging prior to the first ceasefire. Alleged assassination attempts within the
DPR' leadership were experienced by various people, including Gubarev who had been
released in a prison-swapping operation in May.216 However, the political rivalry between
different rebel factions saw Gubarov lose most of his influence. He was pushed on the
background as businessman Denis Pushilin took over for a short while, only to be replaced
by a Moscow political strategist Alexander Borodai who in August announced that he will
return to Moscow. In explaining his resignation Borodai later said that 
„I myself became a fierce advocate of Strelkov's217 departure from the DPR, since I realized that
a period would ensue when the fragile appearance of peace would emerge and such people as
Strelkov or myself  would not  longer be necessary.  Imagine how it  would look if  I put  my
signature  on the "Minsk" agreements,  as  a  native  of  the city  of  Moscow. Such a political
construction cannot exist for long. We did our duty, we helped the DPR and in the end, we left
it.“218 
Borodai  was  succeeded  by  one  of  the  prominent  DPR's  military  leaders:  Alexander
Zakharchenko.  He  has  remained  the  political  leader  ever  since.  The  appointment  of
Zakharchenko was crucial, as he provided stability for the relations between the political
and military spheres, with an obvious bias for the latter. The early DPR was hence an
environment with incoherent leadership, where the military and political actors remained
in strong contention for the legitimate power which would be the source of their ability to
enforce their agenda on the local population. 
The  military  operations  have  to  be  understood  in  this  context.  The  initial
operations starting in late spring 2014 were mostly defensive, attempting to keep back the
Ukrainian "anti-terrorist" offensives. However they were largely unsuccessful. The loss of
the city of Slovyansk and the continuous successes of the UAF and the Ukrainian forces
led the offensive on the doorstep of Donetsk. The government forces were able to capture
the airport of Donetsk, and in the south continued the advance toward Mariupol. In the
context of the failures, Igor Girkin found it convenient to resign as Defense Minister on
14th of  August  and was replaced by a Ukrainian-born Vladimir  Kononov.  Despite his
resignation, Girkin asserts that he was „pulled out of the game“ without elaborating what
he meant but said that it „would be destructive“ for him to stay, as he did not support the
political goals that the Kremlin was aiming for.219 He returned to Moscow and has been
there ever since.  After the initial  turbulent relations between the military and political
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sphere  phased  off,  and  larger  Russian  incursions  occurred,  the  militias  were  able  to
become more successful in combating the governmental forces.  
Luhansk and the Army of the South-East
Luhansk  People's  Republic  was  announced  by  Valery  Botov  –  a  Russian  born
"People's Governor” – after  the seizure of strategic buildings by the Luhansk People's
Militia, also known as the Army of the South-East.  While Botov became the political
leader,  the  military  formation under  it  was  far  less  institutionalized  than its  Donetsk
counterpart. In fact, it soon became clear that the political leadership of LPR had little
authority over the emerged militia formations. The authorities which claimed to be in
control of LPR actually only controlled Luhansk and its vicinity, while the rest of the
territories  were under the control  of autonomous armed formations,  styled as Russian
Cossacks and ruled by their „atamans“.220 These militia formations appeared to be de facto
rulers  of  the  portions  of  LPR  under  their  control.  Each  of  these  rulers  were  field
commanders who had to a certain extent take commands from the political leadership of
LPR and their Russian sponsors, but retained control only over a certain territory and had
little cooperation with the neighboring commanders.221 In addition, such commanders
acted as de facto rulers of the territory under their control. They were able to fill the
vacuum  of  state  power  by  functioning  as  local  judges,  police  chiefs,  tax  collectors,
requisition authorities  and other social actors necessary for filling the vacuum. Such a
pattern of governance was not present in the DPR.
As a result of this,  each such brigade or battalion fought against the UAF in its own
region, and rarely conducted joint operations against the UAF – such commanders rarely
ventured out of their controlled territory. 
The relationship between the military and central political sphere was thus best
characterized as  distrustful.  How did this  contribute to the War itself?  Adding to the
initial technological inferiority of both militias, this only aggravated the situation. The
lack of coordination between the two republics and especially within the Luhansk People's
Militia  contributed  to  the  successes  of  the  early  Ukrainian  "anti-terrorist"  offensives.
Luhansk Militia was particularly weak and vulnerable. Until late August of 2014, they had
only conceded territory. On 14th of August, Bolotov resigned and was replaced by Igor
Plotnitsky,  however,  the  immediate  appointment  of  Plotnitsky  did  not  significantly
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improve the situation between the military and political leadership. 
Novorossiya and the United Armed Forces of Novorossiya
In  an  attempt  to  seek  further  political  and  military  unity,  talk  had  emerged
between  the  leaders  of  both  DPR  and  LPR  about  the  creation  of  Novorossiya,  a
confederation between the two entities. Among other things, this meant the incorporation
of  the  two  militias  into  a  United  Armed  Forces  of  Novorossiya.  Despite  the
announcement of the Novorossiya project on 22nd of May 2014, the armies under their
command remained separate and regional, corresponding to respective territories under
their control and the announcement of the creation of the United Forces of Novorossiya
did not occur until after the first Minsk ceasefire was signed on 5th of September. Despite
the first ceasefire being largely ignored, the elections of Ukrainian parliament took place,
with the Donbass region excluded as they held their own elections. The Donetsk People's
Militia and Luhansk People's Militia converged into the United Armies of Novorossiya
and this military union persisted despite the idea of Novorossiya being abandoned in May
next year.222 As such, both DPR and LPR remain separate entities, described as terrorist
groups by the Ukrainian government and as a result, despite the usage of the umbrella
term United Armies of Novorossiya, the militias in question have also remained separate
entities and largely regional with their own peculiarities. 
The  signing  of  the  first  Minsk  agreement  did  nothing  but  further  agitate  the
distrust between the militia and political leaders,  as it  had been signed at a time of a
successful counter-offensive. The lack of political control provided that the ceasefire went
largely ignored by the militias and the fighting continued – albeit on a smaller scale – after
the signing of the first and the second Minsk agreements.
Structural implications
With  the  loose  structure  of  DPR and  LPR their  initial  capabilities  to  achieve
bureaucratization of coercion were very limited. This was partly due to their expectation
to be incorporated into Russia, as had happened in Crimea and thus they did not initially
perceive the necessity  to create any bureaucratic  structure of  the state,  other  than the
establishment of  a political-military leadership necessary for a facade of  legitimacy for
requesting incorporation into Russia. But this strategy collapsed and in the aftermath it
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can  clearly  be  observed  that  the  bureaucratization  of  coercion  has  been  cumulative,
contributing to their following successful military campaigns and operations. I interpret
the initial military failures during the summer of 2014 as a direct result of the lack of
bureaucratization of coercion. Local warlords fought in their own dispersed regions with
little  bureaucratic  order  surfacing  capable  of  governing  the  whole  regions  supposedly
under DPR and LPR's control. In fact, both of the political leaderships had their own
central  militias  stationed in Luhansk and Donetsk,  and the lack  of  their  bureaucratic
coerciveness  is  well  illustrated  by  the  confusion  between  the  military  and  political
establishments in DPR, whose soldiers were not sure as to who was their leader – Girkin
or Gubarev – and in LPR, where the local warlords who had acquired their own territories
during the takeover of the region often defied the orders arriving from Luhansk. However,
attempts to establish cumulative bureaucratization of coercion became evident once the
central political powers had been consolidated in DPR and LPR after the appointment of
Alexander  Zakharchenko  and  Igor  Plotnitsky  respectively,  following  the  simultaneous
resignations of ethnic Russians Igor Girkin and Valery Bolotov on 14 th of August. The
following period saw the consolidation of political power as the elections in Donbass were
used as a facade of legitimacy in justifying the following announcement of a mobilization
in the territories  of  DPR and LPR223 under  the umbrella  of  United Armed Forces of
Novorossiya. The mobilization meant the establishment of a force of 100 000 conscript
soldiers and increased bureaucratic order was clearly necessary for this. However, it has
remained unclear as to what numbers the mobilization actually reached. 
The  United  Armed  Forces  of  Novorossiya,  established  on  16th September  of
2014224 had been the first attempt at bureaucratization of coercion in the military sphere,
however it had been so in name only. There was no unifying central leadership, and both
the Donbass People's Militia and its Luhansk counterpart retained leadership pertaining
to  the  structure  under  their  control  and  despite  this  announcement,  there  was  little
cooperation  between  the  two  militias.  I  would  thus  argue  that  this  union  only  had
relevance in terms of its symbolic value, represented in its name. In addition, this was
simply the union of militias, rather than introduction of a regular army. Therefore the rate
and degree to which cumulative bureaucratization of coercion was achieved in DPR and
LPR  varied  depending  on  the  region.  I  will  analyze  what  constituted  these  variant
peculiarities in the following passages. 
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LPR faced the problem of decentralization from the very start of its proclamation.
Again, as it was expected to be incorporated into Russia, this initial confusion is to be
expected, however clarity did not fall upon Luhansk once the realization came that Russia
would not follow suit. Instead, the local leaders –  dispersed around the Luhansk Oblast –
grew  increasingly  dissatisfied  as  time  passed.  The  tension  between  the  autonomous
factions and LPR's central authorities grew even greater after the combat stopped on 9 th
December of 2014. The atamans had a number of problems with the central leadership,
first  of  which  was  that  they  considered  it  illegitimate.  Concurrently,  they  did  not
recognize the validity of the Minsk agreement and hence did not find it binding for them.
Instead they called for seizing the rest of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts from Ukraine to
complete  the  Novorossiya  project.  In  their  indignation  of  the  Luhansk  regime  they
resisted  any  attempts  of  centralization  within  LPR.  This  severely  undermined  any
attempts made at achieving centralized bureaucratization of coercion. In an attempt to
achieve  bureaucratic  coercion,  LPR  political  leadership  announced  the  creation  of  a
regular military through re-enlistment of the autonomous factions.  The atamans insisted
on preserving their formations and instead of being subordinated to the central authorities
of LPR they called for cooperation with them.225 LPR's central leadership refused and
established that those armed groups which did not join this central military force by 4 th of
April were declared illegal.226 Thus, while LPR had attempted to achieve coercion of the
ataman factions at first by moderate means – in which the political leadership of LPR
attempted  to  exert  a  certain  level  of  control  over  the  military  formations  through
economic  means  by  retaining  control  over  the  distribution  of  arms  provided  for  the
leadership for redistribution to its military formations – they soon resided for more radical
methods. Those resisting centralization were first simply asked to leave if they decide not
to  comply.  One  of  the  most  prominent  Don  Cossack  fighters  in  eastern  Ukraine,
nicknamed Babai, claimed in an interview to Komsomolskaya Pravda that 
„They asked us to leave; they said: 'If you want to live, leave.' [...] Being there became very
dangerous; they were driving out the Cossacks. [...] We were forced to leave.“227 228
The latest method of centralization of control has been to simply assassinate the ataman
leaders. One of the most prominent leaders Aleksei Mozgovoy was assassinated in May of
2015 and following his assassination, the remaining Don Cossack battalions in Eastern
Ukraine  were  integrated  into  the  Luhansk  People's  Republic  Army,229 or  returned  to
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Russia. The Cossacks merging with the People's Military provided the centrality necessary
for cumulative bureaucratization of coercion.  
DPR  faced  less  problems  in  institutionalizing  their  military  sphere.  After  the
Donbass elections in October and the subsequent announcement of  mobilization,  the
militant forces became united under the centralized command structure controlled by the
Defense Minister of DPR, and all other militant groups that did not join this centralized
structure were announced as illegitimate and ordered to surrender arms.230 As a result, the
bureaucratization  of  coercion  has  been  cumulative  in  both  cases,  with  increasing
bureaucratic  control  over  the  militant  structures  under  DPR  and  LPR's  command,
ultimately reflected on increasing success on the battlefields, in comparison to the initial
phases of the war. 
Centrifugal ideologization
In the ideological department it is firstly important to identify the ideological positions of
the counterparts of the war. Thus I will first examine the ideological views and the general
problems  with  ideology  in  Ukraine.  I  will  then proceed  to  examine  the  relevance  of
centrifugal ideologization for DPR and LPR and attempt to unveil whether they were able
to achieve effective centrifugal ideologization and if yes, then through what means and to
what  a  degree  was  this  achieved.  I  will  proceed  by  arguing  for  the  crucial  nature  of
Kremlin's information warfare when it comes first to the Crimean takeover and then  the
War  in  Donbass.  I  will  argue  that  it  had  a  crucial  role  in  ensuring  centrifugal
ideologization of LRP and DPR, while simultaneously aiming to undermine the capacity
of the Ukrainian state to achieve centrifugal ideologization. I will conclude this section by
exploring how the Ukrainian state has responded to Kremlin's information warfare and
how  it  has  attempted  to  regain  its  initiative  in  enforcing  effective  centrifugal
ideologization upon its soldiers and citizens. 
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Ideology in contemporary Ukraine
When examining the ideological landscape of Ukraine, one is bound to conclude
that Ukraine is by no stretch of imagination an ideologically united state. The history of
the territories of Ukraine is complex, as the Eastern and Western parts of the territory
have  seen  different  rulers,  both  eastern  and  western,  and  as  a  result,  contemporary
Ukraine has remained very divided in terms of ideology. 
The Western part of Ukraine has retained its historical referability with Europe and
the West and is to a large degree nationalist, however the southern and eastern part of
Ukraine have strong affiliations with Russia and the culture and history of Russia. In fact
opinion polls have determined that those living in eastern territories of Ukraine – such as
Donbass – would often reject being called a Ukrainian citizen, but rather prefer the label
"Russian-speaking  residents  of  Ukraine" or  simply  "residents  of  Donbass" instead.231
Ukrainian  nationalism  is  most  prevalent  in  Western  Ukraine  and  additionally  Kyiv.
Centuries  of  Polish-Lithuanian and Austrian  submission  have  clearly  left  its  mark,  as
Western Ukrainians perceive Ukraine as an European state. This is an obvious sentiment,
since majority of Western Ukraine has never been part of the Russian Empire, as opposed
to the rest of Ukraine. 
Even Ukrainian nationalism is not homogeneous. Denis Kiryukhin identifies three
major narratives present under the term.232 First of these narratives is based on the central
idea  of  revival  of  Ukraine  and  its  language's  social  role.  Ukraine  is  perceived  as  a
breakaway part Russia, but while Russia is perceived as the 'Other', it is not an enemy.
The  second  narrative  which  has  become  to  predominate,  is  essentially  stressing  that
Ukraine  was  an  Eastern  European  country  enslaved  by  Russia,  and  that  the  culture,
religion, and language of Ukraine were perceived as victims of a totalitarian regime. This
narrative is guided by the opposition to Russia and identification with Europe, and its
collective tragedy is used as basis for national integration and identity. The third narrative
which according to Kirykhin appeared during the 2000's is  the most radical, one that
focuses  on  fighting  the  against  the  enemy.  This  radical  wing  opposes  both  post-
modernism and democracy and „reflects the social problems and social struggles in terms
of nationalist ideology, hence the cult of national heroes and the idea of ethnocracy“.233 
As a  result,  the  Ukrainian society  is  to  be seen as  historically  divided between
Western and Eastern Ukraine.234 The divisions have prevailed up until modern day and
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the Euromaidan and anti-Maidan protests were a clear expression of the continuation of
this division in Ukrainian thought, history and society. This has had a profound effect on
the political life since the 1990's and manifested itself in the Orange Revolution of 2004,
as well  as in the Euromaidan protests of 2014 and ultimately the current situation in
Ukraine.  Competing  ideological  views  are  in  this  context  reflected  by  domestic  and
foreign policy conducted by the president and the government in power.  Ukraine has
traditionally avoided giving out unequivocal signals about how it sees itself in the world.235
This  was  especially  true  during  the  presidency  of  Kuchma,  under  whom  the  first
nationalist narrative was present. However, the prevailing Ukrainian nationalist position
reflected itself in Ukrainian foreign and defense policy after the Orange Revolution and
was  clearly  pro-European.  Nevertheless,  Ukrainian  Russian  community  along  with  a
substantial support from ethnic Ukrainians does not share the nationalist vision and sees
Russia and Ukraine strongly linked and interconnected by their common history. Both
the Euromaidan protests  and the Orange Revolution saw main support  from Western
Ukraine  in  opposition  to  the  pro-Russian  politicians  originating  and  drawing  their
support mostly from Eastern Ukraine. 
While  in  2004,  the  revolution  led  to  the  empowerment  of  Western-minded
Yushchenko, both the domestic and foreign policy shifted from a previous unambiguous
stance toward increasing cooperation with the West, particularly with EU and NATO.
This became coupled with an increased diplomatic and economic pressure applied by the
Kremlin. Ukrainian economy, being largely dependent on Russia was the main means of
exerting such pressure and Yushchenko found himself replaced by Donetsk-oriented pro-
Russian Yanukovych in 2010. Yanukovych however found himself in a typical Ukrainian
political conundrum. While there was growing popular support for further assimilation
with the West in Western Ukraine,  such a  support  correlated with increased hostility
against such a development in Eastern Ukraine, as well as saw increased pressure from the
Kremlin against such an assimilation. Faced with a choice, Yanukovych decided to respect
the latter in late 2014 and the government suspended preparations for the signing of the
European  Association  Agreement.  Starting  from  23rd November  2013,  this  triggered
protests  first  in Kyiv  and later  in other Western Ukrainian cities.  These protests  were
strongest in Western and Central Ukraine with Kyiv and Lviv being the main hubs of
protest,  while  anti-Maidan protests  became a  commonplace  in  Eastern  and  Southern
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Ukraine, and the two movements began to collide. It is perhaps interesting a comparison
that both the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Euromaidan protests  of  2014 saw
Yanukovych as the main antagonist, with the only difference that due to the latter, he was
forced to flee  the country.  In  an attempt to  end the  protests,  Yanukovych eventually
signed an agreement accepting the reversal of constitution to its 2004 form, amnesty for
protesters arrested since 17th February, new electoral laws and launching an investigation
into government violence conducted by the opposition government and the Council of
Europe, among other things. However this did not save him, as the opposition continued
to push for his resignation, and when Yanukovych disappeared, an emergency session was
called in the parliament, during which they hastily formed a new coalition, passed a bill
regarding the impeachment of Yanukovych and appointed a new interim president. The
removal  of  the  pro-Russian  Yanukovych  and  an  appointment  of  a  nationalist  pro-
European Turchynov as interim president eventually triggered Russian intervention. It is
hence clear that the importance of the collision of Western and Eastern ideologies is a
central theme of Ukrainian politics.
Such an analysis  was  necessary  in  order  to  understand that  achieving  effective
centrifugal ideologization in the context of Ukraine as a unitary state is extremely difficult
and that the political leadership has struggled in this context throughout the history of
independent Ukraine.  The lack of an ideology which would be uniform for the whole of
Ukraine has provided that the political leaders constantly find themselves in a deadlock
whereby endorsing either eastern or western Ukrainian views too significantly would end
up undermining their own political power. This was clearly the case with Yushchenko,
who stood for  often  radical  Ukrainian nationalism,  as  he  attempted to posthumously
award „Hero of  Ukraine“  award to  the  historically  controversial  Stepan Bandera236 or
declared in 2007 that he wants to establish a new law criminalizing Holodomor237 denial.
His pro-western and anti-Donbass views that granted him support  during the Orange
Revolution of 2004 ultimately led to an increasing isolation throughout his presidency.
His support rates plummeted in the years following the revolution and never recovered to
previous levels.238 His pro-Western presidency saw increased tension with Russia, as gas-
related arguments between Gazprom and Ukraine led Gazprom to halt its gas supply to
Ukraine, a decision which also had a direct effect on Europe, as the main transit pipeline
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from Russia to Europe ran through Ukraine. In the next elections strongly pro-European
Yushchenko faded away with a mere 5% of the vote. He was replaced by a strongly pro-
Russian Yanukovych originating from Donbass,  whose politics  were conducted on the
other end of the spectrum: with emphasis on further cooperation with Russia and lesser
with Europe and the West. Ultimately, the Euromaidan protests in Western and Central
Ukraine  saw  him  overthrown.  The  clear  resistance  of  eastern  Ukrainians  to  this
development provided that the War in Donbass became possible and it is exactly these
ideological differences which facilitated the narratives used for centrifugal ideologization
during the War in Donbass. Consequently, the fighting power of the Ukrainian state has
been ideologically crippled from the very start.
Centrifugal ideologization of DPR and LPR
In order to facilitate large scale successful warfare, the maintenance of ideological
narratives is  crucial.  In the initial  stages after their proclamation, both DPR and LPR
depended to a large degree on Russian ideological narratives perpetrated by the Russian
state  media.  There  was  no  perceived  need  to  create  systems  enforcing  centrifugal
ideologization, as they expected to be incorporated into the Russian Federation. As Girkin
stated,  they  did  not  initially  have  any  plans  for  state-building  for  this  very  reason.
However,  everything  changed  with  the  realization  that  Kremlin  is  not  planning  to
incorporate the Donbass area into the Russian Federation. 
While  the  Russian  state  media  has  remained  prevalent  as  the  main  source  of
information for Donbass residents, the self-proclaimed republics have opened their own
sources of information. In an attempt to create centrifugal ideologization both DPR and
LPR have established censorship, with no Ukrainian newspapers or publications available
not on paper form nor in the Internet, though means to bypass the Internet censorship are
still possible. The main paper newspapers sold in DPR include Russian „Komsomolskaya
Pravda“ and DPR's newspaper „Donetsk Republic“ and „Novorossiya“.239 240
In  addition,  the  English-language  news  outlet  Novorossiya  Today  has  been
established. While the Russian state media emphasizes a pro-Russian stance with rebels
used as a means to achieve this end, Novorossiya Today is mainly used by the rebels as a
means of  spreading typical  war propaganda with articles  such as  „Our Great  Leader's
Message To The Kiev Junta Representatives“241, „Kiev Junta Forces Have Redeployed 277
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Tanks And Heavy Artillery In Front Lines“242, or „War Crimes! Nazi Elements From Kiev
Junta Not Allowing Work On Power Lines“243 openly attempting to enforce a narrative
under which they are fighting a noble war in defense of the Donetsk Oblast territories that
they consider the border of their state244 against the aggression from Kiev's Junta Nazis
and fascists.  Novorossiya Today is  evidently a pro-rebel  news outlet,  publishing stories
mainly from DPR and using its leadership as the main sources.245 However, it is not a
publication aimed at the DPR's domestic population, as Ukraine in general was recorded
to have a rather low English proficiency, one of the lowest in Europe.246 It is thus primarily
aimed  at  the  international  community.  However,  I  would  argue  that  by  adopting  a
linguistic rhetoric whereby strict offensive labeling and demonization of the Ukrainian
state authorities is employed as the main means of conveying a message, the publication
will not adequately deliver its messages as the majority of the foreign English-speaking
audience does not identify with such terms. As such, it  suffers  from its own ideology
which might have an appeal in the context of the ongoing war on its domestic population
for recruitment purposes, but in general, fails on the international scene. The use of such a
rhetoric might only prove to be appealing for potential foreign fighters who ponder over
joining  the  forces  of  Novorossiya  in  fighting  the  Ukrainian  state.  There  are  already
numerous foreign volunteer fighters among the ranks of rebels, including from France,
Spain, Serbia and a number of other countries.247 Maintenance of such a narratives in
English is  thus  strictly  relevant  to  the  military  sphere  in  order  to  attract  and achieve
centrifugal ideologization on sympathetic foreign fighters in their ranks. 
Despite the establishment of their own media outlets, the popular opinions about
the future of DPR vary within their population and in the context of only 2% of the
population  being  satisfied  with  the  powers  in  their  region248 different  scenarios  are
supported. 35% of the respondents to the survey wish the separation of Donbass from
Ukraine, while 58% of the respondents would like Donbass to remain part of Ukraine,
whether as an autonomous region or as a part of federative Ukraine.249 
Another substantial problem with achieving centrifugal ideologization is that DPR
lacks a certain nationalist identity to enforce it in nationalist terms. The lack of Ukrainian
nationalism is  supported by the aforementioned survey which determined that  in the
south-east of Ukraine (Luhansk excluded) only 38% of the respondents believed that they
are first of all Ukrainian citizens, while  35% identified themselves as Donbass citizens and
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10% as residents of their cities. However there is no history of this region that can be
separated from Russian history and culture,  and with Kremlin having abandoned any
plans to incorporate this territory, identity of Donbass remains an identification with a
territory without a clearly evident historic substance. As such, only a degree of centrifugal
ideologization seems to be achieved by the political-military leadership who has identified
its  ideology in terms of  exclusion from Ukraine and  its  opposition to the „Nazi Kiev
Junta“ and its pro-Russian affiliations. This narrative is maintained by the Russian state
media readily available in the region, and the media outlets established within DPR. 
I would thus further argue that most of the centrifugal ideologization is a result of
the Russian state media and its prevalence in the region. As such, it is the institutional
framework set up by the Kremlin in order to support its media agencies and the global
reach of their message that ensures the centrifugal ideologization of the region of Donbass.
Would Russian state media withdraw their support for the self-proclaimed republics and
obtain  a  neutral  or  negative  narrative  with  regard  to  the  rebels,  it  is  likely  that  the
centrifugal ideologization of the region would suffer very greatly, especially because the
new media of the region is still relatively underdeveloped, and the residents of the region
have their own traditional patterns of Russian-media consumption which might prove
difficult to shift. Thus I believe that Kremlin possesses a non-military toolkit necessary to
end the fighting in Ukraine in quick fashion, as its state-run media institutions and their
ideological support for the rebels is crucial for their ideological survival. But the very fact
Kremlin has chosen not to do so, predicts that the fight in Eastern Ukraine will persist as
long  as  Kremlin's  objectives  are  fulfilled.  And  since  they  are  not  interested  in
incorporating the region into Russia, nor in allowing the Ukrainians to militarily advance,
the objective is likely federalized Ukraine and protraction the name of the game.  
I will follow  up  this analysis by examining how Russian military theory and the
practice of information warfare has taken advantage of the discussed Ukrainian ideological
divide,  followed by an account of how the Ukrainian state has responded in order to
achieve effective centrifugal ideologization.
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Russian information warfare
"If you ask an ordinary Russian if we are in a war with Ukraine, he won’t understand 
it. In his or her mind we are liberating our Ukrainian brothers from the Nazi regime 
in Kiev installed by Americans. We are on a sacred mission. We are a great nation."250
– President of Free Russia association, Natalia Arno.
The unrest in Kyiv and the confusion related to the interim government were a
perfect ground for agitating the populations of Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and Russia in
order to generate fear. And since most of the population of Crimea and eastern Ukraine
mainly rely on TV and the web – especially that financed by Russia – for information,251 it
is necessary to examine the information put out by these channels. Since the majority of
media is state-run in Russia, the content of such media is to be considered a weapon, as in
line with official military doctrine of Russia, as discussed in the following section. 
in theory
Information and psychological warfare conducted throughout the conflict  are the
key to understanding how the geopolitical uncertainty regarding Ukraine caused by the
Euromaidan protests was exploited by the Kremlin. To understand this, a Russian view of
information  warfare  is  introduced.  This  subject  was  thoroughly  examined  by  Ulrik
Franke, a senior researcher at the Swedish Institute of Computer Science who focuses his
research  among  other  things  on  cyber  security.  In  his  "War  by  non-military  means:
Understanding Russian Information Warfare," he analyzed Russian literature and official
documents with regard to their interpretation of information warfare. 
Franke believes that for the Kremlin, information warfare is a highly politicized
and a strategic matter which demands coordination from various government agencies.
The"Strategy  for  the national  security  of  the  Russian Federation up to  2020",  an official
Russian doctrine published in 2009, sets the cornerstones of the theory of information
warfare. Information in this context is considered a tool to enhance national security.252
This strategy also considers the culture and history a matter of national security that ought
to be dealt with not only within Russia through the creation of a systematic and patriotic
education of Russian citizens, but also abroad via the creation of a common information
and telecommunications environment for the Commonwealth of Independent States and
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its neighboring regions.253 
In military theory and in terms of the Ministry of Defense, information warfare is
defined  as  the  "use  of  information  and  communication  technologies  for  military-political
purposes  in  order  to  act,  against  international  law,  against  the  sovereignty,  political
independence, and territorial integrity of states and to threaten international peace, security,
and global and regional stability.”254 It is also exclusively pointed out how these ends are to
be achieved. It is  to be done through the  "combined use of military force and political,
economic, information, and other non-military means that are realized by extensive use of the
protest potential of the population and special forces.” 255 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has identified the threats within the informational
sphere with the potential to disrupt international peace and stability, which among others
include "actions in the information space aimed at undermining the political, economic, and
social  system  of  another  government,  and  psychological  campaigns  carried  out  against  the
population of a State with the intent of destabilizing society,"256 "the use of an information
infrastructure to disseminate information intended to inflame national,  ethnic,  or religious
conflict, racist and xenophobic written materials, images or any other type of presenting ideas
or  theories  that  promote,  enable,  or  incite  hatred,  discrimination,  or  violence  against  any
individual or group, if the supporting reasons are based on race, skin colour, national or ethnic
origin, or religion;"257 
While Franke's examination of the Russian official documents paints a generally
defensive picture of the literature, he notes a lot can be read between the lines.258 After his
examination of  Russian military literature related to the subject  – also  examined to a
degree in the earlier parts of this thesis259 260 – Franke finds it startling that Gerasimov as
the chief of general staff acknowledges that non-military means outweigh military means
four-to-one,  yet  does  not  attempt  to  remedy  this  by  reinforcing  the  position  of  the
military. 
Perhaps  one  of  the  most  important  conclusions  that  Franke  drew  out  of  his
observations  was  that  since  most  theorists  perceive  information  warfare  as  something
continuous with no regard for the distinction of whether it is conducted during war or
times of peace, it is thus evident that we are at the receiving end of Russian information
warfare at this moment and time.261 In addition, such a perception of information warfare
can clearly be linked to McCuen's population battlegrounds, where such information and
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psychological warfare are crucial in facilitating and maintaining popular support on the
domestic, indigenous and international populations. In terms of Malešević and centrifugal
ideologization,  it  is  clear  that  the  Russian  state  apparatus  is  the  source  that  radiates
ideology via state-funded domestic and international media agencies such as RT.
in Crimea
With this framework in mind, we can examine the information passed on by the
Russian media with regard to the Ukrainian crisis. The media in Russia has gone through
extraordinary  lengths  to  accompany,  legitimize,  and  support  Russian  intervention  in
Ukraine: manipulating with the opinions of the indigenous population of Crimea, of the
Russian home public and the international community, the last of which Russian state
media could infest a significantly lower degree of influence over. 
It  can  be  observed  that  the  biased  media  coverage  was  strictly  relevant  and
necessary for the successful annexation of Crimea, as the vast majority of the peninsula
lives in the information zone of the Kremlin and according to the census of 2001 60% of
the population are ethnic Russians, while an even larger percentage are Russian-speaking.
The  media  and  propaganda  were  also  important  tools  for  legitimizing  Russian
intervention to its domestic population. The information passed on by the state is likely to
be  commonly  accepted  as  truthful  in  the  target  audience  in  Russia.  A  Gallup  survey
published in July 2014 revealed that Russians rely heavily on their state media and lack
any substantial trust for any other type of media when it comes to finding information
about the events in Ukraine.262 Thus it is reasonable to believe that these claims are often
trusted despite their lack of validity, simply because the sources are widely recognized as
trustworthy. As British historian Timothy Garthon Ash described it, Putin "used television
to impose his own narrative of a socially conservative, proud Russia threatened by fascists in
Kiev,  an expansionist  NATO and a decadent EU."263 and Pomerantsev added that „The
Kremlin has reinvented the conflict  in Ukraine as  a  genocide against  the Russians.  People
believe that the fascists are coming to get them, because that’s what they have seen on TV, or
that the CIA is behind massacres in Ukraine."264
According to Franke, Russian actions in Crimea followed the officially introduced
characteristics  of  information  warfare,  whereby  it  directly  conformed  to  the  three
following aspects:
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 The early use of information warfare to achieve political goals without using
military  force,  and  its  later  use  to  create  a  positive  reaction  within  the
international community to the use of military force
 to undermine political, economic and social systems, to destabilize a society
and a state by massive psychological influence on the population, and also
putting pressure on a state to make decisions that are in the interest of the
opponent.
 Mass media use by foreign special services, operating on the territory of the
Russian Federation, to decrease the defense capabilities of the country and
the security of the state, and the spreading of disinformation.265
Firstly, such media went about creating a just cause for the annexation of Crimea.
The goal of the successful operation in Crimea was firstly diminishing the Ukrainian will
to resist, and the informational environment played a key role here. Achieving control
over the infrastructure of transmission in Crimea was essential.  This is  why the “little
green men”  first  established control  over  such infrastructure,  including  TV and radio
stations  along  with  control  over  mobile  phone  operators.266 A  specific  narrative  was
created to counter  the Ukrainian narrative.  The content  of  the subsequently imposed
information was uniform. Oleksander Sherba identified three ideological views that the
Russian media fed its users: (1) Ukraine is a failed state; (2) accusing anyone who disagrees
with the Kremlin propaganda as 'fascist'; (3) Russia is legitimately trying to regain the
territories of its former historical empire.267 All of this was accompanied with the image
that injustice had been inflicted upon the Russian ethnic minority in Ukraine and among
other things that the Crimean peninsula is historically Russian, given away only as a result
of  a  historical  mistake  of  Khrushchev  in  the  fifties  when  this  transfer  had  little
significance.
The attempt to dehumanize the Ukrainian state and their actions was clear from
the off. Both the Euromaidan movement and the Ukrainian government were demonized
through the fabrication of official material, such as the supposedly leaked official e-mails
which  suggested  that  the  nationalist  leaders  were  puppets  of  the  West.268 Additional
Fabricated stories mainly concerned pogroms which were allegedly being conducted by
the  Ukrainian  government  officials  against  the  Jews  as  well  as  the  ethnic  Russians,269
despite the fact that the local communities in question denied that any of such atrocities
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ever took place.270 The Jewish community even went so far as to send an open letter to
Putin to complain about the seemingly ridiculous claims that the Russian media had made
about the alleged crimes in Eastern Ukraine.271 
However,  where  the  Russian  information  warfare  seems  to  have  failed  is  the
international scene. The main media perpetrator of the Russian views internationally have
been Russia Today (RT) and The Voice of Russia, the latter of which became Sputnik
news in late 2014. Both have seen increased funding from Russia and grown their global
reach in the years preceding the Ukrainian crisis.  While the lack of support from the West
is perhaps to be expected in these circumstances, in terms of the CIS and the neighboring
states a certain degree of success was certainly expected. However, Russia seems to have to
a large degree failed to convince “the near abroad” of the legality of its actions. Even the
nearby  authoritarian  leaders  such  as  Lukashenko  remained  hesitant  in  supporting
Kremlin's  actions  in  Ukraine.  The  support  from  the  international  community  has
remained low and has led to sanctions and international isolation of Russia. However, the
measures taken by the Kremlin within Russia, Ukraine, and the international community
are  compatible  with the concept  of  information warfare  under  the context  of  Hybrid
Warfare.
in Donbass
Media remained a mouthpiece of the Kremlin all throughout the war in Donbass
as well. However, the tone taken there was that of typical wartime propaganda. This type
of propaganda always has one goal: to facilitate warfare. There are various ways of doing
so, but generally speaking it is a systematic effort to dehumanize the enemy and create
strong negative emotions and hatred toward a supposed enemy. Wartime propaganda is
first and foremost about providing a narrative in which one is fighting for a just cause. A
large degree of the propaganda in wars – especially that used in the First and the Second
World Wars – aimed to condition the target audience to feel as if the enemy had inflicted
injustice toward them, or their nationality, which would henceforth condition them to
believe in their cause as just. Moreover, rationalizing the injustice inflicted by the enemy
was more often than not done by “type-casting”: creating an image of a vicious, cruel, or
animal-like nature of the enemy. This can be observed in how the Allies depicted the
Japanese during the Second World War. They were depicted as extremely cruel. Fussell
85
mentions a rumor of a mother who received a letter from a Japanese POW camp. The
prisoner  writes  that  he  is  okay  and  tells  not  to  worry  about  him.  Then  he  casually
mentions that she might want to soak off the stamp from the envelope to give it to a
friend who is a stamp collector. After doing so, the mother finds written under the stamp
„they have cut off my tongue.“272 The rumor caught on as it was seen as nothing special
given the image of  cruelty bestowed upon the Japanese,  even though the letters  from
captured soldiers  did not bear postage stamps. Once a large number of similar stories
starts to circulate, they become accepted as truthful – the method at work here is proof by
repeated assertion.
In general terms, such propaganda and rumors all  serve to create an emotional
response ultimately generating an image in the mind that is false but pertains to the goals
of war and decreases the likeliness of soldiers exposed to such propaganda to hesitate when
facing the enemy. In such a context, whether these stories are fictional or true becomes
irrelevant. It is all about sending a message. 
Such propaganda was common to Russian state-run media throughout the War in
Donbass.  Several examples of this  included a report in late September of 2014, when
claims were made about the finding of unmarked graves of hundreds of civilians executed
by the Ukrainian army and that this had been verified by the OSCE monitors, despite the
fact that OSCE debunked such claims.273 Such stories often ran with the footage from the
MH17 crash site rolling on the background as proof. Other top stories included a three-
year-old boy crucified by the UAF in front of her mother274 and a continuous general
claim  about  pogroms  directed  at  churches  and  synagogues  in  Eastern  and  Southern
Ukraine, supposedly resulting in a humanitarian catastrophe and anarchy. The Ukrainian
government was ruthlessly demonized in the process. The prominent stories used for this
end include among others, one claiming that Ukrainian PM Arseniy Yatsenyuk took part
of Chechen war and tortured and executed Russians in 1995,275 while in reality he was a
law student in Ukraine at the time; or that according to Lavrov the Ukrainian government
had adopted a law of glorification of the Nazis,276 while the law in question explicitly
prohibits both Communist and Nazi symbolism and declares them both criminal and
totalitarian.277 All of this conforms to a pattern of extensive information warfare aimed to
facilitate fighting in Eastern Ukraine. 
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Centrifugal ideologization of Ukraine
The  application  of  the  strategies  of  information  warfare  by  the  Kremlin  have
largely  undermined  the  credibility  of  Ukrainian  state  authorities  within  the  Russian-
speaking population of Ukraine. The following chapter will discuss several actions of the
leadership  of  Ukraine  in  its  attempts  to  regain  the  initiative  in  creating  centrifugal
ideologization. The Ukrainian state has fought its information war in the form of a battle
of  narratives  thereby  emphasizing  her  own  narrative  of  the  conflict,  under  which
Ukrainians are fighting ruthless uneducated terrorists fundamentally dependent on Russia.
The  Ukrainian  authorities  have  also  devised  a  very  specific  tool  to  counter
information  warfare  and  its  narratives:  Ministry  of  Information  Policy.  The  officially
introduced aim of this governmental institution established on 14th January of 2014 is to
oversee the information policy in Ukraine and to stop the spreading of biased information
about  Ukraine.278 The  creation of  such  an institution  was  justified  by  an  attempt  to
directly counter the Russian informational campaign within Ukraine.279 Idea of such an
institution  is  far  from novel.  Ministry  of  Information  was  already  established  by  the
United Kingdom in the aftermath of the First and during the Second World War, with the
prime responsibility of publicity and propaganda280 and it can be understood in terms of
common war-time institution building and that it is primarily an institution appearing
during the times of war responsible for wartime propaganda.  However, I would argue that
the  Ministry  of  Information  Policy  of  Ukraine  is  an  institutional  manifestation  of
centrifugal ideologization. While it does not directly enforce violence, it provides that a
certain ideological narrative is maintained, necessary for the social coercion of the soldiers
sent to Eastern Ukraine to fight those who just about a year ago were considered common
citizens  of  Ukraine.  Rather  than  providing  a  unified  narrative  pertaining  to  all  of
Ukrainians,  the  state  has  formulated  a  narrative  dominated  by  the  ideology  of  the
Ukrainian  nationalist  position,  and  have  provided  that  this  narrative  become
institutionally supported by the state apparatus. 
Unsurprisingly,  the  establishment  of  this  institution  has  received  widespread
international criticism. It has been compared to the Orwellian Ministry of Truth and the
announcement of the ministry sprouted protests from various Ukrainian journalists.281 It
has been argued that it can be a basis for the establishment of censorship. But very much
like in Russia, the Ukrainian media is known to be harassed and in fact has never been
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recognized as “free” by Freedom House.282 While the internet has remained relatively free
in Ukraine, the media is still largely controlled by the central government. In this context
the establishment of the Ministry of Information Policy should not strike one as very
surprising.  The Ukrainian government sees it as the guard of its strategic and national
interests as it conducts operations against Russia. In addition, the Ministry of Information
Policy called upon Ukrainians to join the “information forces” to counter Russia, the pro-
Russian media and counter the  troll-army of Russia.283 This provides for an interesting
debate about the correlation between real public opinion and the increasing amount of
paid troll commentators. However, what it clearly demonstrates is that warfare will not
leave our basic developing technologies untouched and information warfare as such has
the potential to become all-encompassing.
In order to achieve effective centrifugal ideologization, Ukrainian government has
decided battle the Russian narratives and for achieving this end, most of the prominent
Russian  cable  networks  have  found  themselves  banned  in  Ukraine.  In addition
Poroshenko introduced a ban on nearly 400 international journalists and 90 legal entities
citing “security threats” or “promoting terrorism” in September 2015. The list was mainly
comprised of Russian state channels and their reporters and correspondents, however also
featured  international  figures  such  as  prominent  BBC reporters,  albeit  some of  them
found the ban lifted some days later.284 285 
While the utility of such institutions as the Ministry of Information Policy has
traditionally  been  limited  to  wartime  practices,  in  Ukraine  –  recognizing  that  the
informational campaign of the Kremlin is one of continuous nature with no regard to war
or  peace  –  the  Ukrainian  government  is  prone  to  consider  this  institution  vital  in
preserving its national interests  and  it  is  thus likely to endure and outlive the War in
Donbass.
Concluding remarks
The Ukrainian Crisis was a conflict which could have been predicted years in advance, as
already during Yushchenko's pro-Western presidency, the Kremlin had grown increasingly
concerned with the possibility of potential Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership.
Warning signals given out in April 2008 were not to be ignored, as Georgia found itself in
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war with Russia a mere 4 months after. Russian officials and generals who had vowed to
protect  their  interests  in  the  region  by  both  military  and  non-military  means  –
corresponding to the theories of warfare adopted during the Russo-Georgian war in 2008
and  perfected  by  theorists  like  Chekinov,  Bodganov  and  general  Gerasimov  –
demonstrated that their warnings had substance. 
The  War  in  Donbass  has  truly  been  a  „hybrid“  war  in  the  sense  of  having
exhibited a mixture of phenomena both from the field of Western Hybrid Warfare, as well
as Russian New-Generation Warfare. To understand these peculiarities, I thus adopted the
theoretical framework of Malešević to examine he conflict and came to several interesting
conclusions.
My first argument with regard to cumulative bureaucratization of coercion was that
it  was  the initial  lack of  DPR's and LPR's ability  to  achieve centralized political  and
military control over the territory which translated itself into military failures against the
Ukrainian governmental forces. However, observing the organizational level of the rebels
over time, it became clear that once their leadership began to accept that an incorporation
of these territories into the Russian Federation will not materialize, the degree of social
and military organization started to rise and was thus of a cumulative nature. Ultimately I
consider that the cumulative nature of bureaucratization of coercion was one of the crucial
elements allowing the rebels to effectively counter the Ukrainian governmental forces. The
attempts to establish a more centralized army through general mobilization and fighting
the  elements  within  LPR aiming  to  resist  centralism  are  clear  manifestations  of  this
process. 
My argument with regard to centrifugal ideologization was that there were two
main reasons as to why achieving effective centrifugal ideologization within Ukraine was
problematic. Firstly it was due to the inherent ideological and historical divisions within
Ukraine,  which  the  Ukrainian  nationalism  has  translated  into  the  implicit  conflict
between  pro-western  and  pro-Russian  narratives.  Ukrainian  nationalism  is  inherently
conflicted by this division and the sense of nationalism has been relatively weak. Secondly
I argued that achieving centrifugal ideologization was additionally problematic due to the
Russian information warfare which played its strategy on exploiting and deepening this
division. Thus I argue that the information warfare campaign need be understood in the
framework  of  Hybrid  Warfare,  as  a  distinct  strategy  aimed  at  undermining  the
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effectiveness  of  Ukrainian  state  power  and  its  ability  to  conduct  effective  centrifugal
ideologization  As  such,  I  would  argue  that  most  of  the  ideologically  driven  labels
employed  in  wartime  propaganda  –  such  as  'fascist'  or  'illegitimate'  –  are  not  a
manifestation of some common Russian sentiment of hatred toward the Ukrainians, but
the explicit strategy of information warfare conducted in the context of Hybrid Warfare.
In a way, it is similar to Hezbollah's information warfare strategy employed during the
Second Lebanon War, where they successfully imposed a civilian-victim narrative. In both
cases, the strategy was to emphasize a certain pattern that has emerged and present it as
something widespread or commonplace. Such demonization of the enemy is a common
theme of wartime propaganda and should be considered as such, rather than take these
stereotypes which have been amplified by contemporary social media and other means, as
reflective of socially majorative reality. 
Additionally, I found that the problems LPR and DPR encountered in achieving
centrifugal  ideologization  were  due  to  similar  divisions,  as  secessionism  lacked  a
majorative support and indeed a large degree of the residents of Donbass have become to
prefer larger autonomy within the state of Ukraine as the most desirable future of the
region.286 I  thus argued that  the initial  lack of  effective  centrifugal  ideologization and
inadequate bureaucratization of coercion in the regions of LPR and DPR provided that
the initial engagements with the Ukrainian governmental forces proved fruitless. It was
only  after  a  more  substantial  military  aid  received  from  Russia  and  the  cumulative
bureaucratization of DPR' and LPR's militias, were they able to effectively battle an ill-for
battle UAF and the governmental forces. 
I adopted the framework of Malešević in order to analyze the Ukrainian conflict
from a sociological, rather than a geopolitical perspective and my findings reflected the
explanatory power of his concepts. I believe that the theoretical framework introduced by
Malešević is a powerful tool for social analysis of contemporary conflicts, as it offers a
great  conceptual  understanding when it  comes to  examining the social  structures  and
importance of  centrifugal ideologization in affecting the course of war outside of typical
analytical  frameworks adopted  for analyzing war,  where  success  can be measured with
victories  in  battles  and frontal  engagements, further analyzed in terms of  lives  lost  or
territory gained or seceded. The theoretical framework of Malešević allows to penetrate
further  and  analyze  the  underlying  social  components  influencing  the  results  of the
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modern and contemporary battlefields. 
Reflection on the analysis
I will conclude the comparative analysis with comparing my findings with regards to the
two wars. While both the Second Lebanon War and the Russian involvement in Ukraine
have been described as forms of Hybrid Warfare and share many similarities, significant
differences could be observed between them. Both hybrid conflicts saw the application of
information warfare as integral to the conflict, however the goals which the information
warfare sought to accomplish were of a different nature. Hezbollah utilized information
warfare  seeking  to  end  the  conflict  in  the  region  by  playing  on  the  narratives  of
disproportionality and civilian casualties. The goal of such an information campaign was
to undermine the legitimacy of the Israeli attack and influence diplomacy of Israeli allies
to coerce Israel into ending the conflict. However, the Crimean crisis saw the employment
of information warfare with the goal to undermine the Ukrainian state authorities and
their  credibility  in  the  indigenous  populations  of  Crimea  and  Donbass,  with  a  clear
strategic  aim to  create  a  positive  environment  necessary  for  the  conduct  an  effective
takeover of the territory. 
The  information  warfare  campaign  conducted  by  Kremlin-backed  media  also
served to undermine the centrifugal ideologization of the Ukrainian forces. With its media
able to penetrate Ukrainian media scene rather effectively, this strategy worked effectively
until the Ukrainian government sought to establish censorship and ban such media outlets
and access to them within Ukraine. 
In  terms  of  cumulative  bureaucratization  of  coercion,  there  were  essential
differences when it comes to comparing Hezbollah and the insurgents of Eastern Ukraine
backed  by  the  Kremlin.  Hezbollah  had  a  complex  bureaucratic  structure  facilitating
fighting and its military wing very effectively and it was their organizational might which
provided that they be able to face off one of the most modern conventional armies of the
region.  The  structural  nature  of  Hezbollah  was  able  to  both  provide  ideological
justifications  for  warfare,  as  well  as  ideologically  coerce  its  soldiers  to  fight  for  its
objectives. However, the level of bureaucratization of coercion was low in the case of the
91
rebels of Eastern Ukraine. As I argued previously, there was no initial need to conduct
effective bureaucratization of coercion, as the original goal had been to be incorporated
into the Russian Federation. Ukraine would likely not have responded by attempting to
regain Eastern Ukraine, would the Kremlin indeed have incorporated DPR and LPR into
the Russian Federation. 
It was only in the aftermath of the realization that incorporation is not going to
occur, did the rebels attempt to achieve bureaucratization of coercion. In comparison with
Hezbollah, the level of bureaucratization of coercion they have been able to achieve is
rather low. Hezbollah structure had been fomented over decades, while DPR and LPR
have  only  had  about  a  year  and  a  half.  However,  several  factors  pertaining  to  the
Ukrainian army, its ill-for-battle state and structure, and the fact that the rebels receive
strong support from Russia in terms of economy and military „irregulars“ have aided them
to conduct effective warfare against a weak conventional Ukrainian army. 
In  terms  of  centrifugal  ideologization it  has  to  be  noted  that  while  ideologies
played a  central  role  in  both conflicts,  they  differed  greatly  in  terms  of  their  nature.
Hezbollah  made  use  of  a  religious  ideology  which  provided  direct  legitimacy  for
Hezbollah and its „defensive jihad“, while Russian-backed separatists in Eastern Ukraine
had to rely on a complex secular ideology which necessitates the justification of killing
surpassing the mere dogmatic facade of a religion. The weakness of the ideological scene
of Ukraine and the lack of a strong national identity were largely preconditions for the
whole conflict. The lack of effective centrifugal ideologization in the whole of Ukraine was
clear from the fact that Yanukovych was barely able to summon military forces to the
streets  during  the  Euromaidan  protests,  as  a  large  amount  of  the  force  available  was
sympathetic with the movement. However, as this was realized the government established
what  I  argued  to  be  a  manifestation  of  centrifugal  ideologization:  the  Ministry  of
Information Policy.
This led me to another substantial reflection: the growing institutionalization of
centrifugal  ideologization.  The  attempts  to  achieve  effective  centrifugal  ideologization
have  resulted  in  increasing  institutional  manifestations  of  the  concept,  the  primary
example of which is the establishment of the Ministry of Information Policy in Ukraine. I
believe that it is the increasing relevance of ideology and ideologization of one's troops
which has necessitated the direct institutionalization of centrifugal ideologization. Such
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institutions  do  not  directly  perpetuate  violence,  but  nurture  particular  ideological
narratives under which violence and war can become justified. This could be observed
clearly  during  the  Second  Lebanon War  as  well  as  the  conflict  in  Ukraine.  Thus,  as
centrifugal  ideologization has become increasingly  relevant  over  the last  centuries  it  is
likely that  such institutionalization continues and institutions such as  the Ministry of
Information  Policy  of  Ukraine  can  potentially  become  commonplace  in  the  future
societies perpetuating warfare. 
Additionally I argued that the centrifugal ideologization of the rebels has to a large
degree depended on the Kremlin and its controlled media. The importance of the Russian
media can not be underestimated in its ability to conduct centrifugal ideologization in
LPR and  DPR.  This  can  be  further  illustrated  with  the  example  of  the  downing  of
Malaysian  Airlines  Flight  17.  The  rebels  of  Eastern  Ukraine  found  themselves  under
scrutiny of the international community, as a result of the catastrophe. Accepting blame
would result in a direct blow on the credibility of its  military forces and thus gravely
undermine  centrifugal ideologization of the rebels. The downing of MH-17 has been a
source  of  controversy  and  ground  for  battle  between  ideological  narratives,  with  the
representatives of the rebel forces finding themselves as the alleged downers of the plane.
These allegations struck a substantial blow on the already negative image of LPR and
DPR in the West and provided that the Western media coverage adopted a fairly negative
image of them. Nicu Popescu argued, that while the UAF's assault on rebel areas with
heavy weaponry – as opposed to surgical urban warfare – caused a large number of civilian
casualties,  and would it  not  have been for  the downing of  MH-17,  the international
community would likely have been more focused on the conduct of war by Kyiv.287 Thus,
despite the fact that Ukrainian governmental forces caused civilian suffering in Eastern
Ukraine, it  did not penetrate the western media on a large scale,  as  the rebels  lacked
informational  strategies  similar  to  Hezbollah  in  2006  –  they  lacked  centrifugal
ideologization  to  conduct  such  operations.  While  Hezbollah  was  able  to  turn  the
international media against Israel, by informational strategies involving disproportionality
and  civilian-victim  narratives,  the  rebels  in  Eastern  Ukraine  found  themselves
compromised due to their  alleged downing of  MH-17 and their  structures  have been
unable to shift public opinion held abroad. Neither DPR nor LPR were able to sow doubt
on the allegations against them on the international scene. Instead, the role of defending
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the  rebels  has  fallen  on  the  Russian  state  media.  Such  media  became  very  active  in
discrediting the allegations against the rebels by the continuous use of disinformation.
Such media coverage attempted to undermine the allegations by proposing a number of
conspiracy scenarios – all of which suggested blame on Ukraine or the West – such as that
the plane was downed by a Ukrainian SU-25 fighter jet,288 289 290 or that it was brought
down by an on board bomb planted by the CIA, 291 or that the Ukrainian government had
used a BUK missile system to down the plane.292 293 In addition, Igor Girkin had initially
suspected a theory involving the plane taking off with already dead people on board.294
While  all  of  these  theories  have  became discredited  and  have  largely  been  unable  to
influence international opinion in any meaningful way, the strategy of airing numerous
conspiracy theories was primarily aimed at the audiences of Russia and the rebel areas. It
worked very well both on the Russian domestic scene, as well as the rebel controlled areas
dependent on Russian media – only 5% of the Russians surveyed blamed LPR or DPR,
while 82% blamed Kyiv for the accident.295 Such public opinion polls suggest that media
had a central role in providing centrifugal ideologization for the potential “volunteers”
joining the DPR and LPR as well as for those already in the area. Increased centrifugal
ideologization and bureaucratization of coercion are among the main reasons I consider
that the forces of DPR and LPR have subsequently been able to effectively battle off the
Ukrainian governmental forces.
Additionally I would like to remark that both of the conflicts reflected not only the
clever use of tactics and relevance of social organizations and ideological narratives, but
also the fact that Hybrid Warfare is a result of extensive understanding and exploitation of
the  adversary's  weaknesses.  In  both  cases,  the  hybrid  adversaries  constructed  their
strategies based on the weaknesses of their opponent as opposed to their own strengths, be
that the perceived IDF's inability to suffer continuous losses, or the exploitation of the
deep ideological divide within Ukraine: both strategies exclusively aimed to exploit the
perceived enemy's  weaknesses.  Subsequently,  one should not seek the reasons of one's
defeat  only  in  the  use  of  innovative  technologies  or  employment  of  novel  tactical
formations by the adversary, but rather attempt to understand their own weaknesses and
attempt to remedy them accordingly. It is much easier to see the reasons for defeat in the
superior  conduct  of  the  enemy  than  recognizing  one's  own  weaknesses  potentially




Malešević argued that there is a substantial relationship between society and warfare. He
believes that warfare was not only influenced by society, but could also potentially cause
change in the society. That is to say, while society sets limits as to what kind of warfare is
employable, the developments in warfare itself can cause changes in such a society. One of
his examples of this were women's rights campaigns that he argued originated largely from
the First and Second World War practices of large scale employment of women, caused by
the lack of male labour296 since the majority of men had been sent to the fronts. After the
war it became very hard to maintain the previous nature of patriarchal relationships, as
women  had  achieved  economic  independence  and  the  demand  for  their  labour  still
persisted. Additionally, the necessity to mobilize millions of men to wage successful wars
necessitated universal conscription, which caused the expansion of citizenship and some
welfare rights on the urban poor and peasantry, neither of which could easily be revoked
after the war.297 Thus it was warfare which was the cause of such long-term social changes.
If one observes the recent technological developments in the sphere of warfare one
can clearly link it with Maleševićian theoretical framework of the cumulative nature of the
bureaucratization of coercion. The currently discussed robotic or even automated nature
of  future battlefields  is  becoming increasingly  likely.  I  would argue  that  the fact  that
current  military  theorists  speak  of  future  warfare  as  one  conducted  by  robots,298 299
automated decision-making,300 or cognitive modeling of the opponent,301 302 proves the
theory of Malešević in terms of cumulative bureaucratization of coercion, as the robotic
and automated nature of future conflict not only signifies that such automated weaponry
or soldiers need not be coerced or ideologically indoctrinated in a way humans currently
do, but also provides emotional distance for the perpetrators of violence. The existence of
a notable emotional distance for the perpetrators of large scale violence was already noted
by Erich Fromm, who argued that nuclear and traditional wars were inherently different,
as  the  latter  featured  a  face-to-face  experience  providing  that  one  could  be  in  direct
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contact with the consequences of one's actions, while the former featured someone who
by the simple push of a button could launch intercontinental warheads while not being in
any emotional contact with the death and suffering he is about to unleash303 – as a result,
killing became increasingly bureaucratized and void of the perception of its  actual evil
character. While it has been argued that the robotic or even automated nature of future
warfare essentially makes the war safer for the common soldiers, as they are removed from
the fronts by attempting to avoid loss of life,304 the very nature of such warfare allows an
emotional distance, potentially facilitating greater suffering of the adversary or in the case
of automated weaponry almost removes such an emotional aspect altogether. It is thus
reasonable to argue based on the theoretical framework of Malešević, that future warfare,
including Hybrid Warfare,  will  exhibit  a  decreasing direct  emotional  contact  with the
consequences  of  one's  actions and provide that  killing results  in a lessened individual
emotional  struggle,  a  perceived  evil,  or  wickedness  normally  associated  in  nearly  all
societies and cultures with such actions. 
The changing nature of society and technology thus constitute dramatic changes in
the nature of Malešević's analytical categories in relation to warfare and also necessitate a
need to examine the changes in warfare and the contemporary theories and practices of
warfare. Hybrid Warfare is no exception in this regard. Nemeth argued that a Hybrid War
largely reflects the social construction of societies conducting such a type of warfare305 and
is hence conducted by what he termed „hybrid societies“. David Barno also seconds the
belief that today's warfare is changing. He claims that today's clashes have increasingly
exhibited irregular troops employing asymmetrical means in an attempt to prevail.  He
believes  that  these  features  in  combination  with  high-tech  weaponry,  subversion  and
covert backing from well-resourced nation states present unresolvable challenges to the
legacy of 20th century models and norms of international conflict and behavior.306 I would
thus raise the question: to what a degree has Hybrid Warfare evolved over time?
While both of the conflicts I analyzed have been categorized as Hybrid Wars  by
various authors, I was able to observe some significant differences between them. As I
explained earlier, these changes were partly due to the fact that the societies perpetuating
Hybrid Warfare differed in terms of their societal construction and thus their ability to
achieve bureaucratization of coercion and centrifugal ideologization, as well as in terms of
the  technologies  available  to  them.  However  I  would  additionally  argue  that  such
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differences were also to a large degree caused by the evolvement of the concept of Hybrid
Warfare.
While the two conflicts I previously analyzed unfolded a mere eight years apart
from  each  other,  these  intermediate  years  have  seen  technological  advancements
influencing the practices of contemporary warfare. The most significant example of this is
the  evolvement  of  cyber  warfare.  Cyber  warfare  is  not  only  an  increasingly  relevant
concept with regard to the future but is already a problem of today, as major cyber attacks
have been perpetrated by Russia against Estonia307 and Georgia308 in 2007 and 2008; and
most recentlty, major cyber attacks have also allegedly been carried out by the Chinese
against the US throughout 2015.309 310 311 Cyber warfare is thus becoming more common
in the context of increasing influence of technology on our daily lives.312 
Indeed,  while  the  Second  Lebanon  War  of  2006  did  not  exhibit  major  cyber
operations,  the  conflict  in  Ukraine  already  did.  Three  days  before  the  Ukrainian
presidential elections, a pro-Russian hacking collective CyberBerkut conducted an attack
on  the  systems  responsible  for  distributing  results  and  voter  turnout  throughout  the
election day.313 The attack was  devastating  and resulted in  the system being  rendered
inoperable,  though computer scientists  were able to restore the system just  before the
elections. The aim of such an attack was not random or spontaneous, as if the election
commission could not offer its usual real-time online results, doubts would easily be raised
with  regard  to  the  legitimacy  of  the  election.  Other  coordinated  attacks  against  the
Ukrainian  military  and law enforcement  agencies  have  been  recorded throughout  the
conflict.314 Developments such as this can potentially transform the conduct of warfare,
and  cyber  warfare  in  particular  further  resonates  the  increasing  importance  of  non-
military means in contemporary warfare. 
Furthermore,  the  recent  developments  in  the  field  of  information technologies
have seen a drastic increase in the importance of information and psychological warfare, as
the grounds for the conduct of such warfare are becoming increasingly common to our
daily  lives.  In  this  sense,  the  rising  importance  of  social  media  reigns  supreme.  It's
potential for organizing possible protests has been clear ever since the Arab Spring and
subsequently  proven  by  the  Euromaidan  protests.  Social  media  is  however  not  only
relevant in terms of potentially facilitating protests, it is also a weapon in the context of
information warfare during kinetic conflict.  Rand Waltzman exemplified the power of
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social  media  in  influencing  public  opinion  during  kinetic  conflicts  by examining an
incident  dating back to 2006,  when a routine successful  military engagement  in Iraq
became a subject of an information campaign:
„The U.S. soldiers killed 16 or 17, captured 17, destroyed a weapons cache and rescued a badly
beaten hostage. This sounds like a successful operation, except for the fact that in the time it
took for the soldiers to get back to their base—less than one hour—the death squad soldiers had
returned  to  the  scene,  cleaned  up  the  mess,  and  rearranged  the  bodies  of  the  their  fallen
comrades to make it  look like they were unarmed in the middle of prayer when they were
murdered by American soldiers. They put out pictures and press releases in Arabic and English
showing the alleged atrocity.“315
Despite the fact that the whole incident had been filmed by the unit, the U.S. military did
not attempt to tell its side of the story before three days had passed, and damage had
already been done. In this way, military victories can easily and quickly be transformed
into influential  damage on the public  opinion and social  media simply aggravates  the
issues that militaries might have in communicating with the public. Social media provides
that such set-ups spread rapidly, as it can potentially influence public opinion in a matter
of hours. The increasing prevalence of such psychological and informational warfare is
thus one of the main components of contemporary warfare and I argue – based on my
previous  examination  of  information  warfare  employed  in  Second  Lebanon  War,  the
Crimean crisis and the War in Donbass – that fighting on this front has become of central
importance for the contemporary hybrid adversaries.
Western scholars have increasingly distanced themselves from the possibility that
the West should conduct Hybrid Warfare, claiming it a defensive type of warfare aimed at
protraction, perpetuated by "hybrid societies" or "non-states". Subsequently, the face value
of Hybrid Warfare is almost exclusively seen in terms of defense of a weaker opponent.
However, I would argue that Hybrid Warfare has grown to acquire an offensive value, if
aided by significant non-military  means and conducted by a strong centralized power
structure – ideally a state power – as an alternative to conventional warfare. As I discussed
in the literature section of this thesis, the Russian theorists have engaged in this debate
and I  believe that they have indeed put their theories to the test in Crimea and Eastern
Ukraine. The Crimean operation was a clear success,  and it  seems to be working out
largely as planned in Eastern Ukraine as well. While much emphasis has been put on the
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military side of the concept of Hybrid Warfare, I will make an effort to sail against such a
Western wind and in doing so will attempt to explain the non-military side of the conflict
in a greater extent. I will further consider new technologies – particularly information
technologies  –  and  their  application  in  the  concept,  and  thereby  propose  two  new
analytical  categories  of  Hybrid  Warfare:  General  Hybrid  Warfare  and Specific  Hybrid
Warfare.  The  former  retains  its  more  western  military-centered  role,  while  the  latter
emphasizes the importance of non-military means. 
Basis for categorization
To understand Hybrid Warfare, I will have to examine military and non-military actions
alike, therefore the framework I will use to explain these categories reflects that. Modern
and contemporary military theory has divided war into strategic, operational and tactical
levels.316
The strategic level reflects the desired outcomes of the war and focuses on defining
a belligerent's general  policies  conducted to attain such goals.  The operational  level  is
directly concerned with concrete military operations in a  theater of  war or  theater of
operations  and is  aimed at  gaining an advantage  over  an opponent  beneficial  for  the
strategic goals via the design and organization of the military forces, as well as the conduct
of campaigns and major operations.  The tactical level is a subdivision of the operational
level  insofar  as  operational  campaigns  are  made  up  of  maneuvers,  engagements  and
battles. In theory, both the tactical and operational level reflect the goals and decisions on
the strategic level and are conducted in accordance with the defined strategic goals.
To  avoid  sliding  into  a  detailed  discussion  about  very  specific  theoretical
distinctions, I will simplify my framework to reflect the differences of the proposed two
analytical categories of Hybrid Warfare on the strategic and on the operational level. The
non-military side of the conflict relevant to Hybrid Warfare was well  defined by John
McCuen,  as  he  claimed that  the  most  decisive  battles  of  Hybrid Wars  are  fought  on
asymmetric „population battlegrounds.”  317 Success  on these  battlegrounds is  crucial  for
achieving effective centrifugal ideologization. That is to say, in order to achieve political
victory  it  is  paramount  that  popular  support  be  achieved  in  the  three  population
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battlegrounds – the indigenous population of the conflict zone, the domestic population
and  the  international  community.  The  population  battlegrounds  which  McCuen
identified have become a crucial part of contemporary warfare, imposing the necessity to
consider the implications military action has on these population battlegrounds already on
the strategic level. While McCuen's perception of these battlegrounds is presented from
the  U.S.  Perspective  –  that  is  from the  perspective  of  a  belligerent  fighting  a  hybrid
adversary – the necessity to count with the effects of military and especially non-military
actions on the possible success or failure on these battlegrounds is reflected on the strategic
conduct of the hybrid adversary as well.
My analytical framework will thus be composed of discussing the problem from
the  perspective of the hybrid adversary on three interconnected levels: the strategic, the
operational and the communal. Through this analytical framework I will thus be able to
examine the differences  between the two categories  of  Hybrid Warfare  firstly  in their
strategic conduct: the strategic goals and policies taken with regard to these goals on the
political and military level; secondly the operational dimension: the nature of the concrete
military and non-military campaigns and their necessary organization; and lastly see what
kind of strategies are employed to achieve success on the three population battlegrounds –
both on strategic and operational level – as I consider these strategies instances of the non-
military means employed during or preceding kinetic conflict.
General Hybrid Warfare
The  genesis  of  this  category  of  Hybrid  Warfare  lies  on  Hoffman  who  believes  that
contemporary and future conflict will  be increasingly complex, but the rise of Hybrid
Warfare  does  not  necessarily  signify  the  end of  conventional  warfare.318 This  category
retains the central role of the military operations both on the strategic and operational
level, while using the notion of population battlegrounds, and the success of strategies
employed to gain victory on these communities, as a supplement to the fusion of irregular
forces and tactics on the operational level. 
While McCuen argued that victory on these battlegrounds is relevant and necessary
only following a military success or to augment the progress of military campaigns on the
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operational level, his analysis pertains to those facing a hybrid adversary. However, from
the perspective  of  the hybrid adversary,  this  category pertains  to defense both on the
strategic  and  operational  level  and  as  a  result,  population  battlegrounds  are  also  less
relevant, as the waging of successful General Hybrid Warfare (henceforth referred to as
GHW) only demands maintenance of  support on one of these population battlegrounds
– the indigenous population of  the conflict zone – while success  on the international
community is of course beneficial and as seen in Lebanon could prove to be decisive, but
is  not  mandatory  for  achieving  operational  success.319 However,  support  from  the
domestic  population is  indeed  mandatory.  As  a  result,  a  hybrid  adversary  possesses  a
significant advantage in terms of population battlegrounds, as the defensive nature of this
category only necessitates maintenance of strong domestic support, while the belligerent
conducting an attack against the hybrid adversary will likely need not only success on the
domestic  scene  to  support  its  aggression,  but  need  support  from  the  international
community in order to legitimize itself and avoid international isolation; and also need
success on the indigenous population of the conflict zone in order to achieve ultimate
political victory and to avoid manifestations of insurgency.
Strategic conduct
Employed as a defensive measure, the strategic level reflects defensive strategies and
goals. While employable both by a state and a non-state, it remains a type of alternative
warfare for those who are facing a conventionally superior force and would very likely lose
a conventional war. As such, it is employed mostly by non-states, „hybrid societies“ and
guerrillas.  On  the  strategic  level,  it  deals  with  developing  defensive  strategies  and
fortifications that will aim to protract the war rather than achieve military victory. 
A typical example of the strategic goals of GHW are those set by Hezbollah during
the Second Lebanon War. Their strategy reflected their ideological notion of „resistance“
and the goals were to always defend the territories under their control. The only strategic-
ideologically offensive action was to hurl rockets into Israeli civilian zones throughout the
war. Their strategy became implemented during the years preceding the war, as defensive
fortifications  and  sophisticated  underground  tunnels  were  constructed  during  peace
time320 in order to enable small scale hit-and-run tactics aimed at protraction and survival
rather than operational military victory. 
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Operational dimension
On the operational  level,  the military operations are conducted in the spirit  of
Hoffman's  Hybrid  Warfare  where  the  operational  force  is  a  mixture of  irregular  and
regular troops in possession of modern weapons, and act as a fusioned force on the same
theater  of  war,  rather  than on separate  theaters  of  war  as  in  Compound Warfare.  In
addition,  while  Hoffman  argued  that  Hybrid  Warfare  sees  the  use  of  terrorism  and
criminality as integral to the concept, I would argue that the possibility of using terrorism
and criminality  depends  on the ideological  nature of  the society  perpetuating Hybrid
Warfare. That is to say, it depends on the social and ideological possibilities of legitimizing
terrorism  and  criminality  within  the  framework  of  Hybrid  Warfare.  Hezbollah  for
instance was able to avoid this conundrum by incorporating violence against the Israelis
into their official ideology,  and were  thus  able to avoid the perceived injustice  of their
behavior, considered terrorism and criminality by the Israeli state institutions and other
international actors. GHW can hence see the use of terrorism and criminality in addition
to the activities of irregular and regular forces, however, it is important to note that if a
society engaging in this type of warfare is unable to legitimize terrorism and criminality it
can undermine the legitimacy of its actions. 
In the Second Lebanon War terrorism manifested itself in the constant hurling of
missiles  aimed  exclusively  at  civilian  areas  in  Israel  with  little  direct  value  on  the
operational  level  as  such.  Additionally,  Hezbollah  has  been  categorized  as  a  terrorist
organization by the US,  Canada,  France,  Netherlands  and Israel,  while  the EU, New
Zealand and the UK categorize merely its  military wing as a terrorist organization, as
opposed  to  the  whole  organization.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  the  perceived  terrorism
conducted by a hybrid adversary can potentially be used to undermine its campaign and
serve as an ideological weapon for the belligerent,  but this  implies  that a distinct and
strong information strategies are employed to achieve this end. 
Additionally,  hybrid  adversaries  can  pose  ethical  issues  for  the  belligerents  by
becoming fused with civilians or fight in close proximity to civilians. Hezbollah proved
the efficiency of this behavior, as the Israeli attacks caused continuous civilian casualties, a
fact  which  is  ideal  for  propaganda  campaigns  within  the  framework  of  information
warfare. For the belligerents of the hybrid adversaries, it is thus central to adopt strong




It  is  an evolutionary continuation of  Hoffman's  Hybrid Warfare  insofar  as  the
operational level sees the fusion of irregular and regular forces and tactics in combination
with actions mostly  understood as terrorism and criminality by the adversaries, but also
incorporates  a  distinct  information  war  campaign  aimed  not  only  at  the  domestic
population,  but  also  at  the  foreign  populations  in  order  to  erode  the  communal
confidence in the belligerent's abilities or to undermine the legitimacy of its actions. In
order to fight on the population battlegrounds, the hybrid adversary therefore seeks to
employ means of information warfare. However where the information warfare conducted
in the context of GHW differs from Specific Hybrid Warfare is in the strategic goals it
aims to achieve. In GHW the hybrid adversary employs information warfare primarily for
the  purposes  of  defense  and  the  goals  of  the  informational  campaign  are  thus  to
undermine the belligerent's ability to conduct effective centrifugal ideologization, as well
as attempt to undermine the legitimacy of its attacks. 
While states are in a clearly advantageous position when it comes to conducting
information warfare – as large states more often than not possess mass communication
networks with a global reach – non-states are also able to conduct information warfare,
though their emphasis is put on creating the message, rather than directly spreading it,
and as  such  depend largely  on more  influential  or  international  media  being  able  or
willing to pick up on their message. An example of this was the Second Lebanon War,
where Hezbollah was able to successfully convey the message they had created by their
actions,  and the outcome of the war would likely have been very different would the
„civilian-victim“ and „disproportionality“ narratives not have been able to penetrate the
international media.  However, the prevalence of social media has alleviated this problem
and provided that non-state entities can spread their message very effectively even without
it being piked up by major news outlets of the international media. Thus social media
provides  non-states  an  alternative  platform  to  conduct  their  information  warfare
campaigns and spreading their message is becoming increasingly easier as the prevalence of
social media as the source of information considered ideologically legitimate rises. 
Furthermore,  the  struggles  on  the  population  battlegrounds  in  the  context  of
103
information warfare reflect  an attempt to diminish the belligerent's ability to conduct
effective centrifugal ideologization by attempting to sow doubt and despair on the enemy
soldiers  ranks,  albeit  it  is  not  exclusively  aimed  at  military  forces,  but  also  on  the
ideological views held by the societies supporting such soldiers. 
Summary
GHW is therefore a strategically defensive concept, more often than not employed
in response to an aggression by a conventionally superior adversary. The strategic notion
of defense manifests itself on the operational level through the fusion of conventional and
irregular forces and tactics aimed at protracting the war and defending the territory. These
tactics include terrorism and criminal activity and can be aided by electronic warfare. A
hybrid adversary of this category fights to defend territory and simultaneously employs
information  warfare  to  undermine  the  effective  centrifugal  ideologization  of  the
belligerent and its legitimacy on the international community. 
Specific Hybrid Warfare
The reason for my attempt to diversify the theory of Hybrid Warfare lies mainly in the
current theoretical underestimation of Hybrid Warfare as an offensive concept. I would
therefore like to propose a new category of Hybrid Warfare called Specific Hybrid Warfare.
I  will  argue  that  when  employed  by  a  state  power  and  aided  by  several  factors  not
previously  classified  as  phenomena  exclusively  associated  with  Hybrid  Warfare,  the
concept  inherits  a  strategically  offensive  value.  It  is  for  this  very  reason  I  coined the
concept of Specific Hybrid Warfare (henceforth referred to as SHW)– as an analytical
category signifying its offensive potential. It is a very specific type of Hybrid Warfare –
hence the name – which exclusively involves a state power – or a strongly centralized
entity possessing the powers traditionally associated with a state – as the main hybrid
threat and while being mainly defensive on the operational level, remains strictly offensive
on the strategic level. This is also reflected by the realization of Gerasimov, who is of the




While the GHW signifies strategically defensive goals, the current category seeks to
pursue offensive strategic goals under the cover of a concurrent defensive nature of the
operational level. Thus, this category describes such a concept of  Hybrid Warfare which
seeks to blur the distinction between offensive and defensive actions: the strategic goal of
this type of warfare is essentially takeover of territory and concurrent defense, if necessary.
The peculiarity of SHW is that the takeover of territory precedes military confrontation
and is a result of the preceding strategic employment of non-military means aimed to
facilitate a coup de'état to be conducted either by a loyal domestic or foreign political-
military elite, backed by either an irregular militia or special operations units of concealed
nature. Such a takeover is preceded by the employment of non-military means aimed at its
facilitation. The strategic conduct is therefore offensive, as the whole strategic goal is to
gain control over certain territory.  Such a takeover can not explicitly be classified as a
conquest, as major military force comes into play only as means of intimidation or as a
subsequent potential defensive measure, rather than a decisive factor in the takeover of
territory. 
SHW serves as  a clear alternative to conventional warfare for state actors,  as it
avoids the deployment of large-scale conventional forces for operational success, and is
thus economically cost-effective. With the inclusion of the non-declaration of war it is also
legally pleasant for the hidden character of the hybrid adversary. However its non-military
initial offensive strategic nature demands certain preconditions on the level of population
battlegrounds for the takeover to be successful.  
Communal level
Any coup de'état without substantial domestic support is likely a failure from the
offset. As potential military confrontation is preceded by a coup de'état, it is desirable that
the takeover of power is efficient and transpires as swiftly as possible. Would the coup
de'état fail, the whole concept becomes worthless as employing Hybrid tactics becomes
complicated on the operational level if control over the territory is not maintained. Thus
the successful takeover demands a predating struggle on the population battlegrounds. 
In comparison with GHW, the communal level poses a much greater challenge for
the hybrid adversary of this category, as one has to retain legitimacy of the campaign not
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only on its domestic population battleground, but also on the indigenous population of
the conflict zone. International community can however be neglected to a degree.
While McCuen argued the international community to be one of the population
battlegrounds where success is necessary for ultimate political victory, he argued this from
the perspective of a belligerent facing a hybrid adversary. SHW does not necessitate such a
need, due to the potential concealed nature of the hybrid adversary. Therefore facing and
defeating  a  hybrid  adversary  poses  crucial  problems  for  military  planners.  When
conducted by a concealed, yet a powerful structural organization – ideally a state power –
the relevance of  the international community has proven to be limp. The takeover of
Crimea proves this adequately. Despite the nearly uniform international condemnation of
the takeover of Crimea, the international community has not taken any meaningful steps
with the potential to reverse the takeover. The sanctions imposed have generally served a
symbolic purpose,  as Crimea has become de facto accepted as a part of Russia,  and I
believe the EU sanctions are likely to be lifted in the following years as their irrelevance to
potentially reverse the situation in Crimea  becomes  accepted. Thus it is likely that the
international  community  is  rendered  irrelevant,  insofar  as  it  refuses to  appreciate  the
ramifications of  SHW.  Furthermore,  the non-declaration of  war allows some states  to
remain indifferent to the situation and as a consequence of this, the international political
community  can  be  rendered  fragile  and  divided,  thus effectively  countering  a  strong
centralized hybrid adversary becomes an unlikely diplomatic scenario.  
Information warfare
While  the international  community becomes increasingly  irrelevant in terms of
SHW,  the  rest  of  the  population  battlegrounds  are  relevant  only  in  the  context  of
information  warfare,  as  it  often  seeks  to  influence  the  opinions  of  all  the  three
battlegrounds defined by McCuen. I argue that to facilitate an operational environment
fertile for a coup de'état the main instrument used to achieve this end in the context of
SHW is information warfare. It seeks to undermine the centrifugal ideologization of the
potential adversary through attempting to destabilize its society and ruling state power by
putting psychological pressure on the population and undermining its social, political and
economic systems. Such a strategy is aimed at the indigenous population of the future
conflict  zone  and  perpetrated  through  the  use  of  media  and  modern  information
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technologies including social networking sites and social media. 
Since such a definition was proposed by the Russian Ministry of Defense,  it  is
perhaps most relevant to compare this theoretical view with the similar practices used by
the Kremlin during the Ukrainian crisis, prior to the direct military-political engagement
in Crimea and Donbass. The Kremlin-backed media frequently aimed to undermine the
political, social and economic systems in the eyes of Crimeans and populations of South-
Eastern Ukraine in order to facilitate a narrative under which the government in Kyiv was
illegitimate and fascist, the state of Ukraine in social upheaval and in a state of anarchy,
and that the Crimeans would be economically  better  off  under Russia,  as opposed to
Ukraine. Such narratives exclusively aimed to undermine Ukrainian political, social and
economic systems and the narrative of a fascist Ukraine as an alternative to friendly Russia
became widespread in the informational zone of the Kremlin, and is perhaps best depicted
by the advertisement campaign of the Crimean referendum.322 The attempts to undermine
the power of the Ukrainian governmental control and its ability to perform centrifugal
ideologization in Crimea proved to be very effective. Rácz observes that the propaganda
and bogus media reports worked efficiently to undermine the morale of the Ukrainian
forces  stationed  in  the  region.323 Thus  it  directly  undermined  the  centrifugal
ideologization of the Ukrainian forces at the region, as they found themselves cut off from
other information sources and often decided to surrender under the pressure of Kremlin's
information warfare. This is further illustrated by the defections which took place in the
Ukrainian navy during the conflict, the most prominent of which was the case of the head
of the Ukrainian navy, Admiral Berezovsky.324
The main difference between the information warfare employed in the context of
SHW and GHW thus lies in the strategic goals information warfare seeks to accomplish.
While in the context of GHW, information warfare is used as a supplement to kinetic
force employed to undermine the adversary and its centrifugal ideologization in order to
bring an end to the military conflict – strategically a defensive action – in SHW the goal
of information warfare is to undermine the adversary and its centrifugal ideologization in
order to facilitate takeover of territory and thereby aid the conduct of  effective conflict
with an attempt to undermine the adversary, its political, social and economic systems –
all of which serves an offensive strategy.
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Cyber warfare
I argue that cyberwarfare is not only becoming increasingly socially relevant in the
future – due to the concept of Internetization – but is already within us, and can occur
either  during  the  times  of  peace,  or  as  strategically  coordinated  with  the  war  effort.
Internetization  already  has  a  strong  effect  on  the  bureaucracies  maintained  by
contemporary  states.  Countries  with  an  increasing  digital  infrastructure  based  on  the
internet are becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyberwarfare. The vulnerability to such
attacks projects an element of weakness on the authorities incapable of deflecting such
attacks,  thereby  in  terms  of  SHW,  cyberwarfare  can  be  considered  as  means  of
information warfare, since the general aim of such a campaign is to penetrate the digital
infrastructure for the purposes of damage or disruption.325 Cyberwarfare can also be used
to demoralize the enemy as an attempt to undermine effective centrifugal ideologization
of the target military or society, as it allows the penetration of foreign internet media and
other information sources for the purposes of spreading propaganda and disinformation.
In the context of  SHW it can  additionally  be used to facilitate  the  „fog of war“
through the penetration and incapacitation of the conflict zone's digital infrastructure, as
well as infrastructure related to the military of the adversary. 
Operational dimension
The operational dimension of Specific Hybrid Warfare conforms to the realization
that contemporary warfare blurs the distinction between offensive and defensive actions,
as major military operations are defensive, but non-militarily or minor military actions are
offensive. The operational dimension reflects the strategic offensive nature of the concept:
major  non-military  means  are  used  to  facilitate  the  coup,  while  military  forces  are
concerned with maintaining control over territory acquired as a result of the coup. This
demands  operational  involvement  of  organized  „irregular“  forces.  Due  to  these
complications I have separated the operational level into two stages: takeover and defense.
Takeover
The potential success of a takeover primarily depends on the success achieved in
the  context  of  the  indigenous  population  battleground  of  the  region.  Offensive
information warfare is utilized to achieve success in the context of this battleground, as
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discussed  earlier.  Gerasimov  spoke  of  asymmetrical  actions  perpetrated  by  special
operations forces and the internal opposition able to create a permanently operating front
through the entire territory of the enemy state, in addition to informational actions.326
Thus the takeover should be preceded by creation or intensification of internal opposition
– supportive of the cause – within the target state. The takeover is materialized through
the use of organized militant groups capable of overtaking the administrative buildings
and resisting possible retaliation and it has to be coordinated throughout the territory for
maximum psychological effect.  Prime successful examples of the such successful recent
takeovers  of  territory  include  Crimea  and  the  Donbass  region,  both  of  which  were
materialized through the use of pro-Russian or exclusively Russian military commanders –
such as Igor Girkin –  in coordination with the capacity of internal opposition within
Crimea  and the  Donbass  regions.  Additionally,  Electronic  Warfare  can  be  utilized  to
undermine  the  adversary's  bureaucratization  of  coercion,  as  Electronic  Warfare  has  a
psychological effect on the soldiers whose equipment is targeted.
Defense
After the successful takeover of territory, it is assumed that the response from the
belligerent  is  an  attempt  to  regain  control  of  the  territory  and  it  is  here  where  the
operationally defensive nature of SHW manifests itself. Thereby, SHW does not centralize
the  military  side  of  the  conflict,  as  its  success  depends  largely  on  the  indigenous
population's  acceptance  of  the  takeover.  The  very  fact  that  there  is  no  preceding
declaration of war by the hybrid adversary allows it to designate attempts of the previous
administrator to regain its territory via military means an act of aggression. In case defense
is necessary, the hybrid adversary will attempt to maintain a concealed nature, and the
potential military standoff occurs within the realms of the previously mentioned „internal
opposition“, that is to say, irregular forces are formed within the territory taken over with
the  support  of  the  hybrid  adversary's  regular  forces  concealed  as  irregulars.  While  in
Crimea, there was no attempt made by the Ukrainian state to regain territory, as it had
been explicitly incorporated into the Russian Federation and would mean an open war
with Russia, the Donbass area remained a secessionist region and an attempt to regain this
territory provided that effective defense was necessary to guard the strategic interests of the
Kremlin. While the mere irregular militias of DPR and LPR proved to be insufficient –
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for  reasons  discussed  earlier  –  Russian  regulars  concealed  as  irregulars  intervened and
provided that Ukrainian conventional force faced a fusion – albeit an incoherent one at
times – of regular and irregular forces which the Ukrainian governmental forces have been
unable to succeed against. 
Summary
Specific Hybrid Warfare is thus a category I have adopted for the sake of advancing
the theory of Hybrid Warfare and highlighting its offensive potency when employed in
coordination with substantial non-military means and by a concealed, yet powerful state
or other strongly centralized structure or organization. However, the practice of this type
of  warfare  is  largely  limited  due  to  special  conditions  necessary  for  takeover  and
maintenance of territory. That is to say it is to a large degree unemployable for taking over
large and ideologically heterogeneous territories. In practice, is has succeeded only in an
operational environment where there exists popular support for the hybrid adversary. Lack
of  uniform support  constitutes  a  sufficient  enough  difficulty  in  achieving  centrifugal
ideologization and bureaucratization of coercion to undermine its successful application.
However, it remains an option for overtaking small territories  or regions  that exhibit a
greater degree of ideological homogeneity  and protest potential in comparison with the
rest of the state it is a part of. In addition, such an ideological homogeneity should be
facilitated prior to the conflict – its successful application demands pre-conflict success on
the population battlegrounds. This is mainly achieved through the realm of information
warfare. 
While  General  Hybrid  Warfare  is  generally  a  defensive  strategy  of  a  weaker
opponent  against  a  conventionally  superior  one,  Specific  Hybrid  Warfare  is  an  ideal
potential offensive strategy conducted against a specific weaker opponent and its allure
stems from the non-declaration of war, its cost-effectiveness and the potential de facto
acceptance  by  the  international  community,  as  I  believe  reaching  an  international
consensus on joint military action is very unlikely, as conformity would prevail over the




In the current debate  all  authors I  have come across  still  employ the general  term of
Hybrid Warfare, and  often  do so by using it  simply as a denoting term for the vague
mixture of irregular, regular and non-military means, whether aided by actions presented
as terrorism and criminality or not. I however argue that Hybrid Warfare embodies not
only  the fusion of  regular,  irregular and non-military means but the concept has also
inherited an offensive value and thus developed further. Therefore it is my opinion that
the term Hybrid Warfare needs to become more nuanced, as in the world of today, we can
observe two largely distinct forms of warfare under the umbrella of this term differing in
many ways. This chapter thus attempted to identify these two distinct forms of warfare by
classifying them as General Hybrid Warfare and Specific Hybrid Warfare and elaborating
on this classification.
While  General  Hybrid Warfare remains  a  strategically  defensive concept,  where
strategic defense manifests itself on the operational level by the fusion of conventional and
irregular forces and tactics aimed at protracting the war and defending territory through
such means, I adopted the concept of Specific Hybrid Warfare to highlight the offensive
potency of Hybrid Warfare, as it is a strategically offensive concept manifest in the goal to
take command over a certain territory followed by the subsequent operational defense of
the territory, would this be necessitated. 
Additionally,  while  General  Hybrid  Warfare  can  be  coupled  with  perceived
terrorism  and  criminality,  the  hybrid  adversary  also  simultaneously  uses  information
warfare with the purpose of both undermining the effective centrifugal ideologization of
the  adversary,  and  battling  against  the  legitimacy  of  its  adversary's  attack  on  the
international  community.  However,  Specific  Hybrid  Warfare  centralizes  information
warfare  from the  start:  it  is  used  to  undermine  the  centrifugal  ideologization  of  the
targeted territory and facilitate its  internal opposition in order to promote an effective
coup de'état. Information warfare therefore serves an offensive strategy and is not aimed at
ending the conflict as is often the case with General Hybrid Warfare, but simply aims to
facilitate conflict. 
While GHW was thus a defensive strategy of a weaker opponent against a superior
conventional opponent as an alternative to a likely lost-from-the-start conventional kinetic
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conflict, Specific Hybrid Warfare is an alternative offensive strategy for a conventionally
superior opponent against a specific weaker opponent as the non-declaration of war gives
such a hybrid adversary a concealed nature, thus alleviating the need to take responsibility
and helps avoid covering for the losses caused by the conflict making it a cost-effective
affair  both  economically  and  legally  when compared  to  conventional  kinetic  conflict.
Additionally I believe the response from the international community to such a conflict is
likely to not be effective enough to have the potential of reversing its results. 
Thus I would argue that future warfare will  not only feature the vague general
Hybrid  Warfare,  but  very  specific  and  elaborated  types  of  Hybrid  Warfare,  as  the
technological advancements and societal change will likely facilitate the further morphing
of  the  concept  and  a  further  elaboration  on  the  subject  becomes  necessary.  While
Hoffman argued that the rise of Hybrid Wars will not likely mean the end of conventional
or traditional warfare,327 I would argue that traditional warfare can become increasingly
peripheral,  as  employing  it  against  a  hybrid  adversary  can mean placing  oneself  in  a
disadvantageous position from the start  with regard to population battlegrounds – an
aspect becoming increasingly relevant in terms of ultimate political victory. The increasing
prevalence of Hybrid Warfare which can effectively counter and neutralize conventional
and traditional warfare – and already replace it in terms of effective offense in terms of
specific smaller territories, as discussed in this chapter – can undermine the effective use of
both conventional and traditional warfare and such forms of warfare can thus become less
likely to be employed in the future – a realization that currently conventionally superior
entities will be reluctant to admit or adopt to, potentially rendering the problems arising
from countering this type of warfare with traditional or conventional means even more




This thesis set out to fulfill a twofold goal: firstly to analyze two contemporary Hybrid
Wars through a historical sociological framework of Siniša Malešević in order to unveil
sociological peculiarities pertaining to the phenomena associated with Hybrid Warfare and
secondly  to  use  this  analysis  as  the  base  for  the  attempt  to  further  elaborate  on  the
definition  of  contemporary  Hybrid  Warfare.  This  work  thus  set  out  to  examine  the
current concepts present in available literature with regard to Hybrid Warfare, in order to
establish a more or less uniform definition which was then applied on the comparative
analysis. By doing so, I was able to determine that the conflicts I analyzed were in fact
representative  of  the  phenomena  associated  with  the  conceptual  understanding  I  had
established. Additionally, I adopted the theoretical framework of Siniša Malešević for such
analysis,  as  he  argued  that  there  have  be  two  historical  process  at  work  in  order  to
guarantee  successful  waging  of  warfare:  cumulative  bureaucratization  of  coercion  and
centrifugal  ideologization.  The  former  refers  to  the  increasing  bureaucratic  nature  of
killing both with regard to rigid hierarchical  institutions  in place to effectively coerce
soldiers, as well as the increasing bureaucratic nature of the methods of killing through the
use of which the emotional contact with the suffering caused on the adversary is bypassed
with increasing efficiency. The latter refers to the particular social institutions capable of
radiating  ideology  and  justifying  both  the  existence  of  such  institutions,  as  well  as
indirectly facilitating warfare by providing it with a just cause through the imposition of a
particular  ideology  or  ideological  narratives.  Through  adopting  the  framework  of
Malešević, I was able to examine the two hybrid conflicts from a historical sociological
perspective in order to see if I can determine any significant similarities and differences in
terms  of  social  and  technological  factors  between  the  two  Hybrid  Wars.  I  was
subsequently able to draw several interesting conclusions from my analysis. 
Firstly, with regard to the Second Lebanon War I was able to establish that the
success of the hybrid adversary – Hezbollah – was largely due to their ability to conduct
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effective  centrifugal  ideologization and bureaucratization of  coercion.  The institutional
and  organizational  layout  and  structure  of  Hezbollah  were  clear  manifestations  of
bureaucratization  of  coercion,  insofar  as  the  members  of  Hezbollah  were  rigidly
commanded by a centralized bureaucratic structure, the constitution of which was directly
aimed at perpetuating warfare and conflict against Israel.
I  was  additionally  able  to  determine  that  bureaucratization  of  coercion  was
intertwined with effective centrifugal ideologization as the latter was also institutionalized
into  the  very  structure  of  Hezbollah.  Particularly,  the  Social  Service  Sector  contained
movements  and organizations  – maintained by  the  central  command of  Hezbollah  –
which  were  directly  responsible  for  indoctrinating  members  of  Hezbollah  as  well  as
attempt to convert Shia Muslims of Lebanon into fighters of the „defensive jihad“.
Lastly, following these observations I also came to a peculiar conclusion with regard
to  the  levels  of  effectiveness  between  the  different  societies  involved  in  perpetuating
warfare. Namely, I argued that liberal democratic and generally open societies are in a
disadvantageous position in terms of military efficiency insofar as they remain keen on
attempting to preserve freedom of speech and press. When facing a hybrid adversary this
becomes a substantial problem, as the hybrid adversaries are generally closed societies with
the ability to exert rigid control over the information flow within the domestic scene and
are thus able to conduct centrifugal ideologization far more efficiently than open societies.
Additionally,  they  can exploit  the  open  nature  of  the  adversary's  society  through the
means  of  information  warfare,  attempting  to  undermine  the  effective  centrifugal
ideologization of the open-natured adversary. 
With regard to the conflict in Ukraine, I was able to draw several peculiar social
conclusions as well.
Firstly, I argued that Ukraine had a hard time achieving centrifugal ideologization
for two reasons:  1) the inherent ideological and historic  divisions within Ukraine: the
West  and  Southern-Eastern  Ukraine  constitute  fundamentally  different  ideological
landscapes where one is prone to hold pro-Western views, while the second firmly holds
pro-Russian views. Ukrainian nationalism is additionally crippled through this division
and provides  that  Ukraine was  by no means  an ideologically  homogeneous  state,  but
rather  constituted  a  diverse  landscape,  comprised  of  various  regions  dominated  by
contrasting majorative ideologies; 2) Information warfare conducted by the Kremlin: the
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aforementioned divisions were an ideal ground on which particular mutually exclusive
propagandist  narratives  could  be  nurtured.  The  strategies  of  information  warfare
employed throughout the conflict aimed to deepen these divisions and aid the „internal
opposition“  within  Ukraine,  as  in  line  with  official  Russian  doctrines  with  regard  to
information warfare. 
Secondly  I  argued  that  the  Ukrainian  state  attempted  to  conduct  effective
centrifugal  ideologization  by  establishing  the  Ministry  of  Information  Policy  which  I
considered an institutional manifestation of centrifugal ideologization. While it does not
directly  enforce  violent  behavior,  it  provides  that  certain  ideological  narratives  are
maintained,  necessary  for  the  social  coercion  of  the  soldiers  sent  to  fight  in  Eastern
Ukraine.  The  Ukrainian  state  has  hence  adopted  a  particular  ideological  narrative
dominated  by  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  position  and  have  institutionalized  the
maintenance of this narrative with the state apparatus.
Thirdly I argued that the both DPR and LPR lacked an ideological or nationalist
substance when excluded both from possible incorporation with Russia, or return into
Ukraine. As a result, they remained largely dependent on Russian ideological narratives
perpetrated by Russian state media.  Subsequently, I argued that it was the initial lack of
both bureaucratization of  coercion as  well  as  centrifugal  ideologization that  facilitated
their  initial  military  failures.  Having  expected  to  be  incorporated  into  Russia,  no
substantial  state-building  operations  that  could  enforce  either  of  these  processes  took
place, as nothing else but a facade of legitimacy necessary to request incorporation into
Russia had initially been established. 
Through this analysis,  I was able to determine that the insight provided by the
theoretical framework of Siniša Malešević can be used as a crucial tool for explaining and
understanding the peculiarities  of  hybrid conflicts  as  well  as  contemporary  warfare  in
general. I was able to confirm that his framework is a powerful tool for social analysis of
not only historic but also contemporary conflicts, as it offers great conceptual perception
of the aim of particular social structures and institutions established and maintained for
the sake of successful warring, providing either cumulative bureaucratization of coercion
or centrifugal ideologization. 
After having observed a number of differences between the two  Hybrid Wars, I
continued by arguing for the changing nature of contemporary warfare. The social and
115
technological  developments  have  provided  grounds  for  new  areas  of  contestation  in
warfare and such developments need to become incorporated into the theories regarding
contemporary warfare. Thus I argued for the need to advance and nuance the theories of
Hybrid Warfare. Based on the observed differences in the two conflicts that I analyzed, I
argued  for  the  potentialy offensive  nature  of  Hybrid  Warfare and thus  proceeded  by
proposing two new analytical categories of Hybrid Warfare: General and Specific.
General Hybrid Warfare retained most of the characteristics traditionally associated
with Hybrid Warfare in the examined western discourse. Thus, General Hybrid Warfare
signifies a defensive strategy where the strategic objectives are defensive, achieved in the
operational  environment  through the fusion of  regular and irregular  forces  employing
irregular  tactics  often  aimed  at  protraction  rather  than  tactical  military  victory.  This
category  engages  the  population  battlegrounds  into  the  conflict  by  making  use  of
information warfare. The strategic goal of such information warfare is to undermine the
adversary and the legitimacy of the adversary's attacks in the context necessary population
battlegrounds.  However,  information  warfare  and  other  non-military  means  are  a
supplement to kinetic conflict, and ultimately support the successful application of the
fusion  of  regular  and  irregular  forces.  I  argue  that  such  a  form of  warfare  is  ideally
employed by non-states, or smaller states as a clear alternative to large scale conventional
warfare, a conflict in which such entities are huge underdogs from the offset.
My Specific  Hybrid  Warfare  is  a  category  signifying  the  offensive  potential  of
Hybrid  Warfare and  is  generally  inspired  by  the  Russian  New-Generation  Warfare.
Specific  Hybrid Warfare  thus signifies  an offensive strategy,  the central  component  of
which is information warfare. In this category, information warfare serves the strategically
offensive goal to facilitate and nurture the „internal opposition“ of a target territory to
such a degree as to render a coup de'état possible.  Once this is  achieved, the coup is
materialized with support from the hybrid adversary of a concealed nature and engaged
militarily  once  the  power  that  had  lost  this  territory  decides  to  retaliate.  Thus  the
operational level – as the hybrid adversary seeks to maintain a concealed nature –  can
become concerned with defensive operations, achieved through the fusion of an irregular
and a regular force of a concealed nature. Such a force is capable of employing a fusion of
both conventional forces and irregular forces and tactics. However, since its application
depends on a variety of factors necessary to facilitate a fertile ground for a coup, it remains
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a  very  specific  type  of  warfare  ideal  for  takeover  of  small  ideologically  homogeneous
territories. I argue that such an offensive strategy is ideally conducted against a specific
weaker  opponent  as  a  clear  alternative  to  conventional  warfare,  as  it  involves  non-
declaration of war, is economically beneficial due to the concealed nature of the hybrid
adversary  and  has  the  potential  of  being  de  facto  accepted  by  the  international
community. 
My contribution to the debate concerning Hybrid Warfare thus centralizes non-
military actions and particular attention is paid to the aspect of information warfare which
clearly  extends  beyond  the  military  sphere,  and  thus  poses  significant  threats  to
conventional opponents disregarding the importance of such campaigns when assessing
their campaigns merely from the perspective of kinetic military campaigns. I believe that
future Hybrid Warfare will thus pose significant, if not insurmountable problems for those
who attempt to maintain strictly kinetic types of responses to hybrid adversaries and their
tactics without centralizing the necessity to battle on the informational arena as well as on
the newly emerged and emerging digital areas of contestation in warfare.   
Recommendations for future research
Technologies and societies  will undoubtedly continue to evolve and thus an increasing
amount  of  research  is  necessary  for  examining  potential  implications  of  these
advancements on the military sphere and contemporary warfare. 
As  examined,  Hybrid  Warfare  has  come  acquainted  with  the  centrality  of
information warfare under which the contemporary cyber warfare flourishes. While I did
not centralize cyber warfare – as I believe it has not yet reached even its mildest potency –
I  do  believe  that  as  the  society  and  technology  evolves,  cyber  warfare  will  become
increasingly relevant in the context of Hybrid Warfare, and further research is necessary on
its impact and possible applications in the framework of Hybrid Warfare. 
Additionally, the contemporary nature of the War in Donbass was a major obstacle
when attempting to gain full comprehension of the conflict. I was unable to provide an
in-depth analysis of the social side of the conflict due to a lack of additional sources as well
as the lack of material in the English language with regard to LPR and DPR. Thus when
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such  material  becomes  available,  future  research  should  be  aimed  at  examining  and
analyzing the specific social organization of the rebel areas as well as evaluate the domestic
public perceptions held in the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk on the subject of the
pseudo-states amidst which the previously Ukrainian citizens suddenly found themselves
in 2014
Lastly, future research can also be aimed at examining the complications that future
automated or robotic warfare can pose on Malešević's theoretical framework used in this
thesis. Automated machinery and weaponry as well as robots need not be bureaucratically
coerced nor ideologized the way humans do and thus it would be necessary to examine the
effects  of  this  on  cumulative  bureaucratization  of  coercion  as  well  as  centrifugal
ideologization of future warriors and populations. 
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